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4 
Introduction 
Disasters, emergencies, incidents, and major incidents – they all come back 
to the same thing regardless of what they are called.  The common 
denominator is that there is loss of life, injury to people and animals and 
damage and destruction of property. 
 
The management of such events relies on four phases: 
 
1. Prevention 
2. Preparation 
3. Response 
4. Recovery 
 
Each of these phases is managed in a different way and often by different 
teams. Here, concentration has been given to phases 2 and 3, with particular 
emphasis on phase 3, Response. 
 
The words used to describe such events are often related to legislation. The 
terminology is detailed later.  However, whatever the description, whenever 
prevention is not possible, or fails, then the need is to respond.   Response is 
always better when the responders are prepared.  Training is a major part of 
response preparation and this book is designed to assist those in the health 
industry who need to be ready when something happens.  One of the training 
packages for responders is the Major Incident Medical Management and 
Support (MIMMS) Course and this work was designed to supplement the 
manual prepared by Hodgetts and Macway-Jones (87) in the UK. 
 
Included is what the health services responder, who may be sent to an event 
in which the main concern is trauma, should know. Concentration is on the 
initial response and does not deal in any detail with hospital reaction, the 
public health aspects, or the mental health support that provides 
psychological help to victims and responders, and which are also essential 
parts of disaster management.  
 
People, in times of disaster, have always been quick to offer assistance.  It is 
now well recognised however, that the ‘enthusiastic amateur’, whilst being a 
well meaning volunteer, isn’t always what is needed.   All too often such 
people have made things worse and have sometimes ended up as victims 
themselves.   There is a place now for volunteers and there probably always 
will be.  The big difference is that these people must be well informed, well 
trained and well practiced if they are to be effective. 
 
Fortunately such people and organisations do exist. Without the work of the 
St John Ambulance, the State Emergency Service, the Rural Fire Service the 
Red Cross and the Volunteer Rescue Association, to mention only a few, our 
response to disasters would be far less effective. 
 
There is a strong history of individuals being available to help the community 
in times of crisis.   Mostly these people were volunteers but there has also 
always been the need for a core of professional support.  In the recent past, 
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professional support mechanisms have been developed from lessons 
learned, particularly to situations that need a rapid and well organised 
response. 
 
As lessons are learned from an analysis of events, philosophy and methods 
have changed.  Our present system is not perfect and perhaps never will be.   
The need for an ‘all-hazards approach’ makes detailed planning very difficult 
and so there will probably always be criticisms about the way an event was 
handled. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, provided we learn from it.   That 
means that this text is certainly not the ‘last word’ and revisions as we learn 
from experience will be inevitable. 
 
Because the author works primarily in New South Wales, many of the 
explanations and examples are specific to that state.  In Australia disaster 
response is a State, rather than a Commonwealth, responsibility and 
consequently, and inevitably, there are differences in management between 
the states and territories within Australia.   With the influence of Emergency 
Management Australia, these differences are being reduced.  This means 
that across state and territory boundaries, assistance is common and 
interstate teams can be deployed and assimilated into the response rapidly, 
safely, effectively and with minimum explanation. This text sets out to 
increase the understanding of what is required, what is in place and how the 
processes of response are managed. 
 
By way of introduction and background, examples are given of those 
situations that have occurred, or could happen.  
 
Man Made Disasters has been divided into two distinct sections. Those which 
are related to structures or transport and those related directly to people.   
The first section, Chapter 3, includes: 
 
• Transport accidents involving land, rail, sea or air vehicles. 
• Collapse of buildings for reasons other than earthquakes or storms. 
• Industrial accidents, including the release of hazardous substances 
and nuclear events. 
 
A second section dealing with the consequences of the direct actions of 
people is separated as Chapter 4, entitled ‘People Disasters’.   Included are: 
 
• Crowd incidents involving sports and entertainment venues. 
• Terrorism 
 
From Chapter 4 on, the emphasis is on the Response phase and deals with 
organisation and response techniques in detail.   
 
Finally there is a section on terminology and abbreviations.   An appendix 
details a typical disaster pack content. 
 
War, the greatest of all man made disasters is not considered in this text. 
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Disasters and Special Incidents From the Past 
Learning From the Past 
History has been well interspersed with stories of disasters.  Details of long 
ago, however, are sometimes sparse, sometimes inaccurate and sometimes 
completely missing.   Accurate collection of data was a low priority for a long 
time.  Much of the data reported will be for the ‘homeless’.  Also of note is 
that most casualty data will be trauma related whilst the long-term 
psychological casualties are usually not recorded. 
 
There is also the fact that what is close to home has more of an impact than 
something that happened far away or long ago, no matter how severe that 
event was. Thus the loss of several friends will cause more emotion than 
reading about mass destruction and loss of life somewhere else in the world.  
Whilst this is understandable, fortunately the presence of modern 
communications, available personnel and a sense of compassion, has meant 
that response to such events from others, sometimes even from other 
countries, is now rapid and effective. 
 
Even when the incident was not recent, we can still learn from what occurred.     
The questions that need to be asked are: 
 
• How did they, the victims, respond? 
• Did they take all precautions? 
• Are we prepared for a similar event? 
• What was learned and what preparations were made?  
• How would we respond in the same or similar situation? 
 
An examination of past events can give some idea of the type of occurrence 
we need to be aware of and the magnitude that we may need to be able to 
cope with. 
 
It is possible to divide disasters into a number of categories – we can sort 
them by when, where, magnitude, cost, or origin.   Magnitude, particularly in 
respect to lives lost, is frequently selected. It is more useful however, from a 
readiness point of view, to look at where and origin. 
 
The origin can be divided into a number of categories.    There are three 
main groupings: 
 
• Natural disasters  
• Disease 
• Man made disasters. 
 
Under the Commonwealth Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, a natural 
disaster includes bushfires, cyclones, earthquakes, floods and storms 
(including hail)(39).   Another natural disaster responsible for a high death and 
injury rate is the heatwave.  Disease is generally thought to be a natural 
disaster, however, these days it can also fall into the second category.     
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Man made disasters include:  
• Vehicle accidents, including air, sea and road 
• Building collapse (other than earthquake or storm related) 
• Industrial accidents and hazardous substance release 
• Terrorism 
 
We define a disaster as being a serious disruption to the community requiring 
special mobilisation of resources other than those normally available(62).  
Over the past there have been many such situations where those at the 
scene would have been totally over-whelmed.   On a world wide basis, the 
table below lists some of the larger natural disasters.   
 
Year Disaster Location Dead 
(Approx) 
1931 Flood China 3 700 000 
1887 Flood Honan Province, China 900 000 
1556 Earthquake Shensi Province, China 830 000 
1970 Cyclone & storm surge Bangladesh 500 000 
1737 Cyclone Calcutta, India 300 000 
1976 Earthquake Tangshan, China 242 000 
1927 Earthquake China 200 000 
1920 Landslide China 200 000 
1923 Earthquake & fire Tokyo-Yokohama, Japan 142 000 
1991 Cyclone Bay of Bengal, 
Bangladesh 
125 000 
1908 Earthquake Messina, Italy 83 000 
1990 Earthquake North West Iraq 60 000 
1755 Earthquake Lisbon, Portugal 60 000 
1949 Flood Guatemala 40 000 
1991 Cyclone Chittagong, Bangladesh 39 000 
1883 Volcanic eruption & tsunami Krakatoa, Indonesia 36 420 
1965 Flood Bangladesh 36 000 
1969 Earthquake Peru 35 000 
1988 Earthquake Armenia, USSR 25 000 
1978 Earthquake Iran 25 000 
1976 Earthquake Guatemala 23 000 
1985 Volcanic eruption & 
mudslide 
Amero, Columbia 20 000 
1970 Landslip Peru 20 000 
1660 Volcanic eruption Mt Etna, Italy 20 000 
1960 Earthquake Agadir, Morocco 17 000 
1977 Cyclones (4) India 14 000 
1968 Earthquake Iran 12 000 
1962 Earthquake Iran 12 000 
1988 Cyclone & storm surge Bangladesh 10 000 
1985 Earthquake Mexico 10 000 
1985 Cyclone & storm surge Bangladesh 10 000 
1972 Earthquake Nicaragua 10 000 
 
Table 1.1- Natural disasters where the death toll was 10 000 or greater (57)
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Note that in table 1.1, whilst deaths are given, the number injured is not and 
injured survivors would be expected to be a far greater number than deaths.  
It is known from the same source that for the 1976 earthquake, whilst there 
were 23 000 dead, there were also 77 000 injured(57).   
 
With regard to man-made disasters, the following are notable: 
 
Year Disaster Location Dead 
(Approx) 
1939-45 World War 2 World wide 51 700 000
1914-18 World War 1 World wide 22 800 000
1989 Angola & Mozambique wars Africa 1 000 000
1930s Mass killings Chelyabinsk, USSR 690 000
1991 Gulf War (U.N./Iraq) Iraq & Kuwait 250 000
1988 Religious war Southern Sudan 260 000
1988 Iraq/Iran war Iran 135 000
1989 Mass killings by troops Romania 80 000
1989 Civil war San Salvador 70 000
1988 Tribal conflicts Burundi/Rwanda 24 000
1989 Troops attack demonstrators Beijing, China 10 000
1989 Total mine deaths for year China 6 000
1988 Iran/Iraq war Halabia, Iraq 3 000
1988 Riots Rangoon, Burma 3 000
1989 Explosion and fire Iraq 2 500
1984 Cyanide gas leak Bhopal, India 2 350
1988 Poison gas attack Kanimasi, Iraq 2 000
1989 Total executions Iran 2 000
1993 Accident Haiti 1 800
1942 Mine accident China 1 570
1989 Riots Mogadishu, Somalia 1 500
1988 Explosion & fire Islamabad, Pakistan 1 000
 
Table 1.2 - Man made disasters with deaths totalling 1 000 or greater (61) 
 
From table 1.2, it can be seen that wars are the greatest of all disasters 
excepting for disease.  World War 1, with a death toll of 22.8 million was also 
accompanied by an injury toll of 21 million.   World War 2, with a death toll of 
51.7 million, also had 4 million injured. 
 
Table 1.3, that of disease, also shows that in 1918, the final year of World 
War 1, not only was the world coming to terms with a death toll of 22.8 
millions but the influenza epidemic of that year added a further 21.6 million 
deaths. 
 
The final category, that of some of the major outbreaks of disease, is shown 
below. 
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Year Disaster Location Dead 
(Approx) 
1347-51 Pandemic – ‘Black Death’ World wide 75 000 000 
1918 Pandemic – influenza World wide 21 640 000 
1989 Epidemic – meningitis Ethiopia 16 000 
1996 Epidemic – meningitis Burkina Faso 4 071 
1996 Epidemic – meningitis Nigeria 3 889 
1995 Epidemic – meningitis Nigeria 3 022 
1988 Famine – cholera Zaire, Angla 2 000 
1996 Epidemic – meningitis Burkina Faso 1 953 
1996 Epidemic – cholera Nigeria 1 342 
1996 Epidemic – malaria Zimbabwe 1 311 
1992 Epidemic – cholera Zambia 1 231 
1997 Epidemic – meningitis Ghana 1 191 
 
Table 1.3 - Major pandemics and epidemics of disease across the world (61) 
 
With regard to epidemics these are now better controlled by well organised 
relief programmes and the availability of antibiotics and vaccines. 
 
Pandemics remain a problem and the morbidity and mortality from these is 
very high.  Malaria remains a major killer with Australia being the only 
inhabited continent (Antarctica is excluded) that is free from this parasitic 
disease.    
 
Recently the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has resulted 
in very high numbers of people dying from AIDS (Acquired Immuno-
Deficiency Syndrome) related illnesses.   Again Australia has been fortunate 
in being able to bring the situation under control very early in the 
development of the pandemic. 
The Australian Situation 
Overall, for Australia, the numbers involved are not as great, however with 
our far smaller population, they are still significant.    
 
Natural disasters are a continuing concern.  Particularly the recurring 
droughts, floods and bushfires.   Tropical storms in the northern parts of 
Australia are a recurring problem. 
 
With experience systems have been developed to deal with bushfires and, 
whilst the frequency has not diminished, the methods of fighting them have 
improved over the years with that experience.  Bushfires are dealt with in 
more detail in the section on natural disasters. 
 
Floods and droughts are not easily controlled.  Droughts are long in 
becoming apparent.  Floods may be short in duration compared to droughts, 
but damage is high.  Control is not generally possible and preparedness 
becomes the main factor in dealing with them.  Learning from the past has 
allowed dealing with such events to become far better organised.    
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As was noted above, in Australia the numbers of victims of disasters is 
relatively small.  This is often due to the sparseness of the population and the 
comparatively low population totals compared to many countries.  However, 
proportionately, the casualty figures are significant for the community. 
 
For Australia, excluding war, the most significant events since the year 1900 
where the death toll was greater than 30 are shown in table 1.4. 
 
Date Disaster Location Dead Injured 
1919 Epidemic – influenza NSW 10 000
1900 Epidemic – bubonic plague NSW,Vic,Qld,WA,NT 550 650
1912 Cyclone Port Hedland, WA 149
1911 Cyclone Cairns, Qld 120
1934 Cyclone Port Douglas/Cairns, 
Qld 
99
1902 Mining accident Mt Kembla, NSW 94
1977 Land transport Granville, NSW 83 213
1921 Mining accident Mt Mulligan, Qld 76
1934 Cyclone Townsville, Qld 75
1974 Cyclone Darwin NT 65
1916 Flood Clermont, Qld 62
1926 Bushfire Gippsland, Vic 60 200
1944 Bushfire Western Districts, Vic 51
1908 Cyclone Broome, WA 50
1923 Cyclone Central Coast NSW 46
1908 Land transport Sunshine, Vic 44 431
1912 Mining accident Queenstown, TAS 42 30
1927 Maritime - Ferry sinking Sydney, NSW 42
1935 Flood Yarra, Vic 35
1926 Bushfire Warburton, Vic 31
 
Table 1.4  Natural disasters and significant accidents in Australia (61) 
 
The above tables are not exhaustive and other events, such as terrorism and 
heatwaves, are covered later in the text. 
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Natural Disasters 
What Are Natural Disasters?  
Natural disasters are those regarded as ‘nature incidents’ or ‘acts of God’. 
These are occurrences over which mankind either has no control, or cannot 
be blamed for.  Quite often, however, some precautions could have been 
taken to mitigate their affects. 
 
Natural disasters are not infrequent.  Often the death toll is enormous.  Whilst 
‘homeless’ numbers are often included, the numbers of those injured are 
often not readily available.  It must be recognised that the recovery from 
natural disasters can often be long and require large amounts of resources.  
Whilst death tolls and casualties can be low, it is often the loss of homes that 
has the greatest impact.  Tables 2.1 to 2.9 in this chapter show some of the 
results from such occurrences.  
 
Australia is subject to most of the varieties of natural disasters.    The only 
exception appears to be the occurrence of tsunamis which are rare in 
Australia in magnitudes that can cause destruction (60). 
 
Natural disasters of significance include: 
 
• earthquakes 
• storm and tempest 
• tsunamis 
• seiches 
• storm surges 
• cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes 
• floods 
• flash floods, landslides and avalanches 
• fires 
• heatwaves. 
  
Each of the above is dealt with separately.   Many of the events are not 
considered to be a major problem in Australia mostly because of the 
population density of the areas effected.  Many of them however are of 
significance and need to be planned for. 
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Earthquakes  
Earthquakes have caused  ` enormous casualties.  The table below shows the 
recorded casualty figures for some notable earth-quakes.  
 
Casualties When Incident Strength (Richter) Dead Injured 
526 Antioch, Syria   250 000  
1668 Anatolia, Turkey –   8 000  
1737 Calcutta, India – earthquake/tsunami  300 000  
1755 Lisbon, Portugal  60 000  
1783 Calabria, Italy   50 000  
1906 San Francisco, USA –  7.9 503 1 000  
1920 Gansu, Peoples Republic of China  8.6 200 000  
1923 Tokyo, Japan   150 000  
1923 Tokyo, Japan   143 000  
1960 Agadir, Morocco – earthquake/tsunami  12 000  
1964 Anchorage, USA  9.2 114  
1970 Yungay, Peru   >10 000  
1970 Chimbote, Peru   66 000 50 000 
1976 T’angshan, Peoples Republic of China  242 000 500 000 
1976 Friuli, Italy   939 3 000 
1985 Mexico City, Mexico –   40 000  
1988 Armenia   50 000  
1992 Cairo, Egypt  >500  
1994 Los Angeles, USA 6.7 57 1 500 
1995 Kobe, Japan 7.2 5 000 21 000 
 
Table 2.1 - Earthquakes and their magnitudes and casualties (100)
 
Measuring Earthquakes 
There are a number of scales used to measure seismic activity.   The most 
commonly used include: 
• Rossi-Forel  
• Richter scale,  
• Modified Mercalli (MM) scale,  
• Japanese Omori  
• European Macroseismic.    
 
The Rossi-Forel scale, developed in 1878, was for many years the most 
widely used scale.     
 
The Richter scale measures total energy (magnitude) whilst the remainder 
give an indication of the intensity of the earthquake.   
 
The Richter scale is an open ended scale indicating  the total energy of the 
occurrence with an increase of one (1) unit being equivalent to an increase of 
ten times the energy, i.e. a logarithmic scale.  This is similar to other scientific 
scales such as the stellar brightness scale for stars and the pH scale for 
acidity. 
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The Richter scale came into use in 1935 and was used against the lowest 
recorded quakes which were given values close to zero.  Since its inception a 
refinement has been made with the introduction of more sensitive equipment 
and, whilst the scale is open-ended, it is now considered that the maximum 
value would be in the order of 9.5.   
 
Most reports of earthquakes give the Richter magnitude value. A Richter 
magnitude 3.0 earthquake is defined as the size event that generates a 
maximum ground motion of 1 mm at 100 km distance.  
 
Using the Richter scale, any earthquake with a magnitude of less than 5 is 
considered to be minor.  The World Book Encyclopaedia says that there are 
on average 1 000 earthquakes a day throughout the world having a 
magnitude of at least 2 (54). 
 
Richter developed his scale for the California, USA, and the region around 
this state.  Adapting the scale to other locations proved to be difficult since 
the geology may be dissimilar thus giving different magnitudes in other 
locations for the same energy. In addition the effects of deep earthquakes 
are different to those of shallow events.  This lead to the development of 
intensity scales. 
 
The Modified Mercalli (MM) scale measures the effects observed on the 
surface. There are two main variants, with slightly different descriptions, of 
the MM scale in use.  These are: 
 
• Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg (MCS) scale 
• Medevedev-Sponheuer-Karnik (MSK) scale.   
 
MM levels range from I to XII.   A seismic occurrence of I is an event having 
an acceleration of  less than 1 cm/sec2 and would not be perceptible.  A 
major disaster would be at XII, with close to total damage, ground distorted 
and objects thrown into the air.  In a level XII earthquake the acceleration 
would be greater than 2 000 cm/sec2. 
 
Rossi-Forel Modified Mercalli 
(MM) 
Omori (Japan) European MSK 
I I 0 I 
I–II II I II 
III III II III 
IV–V IV II–III IV 
V–VI V III V 
VI–VII VI IV VI 
VIII-  VII IV–V VII 
VIII+ to IX- VIII V VIII 
IX+ IX V–VI IX 
X X VI X 
- XI VII XI 
- XII - XII 
 
Table 2.2 - Comparison of four common earthquake intensity scales (3)
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The Japanese scale has seven magnitudes and was based on the 
acceleration of the shock wave and the effect on Japanese buildings about 
the year 1912.  An event at VII (acceleration >4 000 mm/sec) would result in 
all but a few wooden buildings being completely destroyed.  The European 
MSK scale is similar to the MM Scale but is adapted to local conditions(3). 
 
Deaths and injuries from earthquakes in highly populated areas may be high 
but the loss of shelter and communications will usually be the greatest 
problem. 
 
Earthquakes in Australia 
Most people do not regard Australia as being prone to earthquakes.  The 
general consensus is that those countries along the tectonic plates, where 
there is volcanic activity (known as the  ‘Ring of Fire’) are the danger zones.   
So far as severity of earthquakes is concerned, this is so.  However a large 
part of Australia is prone to ‘intra-plate’ earthquakes but these regions are 
mainly outside the populated areas.   Earthquakes with a magnitude of 5 or 
greater, the magnitude of the Newcastle, NSW, earthquake, occur in 
Australia about every 13 months (59).  
 
The map below shows the main earthquake zones in Australia. 
 
 
Darwin 
NT 
Tennant Creek 
Port Hedland 
Alice Springs 
QLD Bucca 
Brisbane SA WA 
Perth NSW 
Newcastle 
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Fig 2.1 - Earthquake zones in Australia (59)
Adelaide
Melbourne 
Canberra VIC 
Sydney 
Goulburn 
Hobart TAS 
From the map, Figure 2.1, it can be seen that much of Western Australia is 
prone to earthquakes but in a region where the population density is low.  In 
other states a number of major cities and more populated regions are also 
subject to earthquakes.  
 
Whilst most of the events recorded for Australian earthquakes have been low 
in intensity and effected areas of low population, there have been significant 
tremors close to more populated areas.  Some of the more significant in 
recent times are shown in Table 2.3 below. 
 
Date Population Centre Strength 
(Richter)
Comments 
Mar 1954 Adelaide, SA 5.4 Considerable damage but no deaths or 
serous injuries reported. 
 
Oct 1968 Meckering, WA 6.9 Considerable damage.  Sixteen minor 
injuries only.  
  
Jan 1988 Tennant Creek, NT 6.3 
6.4 
6.8 
A series of quakes damages 
underground gas pipelines.  Minor 
damage to homes and the hospital. 
 
Dec 
1989 
Newcastle NSW 5.6 Damage at the time was estimated to 
be in the order of $4 500 million.   
Deaths reported were 13 and in 
addition there were 150 serious 
injuries.  
 
Aug 
1994 
Ellalong NSW 5.4 Third highest damage but no deaths or 
serious injuries reported. 
 
Table 2.3 - Major earthquakes in Australia in recent years (60). 
 
Tsunamis 
Associated with earthquakes, are tsunamis.  These are waves resulting from 
earthquakes, landslides or volcanic eruptions occurring undersea. Tsunamis 
were often incorrectly referred to in the past as ‘tidal waves’.    
 
Also known as seismic sea waves, tsunamis travel in open water at high 
speeds. Speeds of 100 metres/sec are common.   In deep water the height of 
the wave at the surface may be only a few metres and consequently ships 
may not even notice them.  When the wave reaches shallow water the speed 
is reduced and the amplitude of the wave is increased.  Tsunamis cross 
oceans and cause destruction many kilometres from the origin of the 
disturbance. 
 
In recent times, Krakatoa, a volcano in the Sunda Straight between Java and 
Sumatra, exploded in 1883.   The results were spectacular with the 
explosions being heard in Australia over 3 500 km from the source.  Ash was 
thrown to height of 80 000 metres into the air.   From this explosion a tsunami 
was generated that reached a wave height of 35 metres.  The death toll in 
coastal towns and villages in Java and Sumatra was estimated at 36 000 (77).   
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Large tsunamis in Australia are considered to be rare. However several 
tsunamis of greater than 1 metre in height have been recorded on the east 
coast of the continent between Brisbane and Hobart and on the west coast 
between Broome and Fremantle over the past 140 years.  A tsunami was 
recorded on the north-west coast of Western Australia in 1994 (132). 
 
There is an aboriginal legend regarding a ‘white wave’ thought to have been 
a tsunami.   There is some evidence that this was linked to a collapse of the 
continental shelf about 50 km off the coast from Wollongong, New South 
Wales.  Other evidence of large tsunamis has also been found in Western 
Australia and Cairns in Queensland (132).    
 
Papua New Guinea, which is situated on the ‘ring of fire’, was subjected to a 
tsunami in 1998.  This resulted from an earthquake, measuring 7.1, off the 
north coast of  Papua New Guinea.  There were three waves.  The first wave, 
three or four metres high, swept many buildings before it.  The second wave 
was far bigger and was estimated at 15 metres.  The shock was localised to 
the extent that villages only 15 km away did not experience any shock at all.   
The death toll was 2 182 with over 9 000 made homeless and many injured.  
Deaths were reported to have been from trauma, drowning and even 
crocodiles (76)(84). 
 
Japan has a history of tsunamis (the word itself is Japanese and is derived 
from tsu meaning harbour and nami meaning wave) resulting from seismic 
activity often many kilometres off shore.   In 1896, Honshu experienced a 
slight tremor.  This was followed by a sudden ebbing of the sea which 
returned as a wave over 30 m high.  The wave washed approximately 160 
km inland.  The official figures were 27 122 dead and 9 247 injured (131). 
 
Japan was badly hit by an earthquake and tsunami in 1923.    This resulted in 
150 000 dead or missing and over 100 000 seriously injured.  In Tokyo there 
were 300 000 buildings destroyed and 1.5 million people left homeless (131). 
 
Seiches  
When an earthquake seismic wave affects bodies of water that are enclosed, 
such as a lake or a harbour, then the result is called a seiche.  The wave 
motion now sloshes back and forth between the shores, something akin to 
rocking a basin of water.   The wave motion may last many hours (60). 
Storms and Tempest 
Storms include such events designated as: 
 
• Cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes 
• Tornadoes 
• Severe Storms 
 
These events are the most common of the natural disaster events and occur 
world wide.  The effects vary depending on the geographical location.  Close 
to the coast then storm surges become an additional complication whilst 
further inland floods, snow and other incidental effects can also complicate 
the situation. 
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Cyclones 
Depending where you are in the world, these events are also known as 
hurricanes (U.S.) or typhoons (Asia).   They are described as consisting of a 
large system of winds rotating about a centre of low atmospheric pressure.   
They rotate in a counter-clockwise direction in the northern hemisphere and 
clockwise in the southern hemisphere.   Cyclones do not occur in the 
equatorial belt (60). 
 
The energy levels of cyclones are enormous and can be equated to the 
energy of up to four hundred 20 megaton atomic bombs (60).  
 
Cyclones vary in both hemispheres due to the presence or absence of land 
masses.  Thus in the south most will form over the oceans.   Outside the 
tropics, cyclones may have diameters of between 1 000 to 4 000 km.  In the 
tropical regions the sizes are much reduced being typically between 100 and 
500 km in diameter.   Tropical cyclones, though smaller than the extra-
tropical, are usually far more violent with wind velocities of 200 km/hr and 
with gusts up to 300 km/hr. 
 
Up until 1978 hurricanes and cyclones were given girls names.  This was 
thought to have come from a novel entitled Storm, by George Stuart, in which 
the hero named a hurricane ‘Mary’.  This was after his girlfriend who, he said, 
gave him more suffering than any natural disaster.   Names now alternate 
between male and female and any name, once used, cannot be used again 
for a period of ten years (51). 
 
In Australia, tropical cyclones are common.  Forming over the Indian Ocean,   
they impact upon the coast north of Perth in Western Australia and on the 
Northern Territory coastal regions.  Most of the Queensland coasts are 
effected and, less commonly, the far north coast of New South Wales.  The 
greatest impact is on those areas that lie north of the Tropic of Capricorn (60). 
  
For Australia the cyclone season is between November and April each year.  
During the season, an average of ten cyclones form in the Australian region.  
Of these six will cross the Australian Coast. 
 
Cyclones are graded for the strength of the wind gusts.   
 
Grade Wind Gusts 
1 Weak cyclone – wind gusts <125 km/h 
2 125 – 169 km/h 
3 170 – 224 km/h 
4 Severe cyclone – wind gusts > 280 km/h 
 
Table 2.4 - Cyclone Grading (60)
 
The deaths and injuries from cyclones can be enormous.   Table 2.5, below 
lists some of the most severe. 
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Year Location Casualties Comments 
1959 Honshu, 
Japan 
4 000 dead, 1 100 
missing and 15 000 
injured 
Typhoon Vera 
1969 South Eastern 
USA 
300 dead Hurricane Camille 
1970 Bangladesh 300 000 to  
500 000 dead 
Surge waves caused a large 
number of the deaths. 
1974 Darwin, 
Australia 
65 dead Cyclone Tracy. City 
evacuated after 90 per cent of 
the buildings were destroyed 
1974 Honduras 3 000 dead Hurricane Fifi.  Death toll was 
half the population. 
1979 Dominica 1 000 dead Hurricane David 
1985 Ganges Delta, 
India 
10 000 dead  
1987 Southern 
England 
19 dead  
1991 Chittagong, 
Bay of Bengal 
70 000 dead  
 
Table 2.5 - Cyclones resulting in significant damage and death (60)
 
In Australia, the most devastating cyclone was that of Mahina which struck 
the Queensland coast in March 1899.  In this cyclone over 400 lives were lost 
when the pearling fleet at Bathurst Bay was destroyed.  Deaths included the 
crews of 100 pearling vessels and 100 local aborigines.  Next to this was 
Cyclone Tracy with 65 deaths but with far higher damage (60). 
 
As in the case of earthquakes, the number of people injured and left 
homeless is very high.  Damage is due to destruction caused by the high 
winds and the frequently accompanying floods and, on the coast, storm 
surges. 
 
Storm Surges 
Many deaths, and much of the damage in coastal regions, associated with 
cyclones are caused by a phenomenon called a storm surge.  This is a far 
greater than usual tidal response caused by the cyclonic system.   Because 
the eye of the cyclone, whilst calm so far as winds are concerned, is at a 
lower atmospheric pressure than normal, the pressure drop allows the sea 
level to rise.   It is common for the sea level to be raised in an area of 60-80 
km diameter to a height of up to 5 metres.  Added to this is the wind effect 
which can blow the raised water onto the coast ahead of the storm.   When a 
storm surge coincides with high tides then the resultant flooding can be 
extensive (37). 
 
Cyclone Tracy was associated with a storm surge of 4 metres but the tide 
was low and the result did not cause flooding (60). 
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Cyclone Eye 
Another danger with cyclones to those in the direct path is the effect of the 
‘eye’.  This is the low pressure centre of the storm.  In the eye, the winds are 
calm and to all intents the danger has passed with the possible exception of 
the storm surges mentioned above.   However this is not so, for as the storm 
moves on then the other edge of the calm reaches the effected area.  When 
this occurs the wind resumes the previous strength, but, because the system 
is spinning, the wind will now be from the opposite direction. 
 
This calm period can be used to begin rescue for those trapped but time will 
be limited and good communications, to ensure sufficient time to return to 
shelter, are essential.   The reversal of the wind direction can also often 
cause already weakened structures to collapse. 
 
Predicting cyclone behaviour is very difficult.  Cyclones may last a few days 
or even several weeks.  They can move at speeds of  25-30 km/h but can 
also remain stationary for a time, move backwards or even move in circles.   
The friction of land masses, after they cross the coast, causes them to 
dissipate with very high rainfall (60). 
 
Tornadoes 
Tornadoes, vortex storms originating from a thunderstorm, have wind speeds 
up to 800 km/hr.   The path is small compared to other storms but they can 
cause considerable damage as they move across the country. 
 
Whilst tornadoes are known throughout the world, the U.S. is the main area 
in which they occur.  The belt formed by the states of Missouri, Oklahoma 
and Texas is known as Tornado Alley.  In the year 1973 over 1 100 
tornadoes were reported.  Second country for frequency, with several 
hundred a year being reported, is Australia.   Perth has reported most 
tornadoes which have moved in from the ocean(60). 
 
Willy-Willy 
There is some confusion about the term willy-willy.  Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(91)  says that a willy-willy is in ‘western Australia a large, travelling, tropical 
cyclone’.  The Macquarie Dictionary (50) defines the term as being a ‘spiralling 
wind, often collecting dust, refuse, etc.’, or alternatively as the Aboriginal term 
for ‘a cyclonic storm’.    Johansen(99) in his work, The Dinkum Dictionary’ 
defines a willy-willy as a ‘gusty, spiralling wind’.   Emergency Management 
Australia, in their text Hazards, Disasters and Survival (60) warn that ‘willie 
willies (or dust devils) should not be confused with tornadoes since they are 
‘smaller, and not usually associated with storms’.  
Severe Storms 
The Australian Bureau of Meteorology divides severe storms into two 
classes(58): 
• Land gales.  
• Severe thunderstorms 
 
Land gales are winds with speed of gale force, i.e. 62 km/hr or greater. 
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A Severe Thunderstorm is defined as one in which there is: 
 
• Hail with diameter of 2 cm or more; or 
• Wind gusts of 90 km/hr or greater; or 
• Flash floods; or 
• Tornadoes; or  
• Any combination of the above. 
 
For most of the populated parts of Australia, severe thunderstorms, often 
associated with hail, lightning, strong winds and heavy rain, cause 
considerable damage each year. Damage is very high with repair cost 
exceeding $100 million each year in the Australian Capital Territory and New 
South Wales alone. 
 
Lightning results in the greatest threat.  There are between five to ten deaths 
from lightning strikes, and over 100 injuries, in Australia every year (58).   
 
Fig 2.2 - Severe storm activity across Australia (59)
 
The map above, showing locations for storms, should not be confused with 
storm frequency. Victoria, which experiences storms across the entire state, 
has fewer storms than does New South Wales.  Melbourne experiences 
between 5 and 10 severe storms per year whilst Sydney has 30 to 40 per 
year, with many of these associated with large hail stones.  Perth is also in 
the high frequency area with 20 to 30 storms per year. 
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Fig 2.3 - Relative frequency of severe thunderstorms across Australia (57)
 
Hailstorms 
Hailstorms are a particular hazard in Australia.   Severe storms are often 
associated with hailstones of varying size which can cause considerable 
damage in addition to death and injury. 
 
The April 1999 hailstorm, which struck Sydney, was regarded as being the 
highest damage-cost event in Australian insurance history with the damage 
costs being estimated at A$1.5 billion. 
 
In the 1999 Sydney storm the size of the hailstones varied across the storm 
path with 37 percent of the reports being ‘tennis ball’ size (6.3 cm).  However 
19 percent reported larger hailstones including reports of ‘cricket ball’ (7 cm), 
‘orange’ (8 cm), six reports of ‘grapefruit’ (10 cm), four of ‘half brick’ (11.5 cm) 
and two as being like ‘rockmelons’ (13 cm) (103).   In this storm there were 
three deaths reported as directly related to the storm and one from lightning.  
Hospitals reported a 50 percent increase in Emergency Department 
presentations in the 24 hours following the storm.   
 
The South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service noted that presentations 
came in two waves, the first with lacerations, fractures and soft tissue injuries 
from contact with the hailstones and the second from injuries to people trying 
to make emergency repairs to their property(103). 
 
Whilst storms with hailstones of this size are rare, with Sydney experiencing 
such storms in 1947 and 1990, hailstorms are relatively common where 
hailstones average less than 5 cm. 
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Some of the results from Australian severe storms are shown in the table 
below. 
 
Date Location Comments 
26 Nov 1971 Canberra, ACT Torrential rain resulted in flash flooding.  
Seven deaths. 
13 Nov 1976 Sandon, VIC Tornado with winds up to 300 km/h.  Two 
deaths when a car lifted several metres 
above road and was thrown 100 metres. 
18 Mar 1990 Sydney, NSW Hailstorm with hailstones up to 8 cm. 
Twenty five serious injuries. 
21 Jan 1991 Sydney, NSW Wind gusts in order of 230 km/h, large 
hailstones and torrential rain. Injuries to 
over 100 people.   Extensive damage. 
22 Jan 1991 Adelaide, SA Tornado and hail caused greatest damage 
since 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. 
22 Nov 1992 Smithton, TAS Tornado caused extensive damage. 
29 Nov 1992 Bucca, QLD Tornado and hailstones reported to ‘cricket 
ball size’ (7 cm). 
15 Oct 1993 Jindalee, NT Winds to 95 km/h.  Hailstones to 5 cm. 
Rainfall of 90 mm/h caused extensive 
flooding. 
23 May 1994 Perth, WA Land gales gusting to 140 km/h.  Two 
deaths and 20 injuries. 
6-8 Nov 1994 SE Australia Land gales wind gusts up to 145 km/h. 
One death and 50 serious injuries.   
16 Apr 1995 Merimbula, NSW Tornado.  Thirty four injured. 
29 Sep 1996 Armidale, NSW Three tornados with hail to 7 cm.  
Considerable damage. 
16 Dec 1998 Brisbane, QLD Severe storm with hailstones to 10 cm.  
Extensive damage caused. 
14 Apr 1999 Sydney, NSW Severe hailstorm with hailstones up to  
13 cm. Record property damage.  One 
death from lightning strike.  Three related 
to storm events. Many injuries from 
hailstones. 
25 Aug 1999 East Fremantle, WA Tornado with wind gusts to 150 km/h.  
Three persons trapped, with one injured, in 
damaged building. 
 
Table 2.6 - Severe storms across Australia (60)
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Flash Floods, Landslides and Avalanches 
Flash flooding is often associated with severe storms.  Land slides, from the 
washing away of the surface, resulting in cutting communications are not 
unusual.   Severe storms cause a greater updraught than ordinary storms 
and this means that the rain is held suspended for a longer period before 
being suddenly released.  Rain deluges can reach up to 200 mm/h and, 
depending on the drainage characteristics, can result in flash floods(58). 
 
Australia is also prone to general flooding resulting from rain in catchment 
areas. The water then moves along the inland river systems, often taking 
considerable time to reach the coast or to inland lake areas before 
dissipating.    Because of the warning systems, whilst communications are 
cut and damage often high, deaths and injuries are few. 
 
Landslides, or to use the British term - landslips, commonly occur in hill 
country following heavy rain storms.   Landslips are also often related to 
earthquakes.  World wide, there have been some massive landslips when, 
for example, in China  in 1920 there were 200 000 killed.   In another 
occurrence 20 000 died as the result of one incident in Peru in 1970 (157).  
 
In Australia, landslips often result in roads being cut and property being 
damaged.   Between 1842 and 1997  there were 74 deaths from landslips in 
Australia(25).  Probably the most noted event was the Thredbo landslip of 
1997.  A large section of the very steep mountainside below the Alpine Way, 
the main highway into the area, collapsed.  Earth, rocks and vegetation slid 
down the slope taking with it a ski lodge.  The lodge then collided with a 
second lodge resulting in both buildings being crushed.  The unstable 
disaster site made  
rescue work very difficult.  There were 18 killed with only one survivor(60).    
 
 
Figure 2.4 - Thredbo Landslip showing demolished ski lodges and extrication work(81). 
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At Gracetown, WA in 1996, a section of cliff broke away and fell on a group 
of spectators who had been sheltering from the rain at a surf carnival.  This 
resulted in nine deaths and a further three being injured (60). 
 
Avalanches are the snow and ice equivalent of landslips.  Australia, whilst 
having extensive winter snow fields, has not recorded any deaths from such 
occurrences.  This is probably due to the relatively gentle slopes involved. 
 
In the U.S. there were 33 fatalities in the year 2000-2001 and a total of 294 
deaths in the fifteen year period from 1985 to 2000.  World wide, there were 
849 deaths recorded in the period 1985-1991.  The largest number for that 
period was France with 180, then Austria with 154, Italy with 140 and 
Switzerland with 138.  During this period the U.S. experienced 68 deaths 
from avalanches(157).    
Fires 
These can be regarded as being in two distinct classes: 
• Urban – where the fire is in a built-up area or industrial complex. 
• Bush or Forest – occurring in uninhabited or farming land. 
 
Even though a fire can cross the urban-bush boundaries, they are controlled 
using different management techniques. 
 
Urban Fires 
Fire has long been regarded as a hazard and has resulted in many deaths 
over time.  Many towns and cities have subjected to devastating fires 
beginning with Rome in AD 64.    At this time Rome had a fire watch 
organisation and a fire fighting system which had been established in the 
year BC 24.  Because of the crowded nature of urban development and the 
high flammability of the materials used in the construction of dwellings, such 
fires could be out of control very quickly.   Whilst damage was often 
extensive, deaths were sometimes low as people were able to escape.   The 
Great Fire of London in 1666, for example, resulted in only six deaths whilst 
most of the city was destroyed (96). 
 
More recently, even with better development and more efficient fire response, 
the more serious fires have been in entertainment venues and deaths and 
injuries resulted from the inability of people to escape.  Some of the more 
serious have been: 
 
Year Location Venue type Casualties 
1903 Chicago, U.S. Theatre 600 dead 
1942 Boston, U.S. Night club 474 dead 
1967 Brussels, Belgium Department store 350 dead 
1972 Osaka, Japan Department store 119 dead 
1974 Kumamato, Japan Department store 99 dead & 100 injured 
1974 San Paulo, Brazil Office block 227 dead & 250 injured. 
1980 Las Vegas, U.S. Hotel 84 dead and 600 injured 
 
Table 2.7 - Serious fires in single venues (96) 
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Bushfires 
Many countries experience forest fires, known in Australia as bushfires.  
 
Australia, because of its environment, is very prone to such fires and there 
have been some very devastating outbreaks.  Fires are generally caused by 
either lightning strikes or by man.  
 
The western part of the U.S. is subject to forest fires as are many areas of 
Africa, particularly on the fringes of the Sahara Desert.  The similarity with the 
Australian situation is that all these regions are also subject to drought as 
well as very high temperatures(131). 
 
Most of such incidents are not disasters in that they are extinguished quickly.   
In Australia, bushfires are generally of two types: 
• Grass fires which occur in farm or scrub country 
• Forest fires that occur in eucalyptus forests. 
 
South eastern Australia is regarded as the most hazardous area of the world 
so far as bushfires are concerned.  The region is subject to drought, and fires 
are driven by seasonal, hot, strong, north-westerly winds.  Rugged terrain, 
shifts in the wind and sparse population, also go toward making bushfire 
control difficult.  In the region, many such fires burn out of control until they 
either exhaust the fuel or are quenched by rain. This may take weeks. 
 
To illustrate the enormity of the problem, in the three week period between 
the 27th December 1993 and the 16th of January 1994, there were over 800 
fires in an area extending from south of Sydney and north to the New South 
Wales/Queensland border in a 100 km wide belt along the coast (13). 
 
Whilst deaths and injuries in most fires are low, there is need for support for 
the fire fighters.  Most of the care will be for minor trauma, smoke effects and 
exhaustion.    
 
In the 2001-2002 Sydney and the South Coast of New South Wales 
bushfires, medical and first aid teams were deployed to support those on the 
ground with teams from St John Ambulance being deployed to perform first 
aid and eye-wash for the effects of smoke. 
 
The need for trained personnel is great in such events and teams often 
respond from other states to aid in an outbreak.   Most such fire-fighters are 
volunteers. 
  
In the U.S., fire fighting with aircraft has been in use since the early 1900s.  
In Australia, the technique is more recent with helicopters being used to 
dump water where there is a high danger to property.  In the 2001-2002 New 
South Wales fires specially adapted helicopters were brought from the U.S. 
to aid local fire-fighters.    
 
Australia has experienced a number of major fires that have caused 
considerable damage to property and to life.   Notable were those shown in 
table 2.8, below. 
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Year Location Comment 
1851 Victoria and South Australia Black Thursday.  Shade 
temperature in Melbourne reached 
47° Celsius.   Ten deaths. 
1939 Victoria Black Friday.  71 deaths. 
1939 New South Wales Extensive fires throughout state. 
Eight deaths. 
1952 Victoria and New South Wales Extensive fires.  Sixteen deaths. 
1957 Blue Mountains – New South 
Wales 
Five deaths. 
1958 Glencoe – South Australia Ash Wednesday.   Eight deaths. 
1967 Southern Tasmania 62 deaths 
1968 New South Wales – Blue 
Mountains and Coastal 
14 deaths 
1969 Victoria Total of 23 deaths with 15 at Lara, 
near Geelong. 
1980 Waterfall – New South Wales Five deaths. 
1983 Victoria and South Australia Ash Wednesday.  76 deaths.  1 100 
injuries required hospital treatment. 
1994 New South Wales Four deaths.  120 serious injuries. 
1997 Victoria Three deaths.  40 serious injuries. 
2001-
02 
New South Wales Extensive fires throughout state. No 
deaths 
 
Table 2.8 - Major bushfires in Australia (18)(110). 
Heatwaves  
Defining a heatwave can be difficult for the average person.  The Emergency 
Management Australia Glossary(62) defines a heatwave as ‘a long lasting 
period with extremely high surface temperature’. The Oxford Dictionary (68) 
and the Macquarie Dictionary (50) agree.  The Encyclopaedia Britannica(94) 
adds a little more in referring to temperatures having to be greater than 32° 
Celsius.   Finally the Emergency Management Australia text, Hazards, 
Disasters and Survival(60) notes that a heatwave is a complex situation 
involving temperature, humidity, air movement and duration. 
 
As has been mentioned with respect to bushfires, there are often periods of 
drought and high environmental temperature in the summer months in many 
parts of the world.   Such conditions cause enormous casualties each year.   
Recently the advent of global warming has raised fears that deaths from heat 
will increase markedly over the next twenty years.   The reports show that in 
the U.S. the deaths from heat waves average 1 500 in the 15 biggest cities 
each year (68). The same reports go on to note that in the 40 year period from 
1936 to 1975, there were over 20 000 deaths in the U.S. from the effects of 
heat and that in 1980 the casualty number reached 1 250 deaths (67). 
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Such deaths are generally due to heat stroke.   In Chicago in July 1995 there 
were 733 deaths which meant mass burials were needed.  The hospital 
system noted that the figures would be inaccurate because many more died 
several weeks or more later and, even amongst the survivors, none of those 
admitted to hospital, and later discharged, had recovered one year later (66). 
 
The effects of heatwaves are often under rated.  For example the U.S. often 
notes the hurricane in Galveston in the year 1900, which resulted in 6 000 
deaths, as its worst disaster, however the following year a heatwave resulted 
in the loss of 9 508 lives.   Los Angeles experienced three heatwaves – 1939 
with 546 deaths, 1955 with 946 deaths and 1963 with 580 deaths.  Each of 
these events had death tolls exceeding the 1906 Los Angeles earthquake 
and fire which resulted in 452 deaths (60). 
 
Similarly the section on bushfires above, notes that the 1939 ‘Black Friday’ 
bushfires resulted in the loss of 71 lives but the heatwave accounted for 438 
lives over the same period (60). 
 
In recent Australian history, only disease and war have resulted in higher 
casualty rates than the effects of heat with figures as shown below. 
 
Year Location Deaths 
1896 southern Australia 437 
1908 South Australia 105 
1908 Remainder of southern Australia 141 
1910 southern Australia 109 
1921 southern Australia 147 
1927 southern Australia 130 
1939 southern Australia 438 (of these 300 were in NSW) 
(further 3 000 seriously effected) 
1940 States of SA, VIC, NSW and 
QLD 
66 (plus 1 200 seriously effected) 
1940 South-Eastern Australia 112 
 
Table 2.9 - Deaths due to heatwaves in Australia over a 50 year period (60)
 
Whilst our population numbers are not as high as those of the U.S., the 
danger for the individuals is the same in Australia.   The Northern Territory 
Government warns that this is probably our most under-rated and least 
studied hazard and almost certainly causes more deaths than any other 
natural hazard with one spell alone accounting for 438 deaths (121).  
 
On a comparative risk level, it should be noted that the deaths in the U.S for 
the 1995 heatwave resulted in 800 deaths in a population of over 240 million 
(a level of 3.3 deaths per million of population).  Compared to this the 
Australian experience was far greater proportionately with 438 fatalities from 
a population of less than 10 million in 1939 (43.8 deaths per million 
population) (61). 
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Man Made Disasters 
As mentioned in the Introduction, for the purpose of this text the category has 
been divided into two distinct sections. Those which are related to structures 
or transport and those related directly to people events, including: 
 
• Transport accidents involving land, rail, sea or air vehicles. 
• Collapse of buildings for reasons other than earthquakes or storms. 
• Industrial accidents,  
Transport Incidents 
In recent times the advent of high speed transport, able to move large 
numbers of people, has resulted in some major incidents, particularly in the 
last fifty or so years with the introduction of large aircraft.  Because of the 
differences between them, each transport type can be considered separately. 
 
Maritime Incidents 
Sea going vessels were the first vehicles that could carry large numbers of 
people and where an incident could result in many deaths or injuries. 
 
Probably the most famous of shipping disasters was that of the Titanic.  The 
Titanic, made its maiden, and last, voyage in April 1912 and struck an 
iceberg in the Atlantic Ocean. Considered to be ‘unsinkable’, the disaster 
caused repercussions throughout the maritime world.   The Titanic, at the 
time of her sinking, carried passengers and crew totalling 2 224 people.  The 
Titanic had lifeboats for only 1 178 (53 percent of those on board).  This 
number of lifeboat places actually exceeded the requirements of the then 
British Board of Trade regulations.  As well as the lifeboat deficiency, 
communications were included in the factors that made this incident such a 
disaster.  Another ship was quite close by at the time but no listening watch 
was kept and so it did not hear the SOS distress calls. A second, unusual 
factor, was that there was no panic amongst those on board(96). 
 
In Australian waters there have been many vessels sunk or wrecked  with 
varying degrees of injury and loss of life.  Since European settlement there 
were 145 such incidents between the years 1788 and 1994 which resulted in 
3 924 deaths reported in the press.   This is not a complete record however 
since a number of vessels were simply recorded as ‘not heard of again’(18). 
 
The Western Australian Museum currently maintains a database of 
Australian shipwrecks (165) and this reference lists 897 wrecks where at least 
one person died.   This listing however includes small boats and launches 
where a single person was aboard and died.  Of those listed, 260 wrecks 
resulted in the loss of more than 100 lives in each event.   Looking at 
transport vessels as a class, the register records the loss of 28 vessels 
resulting in 454 persons losing their lives. 
 
For foreign vessels being wrecked in Australian waters, then the greatest 
loss was that of the Grimenza, a slave trader from China which was lost in 
1853 with more than 650 ‘coolies’ being left on board when the ship sank.  
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Included in the ships lost in Australian waters are two ferries in accidents on 
Sydney Harbour.   The ferry Greycliffe collided with the Tahiti in 1927 with the 
loss of 40 lives. The ferry Rodney was lost in 1938 when she capsized and 
19 persons were drowned (18). 
 
Infowares’ reference, ‘The Worst Disasters’, comments that even with 
modern technology, including satellite navigation and radar, between 350 
and 400 vessels with tonnage of between 6 000 and 800 000, are lost each 
year.   The same source notes that in recent times the most serious 
accidents have involved ferries.   In December 1987, the Dona Paz, a 
Philippines ferry, collided with a tanker.  The resulting explosion and fire 
resulted in the loss of more than 2 000 lives.  There were 30 survivors(96). 
 
Road Transport Accidents 
Most road transport accidents involve cars but, whilst there are many such 
events, the outcome does not usually constitute a major incident.  However, 
when the vehicle involved is a bus then the numbers of killed and injured may 
often reach major incident proportions. 
 
China, according to the Cable News Network, has the world’s worst road toll 
with an average of 300 fatalities a day in the year 2001, an increase of 13 
percent over the previous year.   An examination of reports of major bus 
accidents over the world, for an eighteen month period ending in April 2002, 
showed 42 serious accidents across the world.  The reports show a total of 
720 deaths and 345 injured in these incidents.   Many of the reports however 
do not give the number injured(157).   
 
Date Country Incident Dead Injured Date Country Incident Dead Injured 
Feb 01 China  Bus accident 16 - Oct 01 China Bus accident 20 - 
Feb 01 Australia Bus accident  0 19 Oct 01 Chile Bus/truck  22 - 
Mar 01 China Minibus 
overloaded 
22  - Oct 01 China Bus accident 15 - 
Mar 01 China Bus accident 14 - Nov 01 Indonesia Bus/train crash 20 - 
Apr 01 U.S. High school 
bus crash 
0 >24 Nov 01 China Bus fire 12 - 
May 01 U.S. Soccer bus 
crash 
5 - Dec 01 China Bus accident 13 - 
Jun 01 China Bus crash 18 - Dec 01 Jordan Bus accident 52 - 
Jun 01 U.S. Bus crash 0 22 Dec 01 China Bus collision 28 - 
Jul 01 India Bus plunges 
into river 
22 - Dec 01 Italy Bus fall 2 - 
Jul 01 U.S. Bus accident 0 35 Jan 02 China Bus accident 14 7 
Jul 01 China Bus accident 28 - Feb 02 China Bus in river 11 - 
Jul 01 U.S. Bus accident 0 11 Feb 02 China Bus accident 10 48 
Jul 01 India Bus slides off 
road 
40 - Feb 02 China Bus accident 35 60 
Aug 01 Hawaii Bus slides off 
road 
0 19 Feb 02 Nepal Bus accident 50 - 
Aug 01 U.S. Bus accident 0 33 Feb 02 China Bus accident 10 - 
Aug 01 China Bus accident 32 - Feb 02 China Bus accident 24 - 
Aug 01 U.S. Bus accident 2 - Mar 02 China Bus/truck  15 - 
Aug 01 China Bus accident 32 - Mar 02 China Bus accident 22 - 
Aug 01 China Bus accident 30 - Mar 02 Italy Bus accident 3 2 
Sep 01 China Bus accident 36 - Mar 02 U.S. Bus accident 5 19 
Sep 01 China Bus accident 6 6 Mar 02 China Bus collision 9 32 
Oct 01 U.S. Bus accident 6 - Apr 02 China Bus/truck  19 27 
 
Table 3.1 - Summary of bus accidents across the world over eighteen months (157)  
 
 
38 
 
Australian Road Incidents 
The Australian situation is not as bad as some of the other countries 
mentioned.  For Australia we can obtain statistics more readily for both killed 
and injured and this allows a better understanding of the magnitude of the 
event and what to expect so far as the medical response required. 
 
In Australia, road deaths and injuries have been a significant portion of 
mortality statistics.  In the year 1925 there were 700 deaths on Australian 
roads and the annual rate continued to climb until in 1970 there were 3 798 
deaths.  This was a peak and since then the numbers of deaths, despite 
increases in population and the number of vehicles registered, the number of 
fatalities has dropped.  In the year 1970 the fatality rate was 7.96 per 10 000 
registered vehicles.   In the year 1997 this had dropped to 1.58 per 10 000 
vehicles, an amazing 20 percent of the 1970 figure (133).   
 
Whilst the number of road fatalities (including drivers, passengers, 
pedestrians, motorcyclists and cyclists) was 1 823 for the year 2000 across 
Australia, most of these incidents were not major in that resources and 
numbers did not exceed response facilities. The exception is bus accidents. 
 
With the numbers of passengers in busses, and the lack of seat belts, 
accidents often result in passengers being thrown around.   In a Sydney bus 
accident in 1947, in which a bus overturned on a poor stretch of road, there 
were no fatalities, but 70 of the 80 passengers were taken to hospital for 
treatment with 16 requiring admission.   
 
Of note in this accident was that the first of the 11 ambulances arrived in 
three minutes of the event.  Each ambulance made in the order of eight trips 
and many other wounded were transported by private vehicles (113). 
 
The following statistics were taken from an analysis in which data was 
derived from Australian road safety organisations’ annual statistical reports 
for the twelve year period between the years 1981 – 1993(133). 
 
State/Territory Fatalities Seriously Injured Minor Injuries
Australian Capital Territory 0 0 0
New South Wales 104 828 3 505
Northern Territory 0 0 0
Queensland 31 306 778
South Australia 0 0 0
Tasmania 1 22 57
Victoria 48 835 2 945
Western Australia 24 140 632
TOTALS 208 2 131 7 917
 
Table 3.2 - Summary of casualty figures for bus accidents over the period 1981 –1983(133). 
 
From the above, Paine was able to calculate the injury and fatality ratios for 
bus accidents and concluding that there was one fatality for every 84 
casualties where a bus was involved(132).    
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Included in the period reported above were three exceptional incidents.  The 
bus accidents at Cowper and Clybucca Flat, NSW, both of which occurred in 
1989, and one at Mt Tamborine in Queensland in 1990. 
 
The first of these events was the Cowper accident.  Cowper is on the far 
north coast of NSW near Grafton.   In this event, which occurred on the 20th 
of October 1989, a coach collided with a semitrailer which had veered onto 
the wrong side of the road.  The coach driver tried to avoid the collision but 
was unable to do so and the vehicle ended up in a ditch on the bank of the 
river.  The truck driver, who was killed in the collision, was found to be under 
the influence of ephedrine.  In this event 21 persons were killed and a further 
22 injured (132). 
 
Not long after the Cowper occurrence, on the 22nd of December 1989, a bus 
accident occurred at Clybucca Flat, near Kempsey, NSW.   In this incident, 
two fully loaded tourist coaches collided head-on.   Whilst the Coroner found 
that neither vehicle was speeding at the time of the accident, the combined 
speed on impact was estimated to be in the order of 200 km/h.   Both drivers 
were killed and the impact force tore seats from their mountings and threw 
bodies and contents violently about the interior of the vehicles.   A total of 35 
persons were killed and a further 41 were injured (132).  
 
The third accident occurred at Mt Tamborine in Queensland’s  Gold Coast 
region.  In this event a NSW tour bus went out of control on a steep section 
of roadway and rolled several time before coming to rest against a tree.   
Skid marks for 50 metres showed that the driver had tried to control the 
descent.   A total of 11 persons were killed and 42 were injured (132).    
 
The National Roads and Traffic Authority notes that, after long distance 
domestic air services, the safest form of travel is by bus(113). 
    
Rail Accidents Across the World 
Rail travel is a form of mass transport.  It is utilised both for short distance 
commuter use and for longer hauls between distant locations.  The long 
distance links are used for both passenger and freight haulage.    With the 
advent of air transport, much of the longer links are more likely to be by air 
movement for passengers than by rail in most of the so called ‘western’ 
countries. 
 
Railways, in the modern sense, using steam driven locomotives, first came 
into being in the United Kingdom in 1830 with the Liverpool to Manchester 
railway line.  The construction of this form of transport then spread rapidly 
across the world and in Europe quickly became an international means of 
transport.  In the United States of America, the railroad was considered to 
have been an essential part of the opening up of the country to European 
settlement. (90). 
 
The main advantages of rail transport were that it was cheap and could carry 
large numbers of people compared to other means.   
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World wide, where there are rail networks then there have been accidents.  
Some accidents were due to derailment and others from collision or other 
cause.  The table below lists some of the more notable events where there 
was a collision between trains . 
 
Year Location Killed  Injured
1915 Gretna, United Kingdom 227 200
1953 Tanguwai, New Zealand 151 --
1962 Harmelen, Holland 91 --
1962 Tokyo, Japan 163 300
1975 Moorgate, United Kingdom 42 82
1981 Bihar, India 800 --
1983 Salang, USSR >1 000 --
1988 Clapham, United Kingdom 35 113
1997 Maryland U.S.A 6 0
1999 Paddington, United Kingdom 31 250
1999 Gaisal, West Bengal 303 >200
 
Table 3.3 - Notable rail accidents involving collisions between trains (32)(44)(71)(96). 
 
Rail Accidents in Australia 
In Australia, rail travel commenced in 1854 with the opening of the now 
Melbourne to Port Melbourne steam railway.  The first interstate rail link was 
between Sydney, NSW, and Melbourne, Victoria, and opened in 1883, the 
year of the Eureka Stockade, although at this time there was no common rail 
gauge. 
 
Rail links spread rapidly in the major centres and the first serious rail accident 
in Australia occurred as the result of a derailment at Haslems Creek, site of 
the present Lidcombe, NSW, in 1858 when two persons were killed (18). 
 
The worst rail incident in Australia was the Granville Rail Disaster of 1977.   
In this incident, which occurred at Granville, west of Sydney, NSW, a 
commuter train was derailed as it approached the station.   When the train 
left the tracks it collided with the overhead road bridge stanchions and this 
caused the structure to collapse on top of the train. 
 
As a result of the accident 83 persons were killed and 213 were injured with 
31 requiring admission to hospital.  
 
The Granville accident resulted in many changes to the emergency response 
system in Australia.   One of the first difficulties was site control. Present 
were the dangers of further collapse of the bridge onto the trapped survivors 
and  explosion from leakage of gas from the train’s heating system.   
  
In addition to the above, there were problems of coordination of the rescue 
organisations.  Present were the Police Rescue Squad, the Fire Brigade, 
Ambulance vehicles, emergency medical teams, railway workers and other 
volunteer organisations.   Police also had to deploy 250 officers to control the 
crowd of onlookers which were estimated to be about 5 000 (71). 
 
 
 
41
Australia has an extensive rail network, and in the time since the opening of 
the first rail link, there have been a number of accidents.  The most notable of 
these, up to the year 2000, are listed below. 
 
Location Cause Casualties Year Town State  Dead Injured 
1858 Lidcombe  NSW Derailment 2 -- 
1878 Emu Plains NSW Collision 5 -- 
1881 Jolimont Vic Derailment 4 -- 
1882 Burnley Vic Collision 7 -- 
1884 Werribeee Vic Collision 3 46 
1885 Cootamundra NSW Derailment 7 25 
1887 Windsor Vic Collision 6 154 
1887 Peats Ferry NSW Collision 6 73 
1890 Bathurst NSW Collision 4 -- 
1892 Tarana NSW Derailment 8 -- 
1894 Redfern NSW Collision 11 27 
1901 Sydenham NSW Derailment 7 -- 
1908 Sunshine Vic Collision 44 -- 
1910 Richmond Vic Collision 9 -- 
1913 Murphy’s Creek Qld Collision 6 -- 
1914 Exeter NSW Collision 14 32 
1916 Campania Tas ? 4 39 
1920 Hurstville NSW Collision 5 50 
1920 Wokalup Qld ? 9 -- 
1923 Clapham SA Collision 2 22 
1925 Traverston Qld Derailment 10 28 
1926 Aberdeen NSW Derailment 5 50 
1926 Caulfield Vic Collision 3 153 
1926 Murulla NSW Collision 27 42 
1947 Camp Mountain Qld Derailment 16 38 
1947 Tamaree Qld Collision 8 -- 
1948 Rocky Ponds NSW Derailment 4 19 
1952 Berala NSW Derailment 10 81 
1953 Sydenham NSW Collision 5 748 
1956 Wallumbilla Qld Collision 5 -- 
1960 Bogantungan Qld Bridge Collapse 7 -- 
1969 Violet Town Vic Collision 9 -- 
1976 Glenbrook NSW Collision 1 10 
1977 Granville NSW Derailment 83 213 
1990 Cowan NSW Collision 6 >100 
1996 Hines Hill WA Collision 2 -- 
1998 Robertson NSW Collision 2 0 
1998 Concord West NSW Derailment 1 1 
1999 Zanthus  WA Collision 0 20 
1999 Hornsby NSW Derailment 0 3 
1999 Glenbrook NSW Collision 10 50 
 
Table 3.4 - Australian Rail accidents from commencement of rail to the year 2000 (18) (71). 
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Transport by electric-train in Australia’s two largest cities, Melbourne and 
Sydney, constitutes the largest form of transport for commuters.   Both cities 
have extensive rail networks.   Sydney alone has 2 060 km of tracks in its 
system with 306 railway stations.    
 
ll as seated, there can be over one thousand passengers on 
ach train (40). 
s 
04).  
a total of 88 deaths 
and 961 injuries, show just how significant the risks are. 
Fig 3.1 - Typical commuter train – Tangara model, Sydney, NSW 
 
The Sydney CityRail system operates 2 900 services daily and move almost 
one million passengers to and from work.   For Sydney a typical train is the 
Tangara.  Each carriage has a seating capacity of 120 and a standard train 
consists of eight carriages.  This means that in peak times, with passengers 
standing as we
e
 
In Melbourne the situation is similar.  The Hitachi and Comeng units, which 
form the standard electric-train unit, each has a maximum speed of 115 
km/h.  The units seat in the order of 90 passengers to each car.  Thus a 
standard six car Comeng unit will carry 572 passengers seated or, during 
peak times, what is described as the ‘crush capacity’, of 1 392 passenger
(1
 
From the above, it can be seen that the risk for large casualty figures is high 
however the figures for accidents is very low when movements are 
considered.  Even so, events such as the Sydenham accident in 1953 and 
the Granville derailment in 1977, which accounted for 
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Level Crossing Accidents 
These are comparatively rare when compared to other road accidents.   The 
state of Victoria reported that in the year 1989 there was the highest number 
of such events with 43 as compared to an average of 22(100).  There have 
been a number of incidents where a bus and a train have collided at a level 
crossing in Australia.  Some of the events are shown in the table below. 
 
Year Location Injuries
1943 Wodonga, Vic 25 dead
1944 Brooklyn, NSW 17 dead
1951 Horsham, Vic 11 dead
1952 Boronia, Vic 9 dead
 
Table 3.5 - Significant level crossing accidents involving busses or coaches (71). 
 
Taken in context however, there were a considerable number of what are 
referred to as ‘level crossing occurrences’, that is incidents where the word 
‘occurrence’ is defined as including both accidents where life and property 
were affected or may have done so (16).   The occurrences from the same 
source are shown below for a six month period. 
 
Period NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Australia 
Jan-Jun 
2001 174 0 142 61 3 124 54 558 
 
Table 3.6 – Level crossing occurrences for the six months Jan – Jun 2001(16) 
 
Aircraft Accidents 
Whilst heavier than air aircraft became feasible as the result of the Wright 
brothers experiments in 1903, it was not until two years after the First World 
War that airlines, in the modern sense, came into being in the year 1920(90).   
 
In early aircraft the number of passengers was small but this rapidly grew as 
technology improved.   Statistics are available from the early days of air 
transport and between December 1920 and March 2002, a total of 841 crash 
events involving commercial passenger airlines were reported(105).   It should 
be noted that these statistics only relate to commercial flights and military 
and other civil accidents are not included.  The tables below are extrapolated 
from this data. 
 
One of the factors that becomes apparent when looking at the reports is that 
the number of deaths associated with each event increased rapidly with the 
marked increase in capacity of modern aircraft.   Modern aircraft carry 
anything between 100 and 600 passengers on short or long distant routes.  
These aircraft are designated High Capacity Air Transport. 
 
Reports of accidents mainly report deaths. The high velocities of aircraft, 
coupled with the danger of fire, tend to make survival unlikely where the 
aircraft is airborne.   The table 3.7, below, illustrates this point.  
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Period Incidents Data NotAvailable
Total Av Deaths 
Deaths per incident 
1920-1929 11 - 41 3.7
1930-1939 26 10 148 9.3
1940-1949 25 4 682 32.5
1950-1959 56 1 2 218 40.3
1960-1969 123 - 7 749 63.0
1970-1979 183 1 12 559 69.0
1980-1989 181 - 11 604 64.1
1990-1999 193 - 10 324 53.5
2000-2002 43 - 2 255 52.4
Totals 841 47 580 56.6
 
Table 3.7 - Commercial Aircraft Incidents – 1920 to 2001 (105) 
 
The number of accidents over the eighty or so years looks high, but when 
compared to other means of transport, the accident rate is in fact very low.   It 
is apparent however that the data is not complete, particularly for Australia.   
 
Even though other accidents have been known to occur in Australia that are 
not reported in the table above, the accident rate even so is still low.  The 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau statistics for the ten year period 1991-
2000 reported no fatalities for high capacity air transport and only three fatal 
accidents involving low capacity air transport with 17 deaths(16).    Other 
sources give higher figures for earlier periods.  The table below lists 
commercial aircraft accidents involving fatalities over the period 1934-2001.  
In that period there were a further 16 accidents in which there were no 
fatalities (16). 
 
No. Date Location Fatalities 
1.    3 Oct 1934 Longreach  Qld 3
2.  15 Nov 1934 Barsdale Station  Qld 4
3.  11 Nov 1935 Bay of Bengal 2
4.  18 Jan 1939 Katherine River NT 4
5.  11 Oct 1944 Rose Bay NSW 1
6.  26 Jan 1960 Timor Sea 9
7.  10 Jun 1960 Mackay  Qld 29
8.    5 Aug 1966 Daly River  NT 2
9.  22 Sep 1966 Winton  QLD 24
10.  24 Sep 1966 Tennant Creek  NT 6
11.  29 Dec 1967 Daly waters  NT 6
12.  31 Dec 1968 Port Hedland  WA 31
13.  22 Dec 1969 Gove  NT 5
14.    8 Sep 2000 Burketown  Qld 8
15.    4 Feb 2001 Gapuwiyak  NT 1
Total 135
 
Table 3.8 - Accidents involving commercial aircraft – Australia 1934-2001(16)
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Statistics for aircraft accidents vary considerably from source to source.   An 
article in the Northern Territory News of the 12th of May 2000 noted that 
Qantas, the Australian airline, had an ‘unblemished safety record’ and that ‘in 
the 40 years of jet operations… the airline can still boast having not a single 
crash fatality (95).’   This was repudiated by Shepherd (140) in a letter to the 
Editor in which he reported 16 accidents with fatalities for the airline although 
the accidents quoted were earlier than the 40 year period referred to in the 
earlier article. 
 
The number of fatal accidents in other classes of air transport was higher, as 
shown in the table below. 
 
Fatal 
Accidents 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
High Capacity Air 
Transport 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Low Capacity Air 
Transport 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
            
GA Charter 2 2 4 6 3 6 4 2 3 3 35 
GA Agriculture 1 3 2 4 2 4 5 2 0 3 26 
GA Flying 
Training 
3 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 9 
GA Other Aerial 
Work 
1 1 3 4 4 4 1 2 1 2 23 
GA Private/ 
Business 
14 18 14 9 12 9 7 16 16 8 123 
GA (General 
Aviation) Total 
21 25 22 25 22 23 17 23 21 16 215 
  
 Table 3.9 Fatal Accidents in Australian Aviation for the Ten Year Period 1991-2000(16). 
 
The total of 215 fatal accidents in Australian General Aviation over the ten 
years from 1991-2000 accounted for 374 deaths. As can be seen from table 
3.9, the categories private and business accounted for the most deaths with 
a total of 165 (57.4%). 
 
The high fatality rate for private and business general aviation is reflected in 
the rates per 100 000 flying hours.  This is still very low when compared to 
other forms of transport.  
 
The causes and location of air incidents is also of importance in ensuring that 
a state of readiness exists.  As the table below shows, the majority occur at, 
or close to an airport.   In Australia, the busiest airport is Bankstown, New 
South Wales.  This airport, mainly general aviation and some low capacity air 
transport, handles in the order of 600 000 take-offs and landings a year.  This 
makes the facility the busiest in the southern hemisphere and the sixth 
busiest in the world for movements. 
 
Major international airports such as the Sir Charles Kingsford Smith Airport in 
Sydney, New South Wales, report up to 120 incidents a year and full 
emergency services are always in readiness (16). 
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Table 3.10 summarises the data, where the cause of a fatal crash involving 
high capacity air transport is known, between the years 1920 and 2000. 
 
Incidents Cause of Incident Location 
Per cent Number 
Landing and approach Airport 20.5 162
During take-off Airport 9.0 71
Collision on ground Airport 6.7 53
Windshear  Airport 0.9 7
Total Incidents  37.1% 293
    
Hit mountain, high ground, etc. Flight 11.0 87
Structural, electrical, instrument failure Flight 8.7 69
Engine failure Flight 6.5 51
Weather related, including turbulence  Flight 5.6 44
Crashed, other than hitting high ground Flight 3.9 31
Fire on aircraft Flight 3.4 27
Collision in air Flight 3.1 25
Lost at sea Flight 3.1 25
Shot down, including missile attacks Flight 2.2 17
Explosion Flight 1.4 11
Ice related Flight 1.4 11
Door failure Flight 0.5 4
No fuel Flight 0.5 4
Lightning strike Flight 0.2 2
Total   51.5% 408
    
Bomb Not Stated 3.2 25
Collision, location not stated Not Stated 2.8 22
Crew related, including fatigue and pilot error Not Stated 1.9 15
Other, various Not Stated 1.8 14
Terrorist Not Stated 1.3 10
Bird strike Not Stated 0.4 3
Total  11.4% 89
    
Total Incidents  100.0% 790
 
Table 3.10 - Comparative Location of Incidents (From Lisk (105)) 
 
As can be seen from the table, at least 37 per cent of incidents occur at, or 
close to an airport.   Such incidents, because of the lower velocities involved, 
will often have more survivors than those occurring in mid-flight. 
 
Aircraft accidents often result in all on board being killed. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2001, records  17 aviation disasters in which there were 672 
killed.  Only two of the incidents had survivors.  For one incident, a helicopter 
crashed with 19 deaths and 6 survivors.  The other incident with survivors 
involved a landing accident with 26 deaths and 44 injured (94). 
 
By contrast, on the 15th of April, 2002, an Air China Boeing 767 crashed into 
a mountain in bad weather including fog, rain and strong winds.  In this 38 
survived, including the pilot, with 119 killed (31). 
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Despite the seriousness of accidents in fatality numbers, commercial aircraft 
remain one of the safest forms of transport when measured against actual 
services provided.  The fatality rates compared to flying hours are shown in 
the table below. 
 
Fatality Rate 
per 100 000 
hours 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
High Capacity 
Air Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Low Capacity 
Air Transport 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.120 
 
GA Charter 0.52 0.49 1.01 1.40 0.64 1.24 0.82 0.40 0.59 0.62 0.77 
GA Agriculture 0.91 3.36 1.02 4.60 1.94 3.19 3.65 1.36 0.00 2.58 2.26 
GA Flying 
Training 0.65 0.23 0.00 0.47 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.21 
GA Other Aerial 
Work 0.34 0.38 1.05 1.30 1.29 1.37 0.32 0.63 0.31 0.73 0.77 
GA Private/ 
Business 2.78 3.89 2.91 1.96 2.71 2.01 1.57 5.72 3.70 2.17 2.94 
GA (General 
Aviation) Total 1.20 1.51 1.29 1.47 1.25 1.28 0.92 1.22 1.13 1.00 1.23 
 
Table 3.11 – Fatalities per 100 000 hours flying time in Australian aviation 
for the ten year period 1991-2000(16). 
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Construction Failure 
This section deals with the failure of constructions such as buildings, bridges 
and sport or entertainment venues where that failure was not due to natural 
causes or terrorism. 
 
Structural failure has been found to be due to a number of causes from poor 
design, poor construction, overloading, sheer age or collision with a vehicle.   
Often such failure is totally without warning or within a very short time of the 
danger becoming apparent.  The lack of warning, or short warning time has 
resulted in considerable casualties.   
 
In the case of buildings, the collapse is often described as either explosive or 
implosive.  Implosion is where the building collapses in on itself (this is the 
preferred demolition method) whilst in an explosion the debris are thrown out 
and away from the building.   From a disaster management point of view, the 
difference is in the density of the rubble.  In explosive collapse the debris at 
the site is scattered whereas in the implosion case the debris are piled onto 
the site which has then has implications for search and rescue of the 
ruins(149). 
 
In the case of bridges the most common cause is related to movement of the 
anchor points.  Second to this is collision by shipping.   In the first cause 
there is generally some warning whilst the second, collision from shipping, is 
sudden and tends to result in higher casualties (98). 
 
The 123 of safety (self-scene-survivors) is of considerable importance in 
rescue from collapsed buildings due to the inevitable instability of the 
wreckage.   The preferred method of extrication is the vertical rather than 
horizontal removal of debris.  This means that debris is carefully lifted from 
above with shoring of the excavation rather than pulling from the sides(149).   
This also implies that mobile cranes are required and some form of ready 
access to such equipment is needed by disaster controllers. 
Building Collapse 
Some of the more dramatic of such events are outlined below: 
 
• Chiling, China 2001. Officially 11 died and 32 were injured when 
the building,  a shopping centre, collapsed as 
additional floors were being added and the 
foundations, constructed over a drain, were 
unable to support the weight (157). 
 
• Jerusalem, Israel, 2001. A banquet hall floor suddenly collapsed 
during a function with a total of 24 deaths and 
over 300 injuries resulting from the collapse.   
The cause was suspected to have been poor 
workmanship and a number of people were 
arrested by police.    
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• Kansas, U.S.A 1981. Hyatt Regency Hotel, one year old, at a ‘big-
band’ concert.  Walkways were suspended 
from the ceiling of the lobby and one of these 
was noted to be swaying and bouncing in 
time to the music.  The top walkway suddenly 
broke loose and fell onto a second walkway.  
Both structures fell onto the people on the 
floor.  Deaths were 113 and 186 injured (150). 
 
• Beirut, Lebanon, 2002 A seven story building used as a school 
collapsed onto a road during restoration.  The 
building is said to have imploded.  A total of 
four people were reported as killed with 
‘scores’ injured (21). 
 
The cases illustrated above were sudden and occurred without warning but 
this not always the situation. In some cases warning was given before the 
buildings collapsed.  A number of such cases are detailed below.   
 
• Egypt, 2002  Two buildings collapsed in one day in Egypt.  
One was a five story, residential and 
commercial building including a beauty salon 
on the ground floor.  There were 22 deaths 
(21 were bridal parties preparing for 
weddings) with 25 serious injuries.  Cracks 
had appeared in the walls some days before 
the incident and local residents in the floors 
above the salon had evacuated the building.  
The salon however continued to open for 
business(39).   Poor building regulations, 
unauthorised extension work and shoddy 
construction are blamed for the collapse.  
Rescue attempts used horizontal extraction 
and this was blamed for additional deaths.(21). 
In the second incident a three story building, 
previously condemned by authorities 
collapsed when the wooden supports gave 
way resulting in five deaths (166). 
 
• St Petersburg, 2002 One person was confirmed dead and a 
further seven were missing immediately after 
the collapse of a nine story apartment 
building in Russia.  Cracks had been noted in 
the walls of the building and the residents 
were evacuated.  Within an hour the top 
three floors collapsed followed by total 
collapse of the building(156).  
 
Note the danger of horizontal excavation demonstrated in both the Chinese 
and Egyptian incidents which were reported to be responsible for additional 
deaths. 
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Stadiums and Sports Complexes 
These incidents have usually occurred during an event when the construction 
was filled with spectators and there were no warnings before the collapse.  In 
these incidents, the same rescue method as for buildings should be adopted, 
that is the vertical removal of debris. 
 
Major stadium disasters are more numerous than building events and often 
have involved relatively new structures.  
 
A history of such events is shown below.  Several of these are also 
mentioned separately in Crowd Incidents. 
 
Year Location Comment Dead Injured 
1902 Glasgow, U.K. Stand collapse during 
football match 
25 517
1946 Bolton, U.K. Wall collapse prior to 
commencement of football 
match. 
33 400
1971 Glasgow, U.K. Barriers collapse. 66 140
1985 Brussels, Belgium Wall collapses. 39 ?
1992 Bastia, Corsica Temporary grandstand 
collapses at French Cup 
semi-final. 
17 1 900
2001 Iran Stadium roof caved in during 
a soccer match. 
3 ?
 
Table 3.12 - Sporting facility incidents involving building collapse(30)
 
Bridge Collapses 
There have been a number of major bridge collapses throughout the world 
with sixteen listed since 1876.  Nine were due to design faults, three from 
scour and four from storm damage(8)(98).   One of these failures was 
Australian, that of the King Street Bridge over the Yarra River in Melbourne, 
Victoria.   The cause of the collapse was a design fault coupled with poor 
steel selection(98).   In the case of the King Street Bridge, since the structure 
did not completely collapse, there were no casualties although 
communications were severely disrupted. 
 
Another cause of bridge collapse is that of a vessel passing below the bridge 
deck and colliding with the bridge supports.   For these there is little warning 
and they often occur during busy times and casualties are accordingly higher.  
 
One such incident occurred in Australia in 1975 when the bulk carrier Lake 
Illawarra collided with the support pylon of the Tasman Bridge in Hobart, 
Tasmania.   As a result of the collision the ship sank and four cars crashed 
off the bridge.  The resultant loss of life was 12. 
 
The bridge had to be replaced with ferries during reconstruction which 
resulted in considerable delays in communication. 
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Figure 3.2 - The Tasman Bridge following the collision  with cars overhanging gap(111). 
 
A more recent incident occurred in May 2002 in Webbers Falls, Oklahoma, 
U.S.   In this case a barge collided with the bridge supports causing a section 
of the bridge to collapse.  Fourteen people were killed when they drove over 
the edge.   Because of the slope drivers could not see the destruction and 
most of the cars to go over the gap with a fall of 19 metres to the river were 
travelling at an estimated speed of 112 km/hr (8). 
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Industrial Disasters 
These are frequent and vary considerably in seriousness and areas effected. 
The Disaster Center, in its international database, lists the top 100 
technological disasters of the 20th Century and records 143 000 deaths.  The 
worst of such was an urban fire in Nicaragua in 1972 when 73 000 people 
were killed.  The same source also looks at the cost of such events with one 
event alone, in Indonesia in 1991, costing US$13.2 billion and calculating the 
total for the 100 at US$67.5 billion (157). 
 
Another reference, Draffan (53) examines industrial disasters between 1867 
and 2000.  Most of those listed occurred in the U.S. with a predominance of 
mining accidents.   The author points out that between 1830 and 2000 there 
were 716 mining accidents in the U.S. which accounted for 15 183 lives. 
 
Australia has also had a number of mine disasters.  Between the years 1882 
and 1997 there were a total of 26 incidents where a total of 521 deaths 
occurred.  These are listed below. 
 
Year Location Comment Deaths 
1882 Creswick, Vic Flood 22 
1887 Bulli Colliery, NSW Gas explosion 83 
1889 Newcastle , Hamilton Mine, NSW Fall 11 
1895 Broken Hill , NSW Rock fall 9  
1896 Newcastle, Stockton Mine, NSW Gas 11 
1898 Newcastle, Dudley Colliery, NSW Explosion 15 
1902 Mt Kembla Colliery, NSW Explosion 96 
1904 Charters Towers, Brilliant gold mine, Qld Fire 7 
1904 E Coolgardie, Great Boulder gold mine, WA Mine shaft fall 5 
1908 Mt Morgan, Qld Rock fall (September) 7 
1908 Mt Morgan, Qld Rock fall (November) 5 
1912 North Lyell tin mine, Tas Fire 42 
1921 Mt Mulligan, Qld Explosion 75 
1921 Kalgoorlie, Golden Horseshoe mine, WA Cage falls down shaft. 6 
1923 Bellbird Colliery, NSW Explosion 21 
1926 Redhead Colliery, NSW Explosion 5 
1937 Wonthaggi, Vic Explosion 13 
1954 Collinsville Colliery, Qld Gas 7 
1965 Bulli Colliery, NSW Underground fire 4 
1966 Wyee Coal MiIne, NSW Cave-in 5 
1972 Box Flat Colliery, Qld Explosion 17 
1975 Moura, Kianga Coal Mine Qld Fire and explosion 13 
1977 Agnew nickel mine, WA Fall down shaft 5 
1986 Moura, Kianga Coal Mine Qld Explosion 12 
1994 Moura, Kianga Coal Mine Qld Explosion 11 
1997 Appin, NSW Methane explosion. 14 
Total Fatalities 521 
 
Table 3.13 - Mining Incidents Where Deaths Occurred in Australia (18)
 
 
 
53
Nuclear Incidents 
In the international incidents, Draffan (53) also mentions a number of nuclear 
accidents.  These included: 
 
• Windscale in the U.K., in 1957. 
• Three Mile Island in 1979 in the U.S. 
• Chernobyl in the Ukraine, 1986 
 
Of these the Chernobyl incident was an explosion followed by a graphite fire 
which released radionuclides into the atmosphere.   It is difficult to obtain 
accurate information on the event.   Official reports put the immediate deaths 
as 31 however this has been disputed since the Ukranian government 
reported that there were between 7 000 – 8 000 deaths amongst the clean-
up force alone(108). 
 
Probably the worst industrial incident was at Bhopal in India which occurred 
in 1984.  This was an explosion at a chemical plant.   The explosion released 
a cloud of methyl isocyanate and at least 2 000 people died and a further 50 
000 were injured(108). 
Transport Type Industrial Accidents 
Another type of accident similar in effect to industrial accidents is those 
involving freight.  Death and injuries can be quite low.  However where the 
material is toxic then the problems of safety, isolation and decontamination 
are similar to where buildings are involved.   Such events become HAZMAT 
incidents and require personal protective equipment for responders.   Such 
incidents often mean that communications will be cut for a significant time. 
 
Fig 3.3  Main Sydney-Melbourne Railway Line blocked by derailment 1999(158).  
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Crowd Incidents 
There have been a number of incidents involving crowds over the years. This 
has resulted in a new form of disaster management planning, that of ensuring 
safe mass gatherings. 
 
Over the ten year period from 1979 to 1988 there were 27 serious incidents 
involving crowds.  In the year 1985 alone there were 12 incidents with 213 
dead and at least 555 injured (56). 
 
Between 1964 and 2001 there were no fewer than 28 serious incidents 
involving crowd events.   The table below lists some of the more serious 
occasions. 
 
Year Location Event Dead Injured 
1964 Lima, Peru Olympic qualifying football match. Stampede after goal 
disallowed.  
300 500 
1968 Buenos Aires Crowd stampede following burning paper thrown.  Exit 
doors closed and fans crushed against doors. 
74 ? 
1969 Bethel, U.S. Rock festival with 500 000 in attendance 3 4 000 
1971 Glasgow, U.K. Barriers collapse during football match.  Injuries and deaths 
due to crowd pressure at Ibrox Park. 
66 >200 
1973 Watkins Glen, U.S. Rock festival with 600 000 in attendance.   6 108 
1974 Cairo, Egypt Barriers collapse.  Deaths and injuries due to trampling. 49 ? 
1979 Nigeria Rush by crowd following light failure.  24 27 
1979 St Clairsville.  U.S. Music festival with 40 000 in attendance. 0 3 000 
1981 Piraeus, Greece Fans rush to leave grounds. 24 ? 
1981 Sheffield, U.K. Crowd surge at Hillsborough Stadium. 0 38 
1982 Moscow, Russia Fans leaving stadium at European Cup match, try to return 
after late goal. 
340 ? 
1982 Cali, Columbia Stampede provoked by drunken fans. 24 250 
1985 Mexico City, Mexico Fans trying to force their way into the stadium. 10 29 
1985 Bradford, U.K. Fire in grandstand at soccer match.   Event captured on 
video by T.V. cameras filming match.   
56 200 
1985 Brussels, Belgium Wall collapsed following a riot at the Heysel Stadium. 39 375 
1988 Kathmandu, Nepal Crowd rushes for locked exits to take cover from a hail 
storm at a soccer game. 
90 700 
1989 Sheffield, U.K. Soccer game, Hillsborough Stadium with 50 000 fans.   
Crowd craze – police open gates to alleviate crowding. 
95 400 
1990 Mecca Saudi Arabia Crowd surge in pedestrian tunnel at a religious festival. 1 426 >2 000 
1991 Orkney, South 
Africa 
Fans crushed against fence when fighting breaks out. 40 ? 
1992 Rio D Janeiro, Brazil Fence collapse whilst 150 000 waiting to enter Maracana 
Stadium for championship final. 
0 50 
1994 Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia 
Religious festival attended by estimated  2 500 000 people.  
Stampede during ‘stoning the Devil’. 
270 ? 
1996 Guatemala City Incident at World Cup qualifying match. 83 180 
1999 Minsk, Belarus Crowd of 2 500 at railway station rush to get out of rain. 53 150 
2000 ? Teargas thrown into crowd of 600 young people at end of 
school party.  Panic and building violations prevent escape. 
13 150 
2000 Roskilde, Denmark Crowds at ‘Pearl Jam’ Rock Festival through falls in mud. 9 26 
2001 Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Overcrowding in stadium containing 120 000 designed for 
a maximum of 68 000 results in crowd crush. 
47 >200 
2001 Ghana, South Africa Police fire teargas into crowd after missiles thrown. 126 >200 
2001 Akashi, Japan Poor crowd control measures at fireworks display. 10 120 
 
Table 4.1 - Some crowd  disasters (56)(151). 
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Cause of Casualties 
Most media reports give trampling as the cause of death and injury.  In fact 
most of the deaths are as the result of compressive asphyxia.   Investigations 
following such events have shown steel railings were bent where it would 
require a force of at least 4 500 N (ϕ 450 kg) for such damage.  These forces 
are applied as crowd pressure forces forward from the rear and the front is 
blocked by structures.  At the 1971 Ibrox Park incident in Glasgow, U.K., 
police reported that bodies were piled to a height of 3 metres.  In this 
situation the pressure would be in the order of 4 000 N (ϕ 410 kg) on those at 
the bottom of the pile (69). 
 
The rock concert or music festival situations include other forms of risk that 
can result in casualties (142).  These include: 
 
• Moshing. Described as intense crowd dancing with physical 
contact.  The entire crowd moves in unison often 
with waving arms and slamming into each other (164).  
‘The idea is to enjoy the music in a less than passive 
way’, according to Scott (139) , ‘the idea is not to 
cause harm to each other (even though that’s 
usually the case)’.   Typical injuries include broken 
noses, fractures to the wrists and ankles, contusions 
and cuts and abrasions (144).   Dehydration is not 
uncommon either.  Reputed to have commenced in 
the 18th Century, ‘moshing’ is also known as ‘slam 
dancing’ in some locations (97).  
 
• The Mosh Pit. Moshing takes place in the ‘mosh pit’.   The mosh pit 
is the space in front of the stage.   Some bands are 
reputed to discourage moshing but others 
apparently encourage it.  In 1979 at a ‘Who’ concert 
11 fans died from crowd crush in the mosh pit (97).  In 
the U.S., safety standards allow 2 square feet (0.18 
sq m) per person.   To avoid injury and to allow 
access to any person requiring assistance, it was 
recommended that this be increased to 15 square 
feet (1.39 sq m) but this did not happen(80). 
 
• Crowd Surfing. In ‘crowd surfing’ an individual is hoisted above the 
heads of the crowd and, in a horizontal position, is  
passed hand to hand above the people present (97).  
Injuries often occur if the person is dropped whilst  
fractures and traumatic injuries are not uncommon. 
 
• Stage diving. This is reported to occur at locations where security 
is poor and there is a fairly large crowd.  In this the 
person dives from the edge of the stage, or other 
structure, into the fans below (preferably including a 
good number of their friends to catch them) and then 
‘crowd surfs’.  This the most dangerous of the 
activities (139). 
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Crowd Types 
In order to predict dangers and hazards within crowd activities, such events 
can be categorised into crowd types.   Each type should be managed 
differently.  It should be noted that some events can include more than one 
type or can progress through several types.  Separate planning for each 
phase is required when this can occur. 
 
The following table illustrates some crowd types. 
 
Crowd Type Description 
Ambulatory Walking, usually calm. 
Disability/Limited 
Movement 
Crowd has limited or restricted movement.  Requires 
additional planning. 
Cohesive/Spectator Watching a specific activity. 
Expressive/Revelous Emotional release, for example, cheering movement in unison. 
Participatory Involved in actual event, for example, community fun runs. 
Aggressive/Hostile Initially verbal, open to lawlessness. 
Demonstrator Organised to some degree, for example, pickets, marches. 
Escape/Trampling Danger may be real or imaginary.  
Dense/Suffocating Reduction of individual movement. 
Rushing/Looting Attempt to acquire/obtain/steal something, for example tickets. 
Violent Attacking/terrorism. 
  
Table 4.2 - Crowd Types (24). 
 
Crowd Control  
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) advocates a system in its manual, 
Safe and Health Mass Gatherings (56).   This reference contains the basis for 
planning of crowd events.   The Canadian Government equivalent also 
produces a similar set of guidelines (64).  In the Canadian publication a useful 
set of figures is given for crowd densities.  These are shown below: 
 
• Pedestrians moving in a stream require 25 sq ft (2.32 sq m) to walk 
freely at normal speed and to avoid other people. 
• Walking becomes significantly restricted and speed markedly reduced 
when space is reduced to 10 sq ft (0.93 sq m). 
• Maximum capacity for a corridor/walkway is 5 sq ft (0.46 sq m) per 
person.  Less than this density individual pedestrian mobility becomes 
restricted. 
• Involuntary contact and brushing against others (generally avoided by 
the public and regarded as crowded) occurs at 3 sq ft (0.28 sq m). 
• Less than 2 sq ft (0.18 sq m) per person is regarded as  the danger 
level and crowd forces and psychological pressures begin to develop.  
 
The term ‘craze’, as opposed to ‘panic’, is defined as ‘a group behaviour in 
which there is a temporary, short-lived, competitive rush by a group toward 
some attraction or objective’ (69).  ‘Panic’, almost the opposite, is the fleeing 
from an actual or perceived threat.   
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Fruin(69) points out that craze is often associated with crowds entering an 
event, as for example, trying to get in before the event begins.   Panic is the 
opposite and occurs when the crowd is trying to get out of the site of the 
event because of some real or perceived danger.   A complication of the 
fleeing process is that there is a tendency for people to try to get out the 
same way they came in.   Thus if the normal entry system is to restrict flow, 
to allow for ticket control for example, and to open additional doors at the 
end, then in panic mode, the tendency is to not use the additional exits but to 
converge on the original entrances.   Crowd control must direct people to the 
additional exits. 
 
The Canadian reference (64) , also included in the Australian EMA publication 
(56), gives guidelines for crowd throughput capacities.   These are shown in 
the table below. 
 
Activity Time Requirement 
Collecting tickets • Simple pass-through, one person per 
second. 
• Tear ticket and return stub, two seconds per 
person. 
Doors etc • Door, free swinging, open or gate – with 
queue, one person per second. 
• Revolving door or turnstile – not less than 
two seconds per person. 
Corridors/walkways/ramps 
 
• maximum pedestrian traffic of 25 persons 
per minute for each 1 ft (0.3 m) width. 
Stairs Approximately 16 persons per minute 
upward direction.  (Narrow stairs >5 ft (1.5 
m) wide will reduce the speed). 
Escalators and Moving 
Walkways 
• A standard escalator or walkway is 4 ft (1.2 
m) in width and moving at a rate of 120 ft 
(36 m) per minute will move 100 persons 
per minute under a constant queue. 
 
Table 4.3 - Times required for crowd handling(56) (64)
 
Channelling is of importance in such systems.  These can be formed by 
physical barriers such as stands and ropes, planks and supports or even by 
plastic tape which can be used to form a psychological barrier and guide. 
 
It must be realised from the above discussion that such barriers are only of 
value when there is orderly progress.   Overseas experience, particularly in 
respect to sporting events, has shown that such barriers may need to be 
physically much stronger to control crowds and, for example, to prevent 
spectators from invading the player area.   The disadvantage, as shown from 
the above examples, is that such strong physical barriers can result in the 
crush injuries in the event of crowd surge or panic.  
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Likely Casualties for Crowd Events 
The EMA reference (56) provides guidance as to the likely types of casualties 
to be encountered in the Australian situation and for which response may be 
required.  These include: 
 
• Heatstroke (and exhaustion) dehydration and respiratory distress. 
• Cuts from broken glass and drink-can ring-pulls. 
• Missile injuries from thrown bottles and cans. 
• Fainting and exhaustion from any combination of hysteria, heat or 
alcohol.  At concerts this often occurs at or near the stage barrier.  
• Trampling or crushing (compressive asphyxia) from crowd pressure. 
• Injuries from moshing, crowd surfing or crowd diving. 
• Illicit drug and alcohol abuse. 
• Epilepsy attacks triggered by strobe lighting. 
• Age related illnesses.  
 
Both the EMA(56) and Canadian(64) references include detailed guidance for 
the control of crowd related events.   For the medical support aspects 
another useful guide included in the EMA reference is the inclusion of the St 
John Ambulance Australia guide for the provision of first aid.  This is shown 
below. 
 
Patrons First Aid Personnel First Aid Posts 
500 2  1  
1 000 4  1  
2 000 6  1  
5 000 8  2  
10 000 12  2  
20 000 22+  4  
 
Table 4.4 - Guide to the Provision of First Aid (56)
 
Major events that are not in fixed locations and conducted over a long 
distance, require planning for both on the spot first-aid and for retrieval under 
difficult circumstances.   Such an event is the annual City to Surf fun-run, 
held in Sydney, covering a 14 km course in temperatures in the low twenties. 
In the year 2002 the event attracted close 60 000 participants supported by 2 
500 volunteers and officials, making it the biggest such event in the world.  
Typically this occasion is supported by twelve first aid posts.  Used as a 
training exercise for medical teams, the medical support involves the 
deployment of medical response teams (2 x medical officers + 4 x nurses) as 
well as support from the Ambulance Service and St John Ambulance.  The 
organisation includes medical centres, each capable of resuscitation, as well 
as mobile teams(125). 
 
A further example where the need for flexibility would be involved is in beach 
events where conditions can change rapidly, as for example a sandbank 
collapsing, and many swimmers being put at risk.  In both the examples 
specific planning is required rather than  the usually advocated ‘all hazards’ 
approach.
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Terrorism 
Terrorism again came to world attention on the 11th of September, 2001 with 
the attack on the New York World Trade Center.  This attack, with its 
extensive media coverage, meant a highlighting of the situation and the 
introduction of the ‘war against terrorism’. 
 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (65) defines terrorism as:  
 
"the unlawful use of force against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or 
social objectives."  
 
History of Terrorism 
Historically, terrorism isn’t new.  The Encyclopaedia Britannica 2001 (92) 
dates such activities back to Alexander the Great about 350 BC.  The term in 
use was ‘psychological warfare’.  
 
According to the FBI, the history of biological warfare as a form of terrorism 
began in the 6th Century BC, with the Assyrians poisoning enemy walls.  In 
1346 attackers of a city threw corpses that were infected with what is called 
the Black Death, a form of plague, over the city wall.   On several occasions 
smallpox was used as a biological weapon when the English gave Indians 
assisting the French smallpox-laden blankets during the French and Indian 
War of 1754 to 1767 (65). 
 
For a considerable time terrorist attacks were directed against populations 
and were carried out by governments, political organisations, nationalistic 
groups, religious organisations and ethnic groups.   The Spanish Inquisition, 
Robespierre during the French Revolution which led to his Reign of Terror, 
the Klu Klux Klan and the various Red Army factions are examples of such 
organisations. 
 
There was a change from the mid 19th century when targets became persons 
in power. 
 
More recent conflicts involving the use of terrorism can be seen in such 
disputes as between: 
 
• Algeria and France 
• Palestinians and Israel 
• Republicans and Loyalists in Northern Ireland 
• Internal conflicts between revolutionaries and governments in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Argentina, Sri Lanka, Mozambique and Nepal. 
 
The U.S. based Terrorism Research Center lists eighty six world wide 
terrorist organisations (154). 
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Guerrilla Warfare 
Another form of terrorism is guerrilla warfare.  The word guerrilla comes from 
the Spanish word guerra meaning ‘war’(50).  Basically the objective of guerrilla 
warfare, or as termed by the Marxists, armed propaganda, is to use hit and 
run tactics to harass the enemy until sufficient force can be established to 
defeat them openly. 
 
These tactics have been utilised by most nations and have been used by 
such leaders as T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), Mao Zedong 
(Chairman Mao), Josip Tito, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro (90). 
 
During World War II, guerrilla warfare  was carried out by the French 
Resistance and even Australia was involved in such tactics against the 
Japanese in Burma. 
 
The main basis for both guerrilla tactics and terrorism has been a political 
goal rather than, as in acts of criminal terrorism, the gaining of wealth.  
Major Recent Terrorist Activities 
In the past few years terrorist attacks have changed in that targets are not 
individuals but the general population.  These are carefully planned and, 
more recently, may be suicidal in their implementation.   High publicity is 
included in the objectives in addition to killing or injuring many people. 
 
Lockerbie Air Explosion 
On the 21st of December, 1988 an aircraft in flight exploded from a bomb on 
board.  There were 270 deaths when the plane crashed at Lockerbie in 
Scotland.  The act was attributed to Libyan terrorists.  
 
The Oklahoma City Bombing 
This attack was aimed at the Murrah Federal Building and occurred on the 
19th of April 1995.   In this attack a truck, packed with explosives, demolished 
half of a nine story building.  The blast killed 168 people and over 500 were 
seriously injured (90).  
 
The Tokyo Sarin Incident 
Sarin, a toxic, nerve gas, was released into trains on the Tokyo subway 
system on the 20th of march, 1995. In this event 12 people were killed and 
over 5 500 were injured.  On this occasion early responders became victims 
and there was contamination of hospital staff.  Over 20% of staff involved in 
treating casualties at receiving hospitals became mildly symptomatic.   
Psychologic complications in 60% of the casualties lasted more than six 
months (138). 
 
The World Trade Center 
Total casualties were 3 014, including 479 rescue workers who were killed 
when the towers collapsed, following the deliberate crashing of two aircraft 
into the twin towers of the World Trade Center on the 11th of September 
2001(36). 
 
This incident is examined in detail separately, below. 
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The World Trade Center Terrorist Attack 
This is worth examination in detail since the mode of attack, the numbers 
involved and the disaster management are considerably different to anything 
ever encountered before.  
 
Basically, on the 11th of September 2001, two hijacked aircraft were crashed 
into the twin towers of the World Trade Center at New York City, U.S.   Until 
this time, the building complex was the tallest in the world. 
 
The situation received world wide attention, not only because the casualties 
were the highest of any single incident until then, but because they included 
people from nearly fifty countries. 
 
A Previous Incident 
This was not the first attack on the Center.  In 1993 an explosive filled vehicle 
was detonated in car park of the Center resulting in six deaths and over 1 
000 persons being injured.   Six men were arrested, tried and convicted.  The 
trial judge gave each a prison sentence of 240 years (never therefore to be 
released!) and a restitution fine of US$10 million "just to make sure that you 
never make a dime out of this "(28). 
 
As a result of this incident disaster management plans were reviewed and 
many changes made to the way any such situation would be handled. 
 
The September the 11th Attack 
The following is from a paper presented as part of the Disaster Medicine 
Course conducted at North Ryde, Sydney, NSW, Australia in 2001(36). 
 
The attack of the 11th of September 2001 was different to any that had been 
experienced before anywhere in the world.  The sequence of events was as 
follows: 
 
Time Lapsed  Event 
08:45 0 Passenger jet crashes into the Center’s North Tower  
09:03 18 min Second aircraft crashes into the South Tower  
09:17 32 min All airports closed 
10:05 1 hr 20 min South Tower collapses 
10:28 1 hr 43 min North Tower collapses 
11:02 2 hr 17 min Area south of Canal Street evacuated 
11:16 2 hr 31 min Public Health Response Teams readied 
15:55 7 hr 10 min Injury state – critical 200 and 2 100 total 
16:10 7 hr 25 min Building 7 reported to be on fire 
17:20 8 hr 35 min Building 7 collapses 
19:45 11 hr 00 min 78 Police missing and at least 200 fire fighters killed 
 
Table 4.5 - World Trade Center – Chronology of events (36)
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Casualties 
Accurate casualty figures were difficult to obtain.  Initially the fatalities were 
estimated to be in the order of 6 000.  By December 2001, the fatalities were 
revised to 3 014, including 479 rescue workers who were killed when the 
towers collapsed.   Much of the confusion was due to many people being 
twice reported missing. 
 
The nature of the injuries is also a good indicator for planning for incident 
response.  In this case the nature of injuries was: 
 
• Initial fatalities were those on the aircraft and the impact area and were 
probably at 100 percent of those involved. 
• Burns and trauma associated with aircraft fuel fire. 
• Crush injuries and falls associated with the fire escape stairs. 
• Crush injuries when the buildings collapsed. 
• Trauma from flying debris. 
• Eye and respiratory tract problems from the dust cloud. 
 
Long term effects would include injuries and infections associated with 
trauma, chronic lung and eye conditions and psychoses. 
 
At the time there was a very quick community reaction due to the nature of 
the event and the press coverage.  The community impact was expressed 
by: 
 
• Initial shock, horror and disbelief (some panic but not a lot). 
• Fear, expressed by purchases of gas masks. 
• Anger, with demands for reprisal. 
• Cancellation of travel and holidays. 
• Extreme caution, expressed as ‘jumping at shadows’. 
• The long term includes psychoses, recriminations with a need to blame 
the perpetrators as well as ‘those who should have protected us’. 
 
Command and Control 
Command and Control aspects in New York City (NYC) were initiated within 
minutes.  The response notified and activated: 
 
• NYC Mayor’s Office 
• NYC Office of Emergency Management 
• NYC Emergency Medical Service (already alerted via emergency 911 
calls) 
• US Federal Government 
• FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
• CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 
• Secret Service notify President (approx 30 minutes) 
• NYC Port Authority 
• US Defence, Health and Human Services (HHS) 
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Following local, that is New York City and New York State, responses, there 
was also a national response as federal disaster plans were activated.   
These occurred within hours of the event and included: 
 
• US President declared a Major Disaster and activated the Federal 
Response Plan which is administered by the Federal Emergency 
Response Agency (FEMA). 
• Military alerted – national and international. 
• US embassies and International Assets alerted. 
• United nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
other allies told of the situation. 
 
FEMA is an organisation that can initiate an Emergency Support Function to 
coordinate response operations and the restoration of transport 
infrastructure. 
  
The medical response occurred within minutes as emergency calls were 
made.  The emergency response plan had been modified following the 1993 
bombing and as a result: 
 
• NYC EMS Communications Center activated: 
 Ambulances (52 agencies) 
 NY Fire Department Rescue and Paramedic personnel (many 
entered the building before the collapse). 
• NYC EMS activated City Wide Emergency Medical Action Plan 
(EMAP). 
• Receiving hospitals (54) alerted. 
• On-site Incident Management System activated. 
 
An Incident Management System Unit arrived at the site to survey the scene 
and to establish local operational facilities. 
 
In addition: 
• The US Department of Health and Human Services activated the 
National Disaster Medical System (part of the Federal Response Plan). 
• Total of 80 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams were activated. 
• Total of 7 000 private sector personnel placed on alert. 
• Disaster Mortuary Teams were activated. 
• The Communicable Diseases Center was alerted. 
• The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile placed on standby.  
 
Other assistance is available through the US Federal agencies when State 
resources are exhausted.  This is similar to the Bronze-Silver-Gold response 
of other countries.   
 
Transport became a problem for the World Trade Center event when: 
• Airports were closed 36 minutes after the event. 
• All bridges and tunnels in NYC were closed 36 minutes later. 
• Subways and bus services were closed for six and half hours following 
the event. 
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As well as the above, other factors involved were: 
 
• Emergency vehicles were destroyed at the site when the buildings 
collapsed. 
• Building rubble following the collapse blocked access to the site and 
complicated the removal of victims. 
• Airport closures limited access to outside resources. 
• Military involvement occurred very early in the process. 
 
Figure 4.1 - World Trade Center Tower collapses(29)
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Disaster Victim Identification 
Disaster victim identification was a major issue immediately.  Rescuers 
anticipated that there would be in the order of 6 000 fatalities and procedures 
were put into place with that order of magnitude in mind. 
 
Initially few bodies were recovered and these were mostly those who were 
leaving the building at the time of the collapse. There were also the bodies of 
rescue workers killed in the collapse and retrieved by their colleagues. 
 
As work progressed, many body parts were collected and these were tagged 
and stored for later DNA identification. 
 
Many foreign nationals were listed as ‘missing’.   In addition many thousands 
of nationals were also listed as missing.   This resulted in ‘Have you seen my 
daughter… ‘ photographs being displayed publicly and in newspapers as the 
search continued.   Death certificates were issued, and funerals were held, 
where possible, but for many the grief continued with little hope. 
 
Mental Health 
This text does not deal with the long term aspects of disaster management 
being restricted principally to preparation and response.  However, in the 
World Trade Center incident, mental health response was almost immediate. 
This included the establishment of ‘hot-lines’ to answer enquiries, and advice 
on ‘how to tell your children’. 
 
Long term mental health issues are expected to continue for many years and 
for many, the affects will last their lives.  
  
The Media 
In this event the media were used to great effect.  The media were able to 
play a key role in the early stages by providing a medium for urgent 
communication.  For many people the only source of information was by way 
of media reports. 
 
Principal use of the media was toward: 
 
• Provision live footage from television cameras which was of value to 
controllers. 
• The alerting of those emergency workers who were not on-call to 
‘stand-by’ 
• Publicising the emergency information phone numbers. 
• Broadcasting urgent public notices. 
• Unifying the community. 
 
The Lessons 
The World Trade Center event emphasised a number of the fundamentals of 
disaster management, principally: 
 
• Expect the unexpected 
• For effective control there is need for an all ‘hazards approach’. 
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As well as the two main principles quoted above the event also showed that 
disaster plans must be flexible.  In this event the factors included: 
 
• Plane(s) crash. 
• Building fire. 
• Building(s) collapse. 
• Loss of over 300 emergency personnel and their equipment. 
 
In conclusion, the event confirmed the need for planning and preparation for 
the reaction to an event that gave no warning. 
Terrorism and Australia 
Australia has not been without terrorist attacks although not to the same 
extent as other countries. 
 
Bombings have included: 
 
Year Location Occurrence Casualties 
1986 Melbourne, 
Vic 
Car bomb explodes outside the 
Russell Street Police Head 
Quarters 
1 death and 20 
injuries 
1972 Sydney, NSW Bombs exploded outside two 
Yugoslav travel agencies 
 
1978 Sydney, NSW Bomb explodes outside Hilton 
Hotel where Commonwealth 
Heads of Government are 
meeting 
3 deaths 
1980 Sydney, NSW Bomb explodes in Woolworth’s 
Town Hall store in extortion 
attempt. 
 
1984 Sydney, NSW Bomb in home of Family Court 
judge. 
1 injured 
1984 Sydney, NSW Bomb explosion in Family 
Court, Parramatta 
 
1984 Sydney, NSW Bomb in home of Family Court 
judge. 
1 dead and 1 
injured 
1985 Sydney, NSW Explosion at Jehovah’s Witness 
Hall at Casula 
1 dead and 48 
injured 
1986 Melbourne, 
Vic 
Bomb at Turkish Consulate. 1 dead (bomber) 
1992 Katoomba, 
NSW 
Bomb at Blue Mountains City 
Council chambers 
 
1994 Adelaide, SA Letter bomb at National Crime 
Authority Adelaide Head 
Quarters  
1 dead and 5 
injured 
 
Table 4.6 Terrorist bombings in Australia(18)
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Terrorism of a Different Sort 
Port Arthur 
Terrorism is usually defined as having a political motive however sometimes 
the acts are just as horrific but are perpetrated for other reasons.  In Australia 
such an event would include the Port Arthur Disaster in which a sociopathic 
gunman opened fire at tourists at the historic Port Arthur site in Tasmania on 
the 28th of April 1996. 
 
The gunman had pre-planned his actions and shot and killed 35 people and 
seriously injured a further 18.  Described as ‘spree killing’ , this incident was 
the worst ever in the world to that time (20). 
 
The incident was also marked by a number of other factors, one of which was 
a very well organised response. 
 
Because of relative isolation, initial response involved site staff, two local 
doctors and three ambulances.  Of concern was that at that time the 
whereabouts of the gunman was not known.  In support of these personnel, 
additional road ambulances and three helicopters were despatched to the 
scene. The incident began at 1:30 pm and it was not until between 3:00 pm 
and 4:15 pm that the first five seriously injured could be transported by 
helicopter to the Royal Hobart Hospital. Helicopters were required to land in 
the Hobart Domain, approximately one kilometre from the hospital(167). 
 
In this event there were a number of factors that assisted in the response 
according to Dr S Wilkinson, Chief of Surgery to the Royal Hobart Hospital 
(167) these being: 
 
• The weather was clear. 
• Ambulance demands were less than normal. 
• Two extra helicopters and a crew were available. 
• Eighteen volunteer ambulance officers were in Hobart on a course. 
• An EMST (Early Management of Severe Trauma) course had just 
finished. 
• The ‘Code Brown’ call came at the change of a nursing shift, thereby 
increasing the number of staff available. 
• The area around Port Arthur was popular for emergency exercises thus 
making the location well known. 
• The ‘Code Brown’ protocol had just been revised and an Emergency 
Services workshop held one week before. 
 
All the above resulted in staff at the Royal Hobart Hospital, the only tertiary 
hospital in the region, being able to cope with the initial response in a very 
orderly manner. 
 
The aftermath was severe mental health problems, with the hospital having 
received all the bodies and all the injured as well as the then injured gunman.  
The presence of the gunman led to bomb threats.  Patients and staff were 
stressed.   
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There were ethical issues.  All visitors to the hospital were searched for 
weapons on entry.  International, as well as local, media interest meant that 
the hospital was besieged by reporters. 
 
A final outcome was the effectiveness of the anti-gun lobby which saw very 
stringent gun laws introduced across the country. 
 
White Powder 
Following the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September 2001 in the U.S., 
another form of terrorism was released on the population.  This was the 
anthrax scare.   In the U.S. a number of booby-trapped packages were found 
which contained anthrax spores and several deaths resulted.  This is a form 
of biological terrorism. 
 
In Australia there was considerable fear and a large number of situations 
were reported and dealt with.   The fear resulted in the A/Commonwealth 
Chief Health Officer and the Chief Health Officers of the States and 
Territories releasing a fact sheet which was circulated to medical 
practioners(42).        
 
The fact sheet warned that if there was a fear from either the patient or the 
doctor that anthrax could be involved then the police should be informed 
immediately and the patient isolated.   In Australia there have been cases of 
anthrax over a long period.  Though rare, it is usually associated with 
herbivores and particularly with sheep.  The common name was wool sorter’s 
disease.   The disease is now controlled by vaccination.  The disease is 
zoonotic and is not spread from person to person.  It responds well to 
antibiotic treatment. 
 
The main fear is associated with the possibility of genetically changed strains 
that are resistant to antibiotics.  The spread in terrorism was typically by the 
use of a ‘white powder’.   The powder was spread to the atmosphere by 
some form of propellent and inhaled by the victim.  Inhalation anthrax is 
normally rare and whilst it may be life threatening although it responds well to 
early treatment. 
 
The success of the terrorism can probably best be related to the enormous 
amount of fear and time lost in testing, decontaminating and reassuring.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Five Cs & Safety 
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Command, Control, Communication, Coordination,  
Cooperation & Safety First 
MIMMS (Major Incident Medical Management and Support) uses the first 
three terms as key contributors to success, Command, Control and 
Communication and goes on to say ‘without them you get Chaos, Crisis and 
Confusion’ (85). 
 
In Australia it is more common to use an additional two, to make five, key  
words in major incident management (33): 
• Command 
• Control 
• Communication 
• Coordination 
• Cooperation. 
 
In general, as distinct to disaster management, use each of these terms may 
have both a different meaning and application which can be confusing when 
there is a range of interpretations as to how they are applied.  In the incident 
response context the terms have precise applications and knowing who is in 
command or control or who coordinates is essential for good management. 
 
Communication is dealt with separately in this text. 
Command 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘command’ as to ‘have authority over, 
control of, be supreme’(68). 
 
In defining command, Emergency Management Australia notes that this 
relates to a single organisation (health, fire, police…) and is the management 
and direction of that organisation’s members and resources in its roles and 
tasks(55). 
 
The principle is that one organisation cannot command personnel from 
another organisation. 
 
The Emergency Management Australia’s, Commonwealth Counter Disaster 
Concepts and Principles makes the point that command and control must be 
established and clearly specified prior to any incident and any such decision 
cannot wait until an incident occurs.   The same text, dealing with 
coordination, also notes that most problems relate to coordinating resources 
rather than a lack of resources(55). 
 
A later publication, Manual 3 – Australian Emergency Management Glossary, 
1998 (p21)(62) defines the term as; 
 
 ‘Command.  The direction of members and resources of an 
organisation in the performance of the organisation’s role 
and tasks.  Authority to command is established in legislation 
or by agreement with an organisation.’ 
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Control 
Using the Concise Oxford Dictionary (68) to define ‘control’ confuses the issue 
since this reference defines the word as meaning ‘having the power to direct 
or to command’. 
 
The Australian Emergency Management Glossary (ibid, p 25) defines the 
term as being (62): 
 
 Control.  The overall direction of emergency management 
 activities in an emergency situation.  Authority for control 
 is established in legislation or in an emergency plan, and 
 carries with it the responsibility for tasking and coordinating 
 other organisations in accordance with the needs of the of  
 the situation.   Control relates to situations and operates  
horizontally  across organisations. 
 
In practice then, control relates to situations and is usually given to the 
organisation best able to deal with the situation or having the legal 
responsibility to do so.  This organisation is often referred to as the ‘lead 
agency’ or the ‘combat agency’. 
 
Being in control, that organisation decides the general management and 
tasks other agencies according to the situation. 
 
 
People are Commanded 
Situations are Controlled  
People Communicate 
Resources are Coordinated 
Organisations Cooperate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication 
This is dealt with in detail separately in this text.  However it is important to 
realise that constant communication, both across organisations and within 
organisations, is essential at all times.  Communication, like coordination , 
must operate both vertically (within the organisation) and horizontally 
(between organisations). 
Coordination 
This deals with resources.   Resources, in the broad term, include 
organisations, manpower and equipment.   Coordination deals with the 
collection, allocation and distribution of the resources available for an 
incident.   Unlike command, which operates vertically within an organisation, 
and control, which operates horizontally across organisations, coordination 
exists both horizontally and vertically. 
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Coordination then, means that each organisation will need to gather its own 
resources and decide on their distribution and use.   When that organisation 
does not own the resource then the controller has the responsibility of 
coordinating the resources and deciding where they will be deployed. 
Cooperation 
The publication, Emergency Services Organisations – Who, What & When 
(33) points out that without a genuine spirit of cooperation between 
participating agencies involved in a situation, then success, whilst it may be 
obtained, will not be as efficient or as smooth as it could be.   In practice this 
has usually meant that each agency must recognise and support the control 
authority.   It also means being willing to provide assistance or equipment 
when it is needed. 
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Fig 5.1 – The application of the ‘5 Cs’  
 
‘5 Cs’ Summary 
Of the components for successful management, only Command, which works 
vertically within an organisation, and control, which operates across organ-
isations, are one-dimensional. The remaining three, communication, 
coordination and cooperation, are essential both between and within 
organisations. 
 
In any major incident emergency management situation, the ‘5 Cs’ are 
essential for the situation to be resolved quickly and efficiently.     
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Safety First – The Three Ss (3Ss) or Safety 1-2-3  
Equally as important, if not more so, than the 5Cs are the 3Ss also known as 
the 1 2 3 of safety.  The 3Ss, related to safety and are, in order of application: 
 
• Self 
• Scene 
• Survivors 
 
In the health situation, the Ambulance Service usually has the say in deciding 
on safety measures and will liaise with other agencies to ensure that 
responders are not put at unnecessary risk. 
 
Fig 5.2 The Four Don’ts 
The 4 Don’ts 
Basically there are four rules and these are shown in Fig 5.2 above.  They 
are basic but, coupled with the rules below, life saving.  Each is important 
and supplements the other rules. The lives saved can include responders, 
survivors and your own.  
Self 
The order is important.  Personal safety (self) must come first.  If you become 
another casualty of the incident then this is not just one more victim but one 
less rescuer.  You are not much help if you are injured, or worse, killed, by 
entering a scene that isn’t safe.  
 
Ensuring that you are properly equipped, both in dress and equipment, 
makes you more efficient as well as preventing harm to yourself. 
 
Personal equipment is dealt with separately but it must be emphasised that 
you should not be allowed to enter a scene unless you are properly 
protected. One of the highlights of bushfire response is a plea to house-
holders not to fight fires or to protect their homes dressed in a T shirt, shorts 
and thongs.  Yet press coverage often shows people dressed this way. 
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Knowing what you are to face is also important in response.  If you are the 
first on the scene then identifying any hazards present is equally as important 
as checking for survivors. Your briefing of the next rescuers to arrive may 
save them injury. 
 
If you are not the first on the scene then, before rushing in to help, check with 
someone as to what the situation is.  This may take several minutes, feel like 
hours, but may save lives, including your own. 
 
The defence forces have a saying ‘Time spent in reconnaissance is seldom 
wasted’.  The civil equivalent is reduced to ‘Look before you leap’.   Be aware 
of what you are walking in to becomes the message. 
 
Many people have been awarded medals and honours for placing 
themselves at great risk to save lives or property.  Many of them say ‘I just 
didn’t think – I just did it’.  Unfortunately many such awards are posthumous.  
We are likely to learn more from the ‘unsung hero’ who looks, assesses and 
then acts, perhaps not as dramatically but just as effectively. 
Scene 
Safety of the scene is less understood.  This is applied in two ways: 
 
• Stabilisation of the scene 
• Risks from the scene 
 
Scene stabilisation is used to ensure that the situation will not get worse.  
The Thredbo Disaster in the Snowy Mountains of New South Wales required 
that rescue attempts were delayed until it could be sure that action taken 
would not cause any further slippage of the hillside.    
 
Digging in wreckage has to be carried out so that it does not cause the 
building to collapse. Unfortunately this is not often the thoughts of the initial 
responders. 
 
Risks from the scene may not be obvious, particularly in chemical, biological 
and radiation incidents (CBR – Special Incidents).   One of the indicators in 
such situations is responders suddenly becoming casualties as occurred in 
the ‘sarin incident’ in Tokyo. 
Survivors 
It often appears to be callous, but the last consideration is for the survivors.  
It is not easy to stand and listen to cries for help from those trapped, or the 
sounds of those in pain, and just wait.   The infamous September 11th (2001) 
attack on the World Trade Center in New York, US, showed the wisdom 
however when the collapse of the building resulted in the loss of over 300 
rescue workers.   Following this, when ever it appeared that nearby buildings 
could collapse then all rescuers were evacuated from the scene.   The 
reasoning is – we don’t want more victims.   This means that unless the 
rescuer (self) and the scene are safe, then we do not attempt to extricate the 
survivors.  Survivors are a bonus, more victims, because of the rescue 
process, is a deficit.  
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Communications 
Importance of Communication 
It is not uncommon, when reading reports and evaluations of how situations 
were managed, to find that the lack of communication is cited as one of the 
greatest difficulties encountered in the command and control of the 
circumstances. 
 
In these days of the mobile phone, the use of radio is often regarded as an 
anachronism, however for the field situation the radio remains an extremely 
useful communications tool.   In addition to this, many parts of Australia 
reception and transmission with mobile phones is poor or non-existent. 
 
For efficiency, radio procedures and distribution needs to be controlled.   
Throughout the world the most commonly utilised procedures are those that 
were instigated for use by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for 
military use.   It is this system that is advocated for use in incident control. 
 
In the major incident or disaster situation radio communication is more formal 
than say the discussions and procedures used from day to day on the 
ambulance radio or to control a fleet of taxis.   This is because the situation 
may be complex and everyone needs to be able to understand and be 
certain about what is happening. 
 
How the message is passed is very important.   In critical situations ‘getting 
the message across’ is vital for a successful outcome.    
Message Formats - CAP 
The form in which the message is presented is important in three ways.   It 
must be CAPped: 
 
• C – Concise, that is it must be as brief as possible whilst still imparting 
the information needed. 
• A – Appropriate, it is what we need to know without any extraneous 
information. 
• P – Precise, in that it is accurate where ever possible or tells us if there 
is doubt and the information must be checked. 
 
In order to ensure that information is received in so that these requirements 
are met, there are various protocols in use.    
ETHANE 
In the urgent situation where an incident is being reported, it is essential that 
the information is presented quickly and meeting the CAP requirements.    
 
ETHANE is a mnemonic, that is a word used to aid the memory(87).  ETHANE 
tells us what we need to report and the order in which to present the 
information.  Many operations units have pro forma already in this  format to 
make recording and checking the information given or received is complete. 
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Many information systems also use this format in reporting. ETHANE 
expands to mean: 
 
• E -- Exact  location of the incident, where it is and how to get there 
• T – Type of incident, e.g. a train derailment, motor vehicle accident, fire 
• H – Hazards present and including fallen power lines, chemicals, etc 
• A – Access to the site which will include the safe route in and the 
location of any check points that may have been set up or vehicle 
parking locations   
• N – Number and type, by priority, of casualties where known (including 
dead) and an estimate, if the number is not certain at that time 
• E – Emergency services on site at that time or those required. 
SITREP 
An abbreviation meaning Situation report.   A much more formal document, 
which will often have attachments, outlining the situation to that time and 
expectations for the near future. 
 
SITREPS are issued as needed and can be as frequently as hourly or even 
daily during a crisis.   It is important that they are numbered and dated.   The 
expected time of the next report should also be given so that those involved 
can be certain that they have the latest available information. 
HIRIS 
The New South Wales Department of Health uses a computer on-line system 
called HIRIS (Health Incident Reporting Information System) which is used to 
communicate intelligence about incidents occurring within New South Wales.    
 
Data can be entered at State, Area or Hospital Disaster Control Centres.   
The information is in a set format and ETHANE is included in the information.   
 
The system allows incidents to be at six levels which in turn fit into four status 
colours.  The information is provided in a menu display at the selected State 
or Area level and is then displayed in Status Level – Date order.   That is the 
most serious and most recent will occur first.  HIRIS Status Levels are: 
 
Status Level Colour  Description 
Status Level 1 GREEN No incidents or problems 
Status Level 2  
Status Level 3 
ORANGE   Equipment failure, routine procedures affected 
or not affected, contingency plans in place for 
work, rounds etc. 
Status Level 4 
Status Level 5 
RED Equipment or system failures, hospital cannot 
cope with some types of patients or cannot 
take an influx of patients 
Status Level 6 BLACK Major system failure, hospital cannot cope 
with any patients and services are cancelled. 
patients require diversion to other Area or 
Hospitals 
 
Table 6.1 – HIRIS status levels 
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HIRIS allows the SITREP to be entered in a strict format.   Some sections 
offer only a choice of preset conditions whilst others allow a brief description.  
The report has an introduction section and then three information sections. 
 
1. Introduction.   
 
• This includes the details of the person making the report, the incident 
name, what locations are affected, the status level (1 to six as detailed 
above) and the trend (e.g. static, worsening, improving or closed).  
 
2. Section 1 – Background / Incident Description 
 
• ETHANE 
• More Information – Allows narrative of impacts, effects or a brief 
summary of the incident. 
 
3. Section 2 – Current Situation / Actions Taken 
 
• Who Is In Charge – Person or persons managing the incident, also 
adds how to contact them. 
• Actions Completed Till Now – a table of action so far. 
 
4. Section 3 – Evaluation 
 
• A brief description of the situation to date  
• Future Actions – what is planned  
• Resources Allocated – what, where from, where sent 
• Distribution List – who will receive the report 
• Next SITREP due 
 
SMEAC 
The military uses a form with the acronym SMEAC.   SMEAC is short for: 
 
• S – Situation: what has happened and is happening now  
• M – Mission: what we are going to do 
• E – Execution: how we are going to do it 
• A – Administration and logistics: the where it will happen, when it will 
      happen and what with 
• C – Command and Signals: who is in charge, how to report and what 
         they will need to know from you. 
 
Where it is appropriate, an additional section is added to the top of the 
message indicated by the letter T for Topography.   This may be a map or a 
description of the site. 
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Radio Communications 
Radio Equipment 
Hand-held radios, or those fitted to vehicles are now available in a number of 
formats with varying degrees of sophistication and power.  Some are 
available with fixed frequencies whilst others may have a large number of 
channels or even be able to be tuned to a frequency. 
 
In much of Australia the GRN (Government Radio Net) is available to ensure 
that there is a degree of flexibility within various organisations with the ability 
for organisations to be able to use the set both internally or to speak to other 
agencies or organisations.  Other radios may be fixed in frequencies and only 
be able to be used with matching sets. 
Taking Charge of a Set 
When issued with a radio, with which you are not familiar, ensure that you 
are given a demonstration of the main parts.  In particular you will need to 
know: 
 
• how to turn the set on and off 
• how to change batteries (ensure you have access to a spare battery 
and/or a battery charger) 
• the channel (frequency) to use 
• operation of the ‘press to talk’ switch and any other controls. 
 
In addition you will also need to know: 
 
• your call sign 
• call signs and identities of others on the net 
 
Note that, unlike the cellular phone, you will not be the only operator using 
the system.   Listen for your call sign.    
 
Good procedure will assist in good communications. 
 
Remember also that using a radio is like having a conversation in public and 
that anyone with a radio tuned to your frequency can listen to what you are 
saying.    
 
Radios in general use are usually either HF (High Frequency – long range 
reasonable clarity) or VHF (Very High Frequency – shorter range but good 
clarity) or UHF (Ultra High Frequency – very short range but very clear). 
 
Hand held radios are usually UHF or VHF whilst fixed stations or the larger 
sets are HF. 
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Voice Procedure 
The fundamentals of good communication are: 
 
• Accuracy 
• Brevity 
• Clarity 
 
The above are referred to as the ABCs of Communication. 
 
Accuracy and brevity require discipline and practice.   Ensure you have your 
facts before you transmit and keep the transmission time to a minimum.   
Someone else may need to pass an urgent message and the less time any 
individual ties up the net then the more other people can use it. 
 
When using radios, only one person on the entire net can speak at any given 
time.   This means that before you press the ‘talk’ button no one else should 
be using the radio.   Interrupting a transmission merely means that neither 
you nor the other person will be heard.   The watchwords are ‘listen before 
you speak’. 
 
Clarity can be achieved by use of the voice and in particular pay attention to: 
 
• Rhythm 
• Speed 
• Volume  
• Pitch 
 
These factors can be remembered by the familiar letters RSVP. 
 
Rhythm should be steady, that is there should be a noticeable distinction 
between words with a longer break between sentences.   This often means 
that you need to know what you are going to say so that there are no gaps 
where you seek a suitable word or fact.  
 
Speed should be slightly slower than normal speech.   Remember that 
someone at the other end may be trying to write down, if not word for word, 
then at least the import of what you say. 
 
Volume should be at normal conversation level as if you were using a tele-
phone.  Shouting does not help where radio communications are poor.   
Unless the radio has a ‘whisper’ setting (sometimes found on military 
equipment) then speaking softly doesn’t help either. 
 
Pitch is more difficult. The best voices on radio are female pitched.  This 
means that if you have a deep voice then you should make a conscious effort 
to raise the pitch when using a radio. 
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Basic Message Handling 
Unlike the telephone where you dial the destination, all people with a similar 
radio using your channel will be listening.   This collectively is referred to as 
the net.   This means that you must alert the person to whom you wish to 
speak.   This is achieved by giving each radio a call sign. 
 
The system is somewhat like sending a letter to some one.  First you say 
who the letter is to -- for example ‘Dear John’ and ending with your name as 
the sender, say Regards Mary.   By giving the recipient’s name first, it alerts 
them to the fact that the message is for them.   A typical call may be: 
 
 Zero Alpha (the station you are calling) THIS IS Charlie Eight (your 
call sign) OVER.  (You are ready to talk). 
 
You would then expect a response such as: 
 
 Charlie Eight THIS IS Zero Alpha.  SEND, OVER 
 
This would tell you that communication is established and Zero Alpha is 
ready to talk to you so go ahead with your message. 
 
Where communications are good and contact has been initiated it is then 
permissible to just prefix messages with your own call sign.   Thus a call may 
be: 
  
Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight OVER. 
 Charlie Eight THIS IS Zero Alpha SEND, OVER. 
 THIS IS Charlie Eight – No response to your last request, OVER. 
 Zero Alpha.  ROGER.  OUT. 
 
Note that in the above examples a number of words in block letters such as 
ROGER and OUT are used.   These are short hand or code words and are 
explained below. 
 
Sometimes control may call all stations at once – this is referred to as a net 
call.   In this case each station will respond in turn.  For example: 
  
All Stations THIS IS Zero Alpha.   Be ready to move at one hours 
notice. ACKNOWLEDGE.    OVER 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie One.   ROGER .   OVER. 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Two.  ROGER.   OVER. 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Three.  ACKNOWLEDGED.   OVER. 
 
When all stations have responded then Control then closes the transmission.  
  
All Stations THIS IS Zero Alpha.   OUT. 
 
If a station does not respond, for example Charlie Five, then the next station, 
in this case Charlie Six, waits five seconds and then responds.   If Charlie 
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Five heard the message but couldn’t get to respond in time then they wait 
and reply when all the other stations have finished. 
 
In theory, a radio station will always be ready to accept a message and you 
should simply be able to call them up and go straight into the text. In practice 
this is not always the case.   The recipient may not have anything to write 
with (or on) and may need move or even sit down.  Therefore it is good 
practice to tell the recipient that you have something that they will need to 
note.   A message then would be: 
 
 Charlie Two THIS IS Zero Alpha.   Message.  OVER. 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Two.  WAIT  (sits down, grabs a pen) 
SEND. OVER. 
 
More advanced procedures, for example where the message is long, or you 
make a mistake, are discussed below. 
Radio Shorthand or Code Words 
In the interests of accuracy and brevity, a number of ‘code words’ have been 
introduced.   These words have specific meanings and when used ensure 
that all parties have no doubt of what was intended.  The most common of 
these words are listed in the table below. 
 
Other words may be used locally in plans and procedures. Where local ‘code 
words’ or even ‘code phrases’ are used then it is essential that their 
meanings are known and understood by all parties on the net. The most 
common words are 
 
Code Word Meaning 
OVER I have finished speaking - it is now the receiver’s turn to talk 
OUT The conversation is completed (no reply to this is required) 
ROGER I understand 
OK I understand (non-NATO alternative) 
SEND I am ready to receive your transmission 
GO AHEAD I am ready to receive your transmission (non-NATO alternative) 
ACKNOWLEDGE Tell me that you have received my message 
ACKNOWLEDGED I have received your message 
SAY AGAIN Repeat what you just said (Note:  the word REPEAT has a special 
military meaning and should not be used) 
WAIT I cannot reply in the next five seconds (may be used again once 
more after a further five seconds and then WAIT OUT if more time 
is required) 
WAIT OUT I cannot reply or take your message immediately (within the next 
ten seconds) and I will call you back when I am ready 
STANDBY Keep listening - further information will follow 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival (use single letters - not spelt 
phonetically) 
ETD Estimated Time of Departure (as for ETA) 
 
Table 6.2   Radio voice procedure special words and their meanings 
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There are some ‘slang’ expressions that, regretfully, seem to be used in the 
excitement of the moment.   These are unacceptable and should not to be 
used.  Examples of such words and phrases are: 
 
Expression Comment 
OVER AND OUT 
  
 
 
It is either ‘OVER’ OR ‘OUT’.   Remember if you say OVER 
you want a reply and if you say OUT then the transmission is 
ended. 
ROGER DODGER slang and meaningless 
 
TEN FOUR taken from an old police television programme and is also 
meaningless  
COPY THAT Just another way of saying ROGER 
 
Table 6.3 - Some slang expressions 
 
Swearing is never acceptable on the radio. 
Spelling Words 
In order to avoid confusion, difficult or important words should be spelt.  It is 
however often difficult to differentiate over a radio the letters B, C, D, E, G, P 
or the letters M and N.  In order to overcome this difficulty a phonetic 
alphabet is used.   The standard phonetic alphabet is shown in Table 6.4. 
 
When a message requires that the word be spelt then the word is said first 
then the words ‘I SPELL’ followed by the phonetic letters for the word.   Ask 
for an acknowledgment after the word, or words have been spelt. For 
example you need to tell control that the nearest railway station is at 
Granville.   The message would then be sent as: 
 
 …The closest railway station is Granville.   I spell, Golf—Romeo—
Alpha—November—Victor—India—Lima—Lima—Echo.   
Acknowledge.   Over. 
 
A Alpha N November 
B Bravo O Oscar 
C Charlie P Papa 
D Delta Q Quebec 
E Echo R Romeo 
F Foxtrot S Sierra 
G Golf T Tango 
H Hotel U Uniform 
I India V Victor 
J Juliet W Whisky 
K Kilo X X-ray 
L Lima Y Yankee 
M Mike Z Zulu 
 
Table 6.4 - The Phonetic Alphabet 
 
Use of the phonetic alphabet requires practice.  One way of doing this is to 
read out phonetically the number plates of overtaking or passing cars. 
 
 
90 
Numbers and Figures 
As with letters, numbers are important and should be emphasised.  The pro-
nunciation for each digit is shown in the table..   For clarity the number is first 
said and followed by the pro-word FIGURES to alert the receiver to the fact 
that numbers follow or to show the difference between TWO and TO or 
FOUR and FOR or EIGHT and ATE for example.   If the distance from the 
track junction to your position is 450 metres, then message becomes: 
 
 …my location is four hundred and fifty.  Figures for-wer, fiy-iv, zero 
metres from the junction.   Acknowledge.  Over 
 
1 wun 6 six 
2 too 7 seven 
3 thu-ree 8 ate 
4 for-wer 9 niner 
5 fiy-iv 0 zero 
 
Table 6.5 - Number pronunciation. 
 
Where there is a decimal point then the word DECIMAL is used so this 
means that four and half would become: 
 
 Figures for-wer decimal fiy-iv. 
Advanced Message Handling 
 
Corrections. Occasionally you may make a mistake when sending a 
message.   These errors must be corrected.   To do so the procedure is: 
 
• as soon as you realise that you have made a mistake, say WRONG 
• follow this with the correction 
• if necessary say the correction again for clarity. 
 
For example you may be sending the following: 
 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.   My new location is at the junction 
of the track and the North East Road.  WRONG.  The junction of the 
track and the North West Road.   I SAY AGAIN the North West Road.   
OVER. 
 
Repeating. The standard military words to ask for something to be repeated 
are SAY AGAIN.   The word repeat is reserved for artillery and means ‘fire 
another lot of shells where you fired the last lot!’   On a civil net it is not so 
important but custom dictates you try to remember to use the words SAY 
AGAIN. 
 
Often it is only a part of the message that you wish to hear again then the  
section required is indicated by one of the phrases shown in Table 6.6 below. 
These allow you to ask for all or part of the message to be sent again 
depending upon your needs. 
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Pro words Example 
SAY AGAIN SAY AGAIN Grid Reference.  Over 
(you only want to hear the numbers again) 
 
SAY AGAIN  
ALL AFTER 
SAY AGAIN ALL AFTER the word Junction. Over 
(You received the first part of the message but you need 
to hear the end, that is after the word Junction) 
 
SAY AGAIN  
ALL BEFORE 
SAY AGAIN ALL BEFORE Track.  Over 
(You got the end of the message but not the first part) 
 
SAY AGAIN  
ALL BETWEEN 
SAY AGAIN ALL BETWEEN Location and Road. Over 
(This is the only part you are not sure of) 
 
 
Table 6.6 -  Procedure for clarifying parts you missed. 
 
Long Messages. Occasionally it will be necessary to transmit a long 
message.  That is one that will take several minutes to transmit.   In this 
case, to ensure that it is being received correctly, pauses are put into the 
message to allow for clarification, repetition or correction if needed.   The 
message should be broken into short parts so that each will not take longer 
than thirty seconds to transmit before asking for acknowledgment.  For 
example: 
 
 Charlie Eight THIS IS Zero Alpha.  Long Message. OVER. 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.   SEND.   OVER. 
 This is Zero Alpha.  Message Begins.   The following stores will be 
required (the message continues to a suitable break point)  
…bandages.   MORE TO FOLLOW.   OVER.   (This tells Charlie Eight 
that the message is not finished but allows a check to ensure that the 
receiving station has written it down so far.   This will continue with 
SAY AGAIN… being used for those parts missed until the message is 
completed). 
Radio Check and Signal Strength 
The quality of communications is often variable.   It changes from place to 
place and from time to time.   It is essential for good communications, as well 
as for command and control, that both strength and clarity be checked 
periodically. 
 
In order to test communications another ‘code word’ is used.   In this case the 
words RADIO CHECK.   This can be as ‘net call’ from control or by 
individuals checking, particularly after a move.   Typically control will ask: 
 
 All Stations THIS IS Zero Alpha.   RADIO CHECK.   OVER 
 
Stations respond in order as for a ‘net call’. 
 
There are two components – strength and readability.   A range of responses 
is shown below in the table. 
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Strength Description Readability Description 
LOUD There is no 
problem hearing 
the station 
CLEAR There is no 
distortion 
WEAK Can be heard but 
background or 
local noise may 
make it difficult 
DIFFICULT Words are heard 
but there is 
interference 
NOTHING 
HEARD 
You cannot hear 
their signals 
BROKEN Only a few words 
in each sentence 
can be heard 
  UNWORKABLE Only an 
occasional word 
or strong 
interference 
 
Table 6.7 - Responses to Radio Check. 
 
When seeking a RADIO CHECK tell the other station their situation.  For 
example: 
 
Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.  RADIO CHECK.   OVER. 
Charlie Eight THIS IS Zero Alpha.  You are LOUD and CLEAR. OVER 
THIS IS Charlie Eight.  ROGER.  You are WEAK and READABLE. OUT. 
 
If you received no response to your call then the traffic would be: 
 
Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.   RADIO CHECK.   OVER. 
(wait for response but you received no reply.  Transmit) 
Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.  NOTHING HEARD.   OUT. 
 
Where one station may not have good radio communications with Control it is 
still possible to be able to talk to another station that is in good contact.  In 
this case stations may ask other stations to relay messages for them.   When 
this is done it is essential that it be accurate and acknowledged.   It is also 
necessary to inform the final recipient that the message is relayed.   Typical 
traffic would be: 
 
 Charlie Eight THIS IS Zero Alpha.  Are you in contact with Charlie One? 
OVER 
 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.   ROGER.   OVER 
 THIS IS Zero Alpha.  Relay to Charlie One – Expect Medical Commander 
to visit your location at 1300 hours.  ACKNOWLEDGE.   OVER 
 THIS IS Charlie Eight.   ROGER.   OUT TO YOU. 
 Charlie One THIS IS Charlie Eight.   MESSAGE.  OVER. 
 Charlie Eight THIS IS Charlie One.  SEND.   OVER. 
 THIS IS Charlie Eight.  Message from Zero Alpha.   Expect Medical 
Commander to visit your location at 1300 hours.  ACKNOWLEDGE   
OVER 
 THIS IS Charlie One.  ACKNOWLEDGED.   OUT. 
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 Zero Alpha THIS IS Charlie Eight.   Message relayed to Charlie One.  
ACKNOWLEDGED.   OVER. 
 THIS IS Zero Alpha.   ROGER.   OUT. 
Ambulance Radio Channels 
The Ambulance Service of New South Wales network has a number of 
channels for day to day communications.  The allocation of these channels is 
shown in the table. 
 
Channel Number Allocation 
1 – 6 Daily Operations 
7 Helicopters/Rural state 
8 Daily Operations 
9 Emergency Reserve Channel (ERC) 
 
 (Channel 7 is used for communicating with all helicopter air 
ambulances and with road vehicles travelling from metropolitan 
Sydney to rural New South Wales areas). 
 
Table 6.8 - Ambulance Service of New South Wales radio channel allocation. 
The Quebec Disaster Radio Network 
The Quebec Disaster Radio Network was a medical command channel, 
which operated in the Sydney Metropolitan Area but has now ceased to exist.   
Radios were maintained by the State Emergency Service (SES) and the 
frequencies were controlled by the SES Senior Communications Officer. The 
restoration of such a medical command channel would be strongly 
supported. 
 
The Government Radio Network (GRN) 
This is the replacement for the Quebec network and is a series of 
frequencies and channels used for Government communications.   Channels 
are allotted to various bodies.   These frequencies and channels are 
registered and licensed.    It should always be remembered that these 
channels are often monitored to ensure proper use.    This system enables 
various organisations to be able to communicate over long distances using 
hand held radios.   
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Fig 6.1 - Typical handheld radio used on the GRN in New South Wales 
Summary 
 
Communication is often the key to both good command and control and good 
command and control is the key to efficiency.   Efficiency saves time and 
lives. 
 
The VHF Radio is the most common means of distant communication used in 
the field for command and control in major incidents but where the GRN is in 
use then this may be replaced with an HF radio. 
 
The fundamentals of good radio use are  Accuracy, Brevity and Clarity 
(ABC).   
 
The aids to Clarity are Rhythm, Speed, Volume and Pitch (RSVP). 
 
Radio communication rules follow the military system in order to ensure 
clarity and brevity.   This includes the use of ‘pro words’ and the NATO 
phonetic alphabet and number pronunciation system. 
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Emergency Management 
Australia, like many other parts of the world, is subject to major incidents and 
disasters of many different causes.  This has led disaster management to 
use an ‘all hazards approach’ rather than planning for different types of 
incident. 
 
Australia uses four concepts in managing incidents: 
 
• All Agencies (Integrated) Approach 
• Comprehensive Approach 
• All Hazards Approach 
• Prepared Community 
 
All Agencies 
This means that there is an active system at all levels of government, from 
Commonwealth to State and Local.   Statutory authorities, private, voluntary 
and community organisations and even individuals, cooperate when there is 
a threat of an incident, an incident and the recovery from an incident.    
 
All agencies must be aware of their own role and the role of others so that 
they can cooperate as the needs arise.  This usually means that the 
existence of coordinating bodies where the various organisations can meet, 
exercise their functions and ensure that they are prepared.  
 
Comprehensive Approach 
This is the acceptance that there are four phases in management of disaster 
situations – the PPRR system: 
 
• Prevention – Legislative and physical approaches to lessen risk or 
ensure that plans are in readiness 
• Preparedness – Resources and services are in readiness should there 
be an occurrence 
• Response – Action can be taken with minimal delay before, during and 
after any incident to reduce the impact and provide support to the 
community 
• Recovery – A coordinated approach that supports a community in 
rebuilding the physical infrastructure and to give emotional, social and 
economic aid as needed. 
 
All Hazards Approach 
This initially requires the identification of the hazards likely to be faced by the 
community. Recognising that many different hazards can have a similar 
outcome, the ideal is to make a single system capable of covering all the 
possibilities.   This approach still recognises however that many of the 
hazards will require their own PPRR planning. 
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Prepared Community 
This involves ensuring that local communities are aware of the types of 
disaster that could affect them and that the community has accordingly 
developed local arrangements to control them.   This means that the local 
community must be informed, alert and actively support its local volunteer 
emergency services. Local government is similarly involved and that there is 
local PPRR planning to meet local needs. 
Legislation 
Commonwealth 
In 1991, the Commonwealth Government and all of the Australian State and 
Territorian Governments ratified the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Convention.  These protocols use the term ‘civil defence’ which includes 
disaster response(73). 
 
The Protocols require attention to certain tasks.   These tasks are: 
 
• Warning 
• Evacuation 
• Shelter management 
• Blackout measures 
• Rescue 
• Medical services (including first aid) 
• Religious assistance 
• Fire fighting 
• Detection and marking of danger areas 
• Decontamination and similar protective measures 
• Emergency accommodation and supplies 
• Restoration and maintenance of order in affected areas 
• Emergency repair of indispensable public utilities 
• Emergency disposal of the dead 
• Preservation of objects essential for survival 
• Complementary activities necessary to carry out any of the above 
tasks, including, but not limited to, planning and organisation. 
 
 
At the Commonwealth level, Emergency Management Australia (EMA) is the 
emergency and disaster management organisation and it gives guidance to 
the states and territories in developing emergency management procedures 
as well as coordinating Commonwealth assistance both to the states and 
territories and to other countries through Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID). 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act places the responsibility for 
the management of disasters and major incidents with the states and 
territories.  The Commonwealth has only a supporting role. 
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Australian Defence Force (ADF) Assistance 
The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) may be asked to assist and this is 
provided through the National Emergency Management Coordination Centre 
(NEMCC) of Emergency Management Australia (EMA) located in Canberra.   
Any such requests will be via the State Emergency system.   Defence 
Assistance provided to the Civil Community (DACC) is most commonly by 
the provision of resources such as tentage, field kitchens and other field 
equipment.   The ADF may responded to requests for personnel in such 
emergencies as bush fires.  The RAAF may also be involved with transport 
and delivery of supplies. 
 
Support under DACC is provided under three categories: 
 
• Cat 1 – Support to a local emergency with immediate threat to life 
and/or property.   A local defence commander, utilising local 
resources, may approve this type of support.   Where assistance 
required exceeds that available at the local command then the request 
becomes a Cat 2. 
 
• Cat 2 – Support to a general emergency with direct threat to life and/or 
property.   ADF Headquarters (ADFHQ) can approve support following 
an approach through the NEMCC. 
 
• Cat 3 – Support provided for an ongoing emergency with no direct 
threat to life and/or property.  Usually an extension to a Cat 2 request. 
 
State and Territory Responsibilities 
As mentioned above, the states and territories are responsible for the 
protection and preservation of lives and property through: 
 
• Legislation and regulation 
• Provision of emergency services 
• Provision of government and statutory authorities to provide community 
services. 
 
In New South Wales the controlling legislation is the State Emergency and 
Rescue Management Act 1989, often reduced to being referred to as the 
SERM Act(119).   Other states have similar legislation. 
 
The New South Wales system, gives responsibility for emergency 
management to the Minister for Emergency Services. The SERM Act has 
four main provisions: 
 
• The responsibilities of the Minister 
• Establishment of Emergency Management Committees 
• Production of Disaster Plans 
• Operational controlling arrangements. 
 
The Minister oversees the system and ensures that PPRR measures are in 
place.   Because disaster responses will involve other ministers of state, the 
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Minister for Emergency Services has the coordinating role.   Finally, the 
Minister is also responsible for ensuring the review of the State DISPLAN. 
 
The Minister is empowered under the SERM Act to convene a State 
Disasters Council.  This Council would comprise: 
 
• The Minister, who Chairs the meetings 
• State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) 
• Representative of government or other agencies as decided by the 
Minister 
 
There can be a series of committees set up to assist the Minister in the 
fulfilment of the obligations. 
State Emergency Management Arrangements 
State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) 
The main committee in New South Wales responsible for overseeing 
emergency management across the State(119). 
 
The SEMC consists of the following members: 
 
• Chairperson – appointed by the Minister 
• State Emergency Operations Controller (SEOCON) 
• Representatives from the Emergency Service Organisations 
o NSW Police Service 
o Ambulance Service of NSW 
o NSW Fire Brigades 
o NSW Rural Fire Service 
o State Emergency Service (SES) 
o NSW Volunteer Rescue Association (VRA) 
• Functional Area Coordinators 
o Agriculture and Animal (NSW Agriculture)  
o Engineering  
o Environmental (Environment Protection Authority – EPA) 
o Health (Department of Health) 
o Media (NSW Police Service, Media and Marketing Branch) 
o Transport (Department of Transport) 
o Welfare (Department of Community Services) 
• Representative and Advisors  
o Premier’s Department 
o Treasury 
o Department of Local Government 
o Communications (Department of Public Works and Services) 
o Department of Urban Affairs and Planning 
• Observers 
o State Coroner 
o Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
 
During the preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games, the Olympic 
Coordination Authority was also represented.  
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District Emergency Management Committees (DEMC) 
New South Wales is divided into Emergency Management Districts.  District 
boundaries are decided on local government boundaries, geographical 
boundaries and threats to the area.  The boundaries coincide, where 
possible, with the Police Regions for the rural districts and with groups of 
Police Patrols in the Sydney area. 
 
The members of each District Emergency Management Committee are 
based upon the membership organisation of the SEMC depending on the 
resources found within the district.  Thus a DEMC will consist of: 
 
• District Emergency Operations Controller (DEOC) as Chairperson 
• Senior representative of the council of each local government area 
within the district 
• Senior representative of each ESO within the district 
• Representatives of organisations providing functional areas within the 
district. 
 
The DEMC has similar responsibilities to that of the SEMC in ensuring PPRR 
plans are available within the district boundaries.   The DEMC is responsible 
to the SEMC. 
 
The Police Service is tasked with providing executive support to the DEOC 
and the DEMC.  The support is provided by an officer called the District 
Emergency Management Officer (DEMO). 
 
Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMC) 
The third and final tier is in place to ensure that the Prepared Community 
concept is fully applied.  In order to do this there is a local committee, 
responsible to the DEMC, based on the Local Government areas similarly 
responsible for PPRR planning. 
 
The membership of the LEMC follows the same guidelines as the DEMC in 
having representatives of those organisations present locally.   There are 
some differences however in the appointment process.  Membership 
comprises: 
 
• A senior representative of Council from the local government area or 
combined areas.  This person is the Chairperson of the Committee.   
The person so appointed must have the authority to commit and 
coordinate the use of council resources in the event of an emergency. 
 
• Senior representative of each ESO within the local area. 
 
• Representatives of organisations providing functional areas within the 
local area.   The Emergency Management Arrangements (1998) notes 
that very few such functional areas will be represented locally. 
 
• Representatives from other organisation in the local area that provide 
functional services as determined by the local Council may decide. 
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In the LEMC case the administrative support is usually provided by the local 
Council.  
  
The officer responsible for the assistance to the LEMC is known as the Local 
Emergency Management Officer (LEMO).  It is not uncommon for the LEMO 
to be the Chairperson of the LEMC. 
 
Functional Area Sub-Committees 
The system allows Functional Area Coordinators to form Functional Area 
Sub-Committees to assist them.  In Health, this system of sub-committees 
exists at State and Area levels.   Commonly non-government organisations 
are members of these committees and the Red Cross and St John 
Ambulance organisations may be members of the sub-committee. 
 
Sub-committees are mainly at District level and very few will be formed at the 
local level. 
 
Emergency Management Plans 
Whilst the State DISPLAN is the main disaster response plan for New South 
Wales, other supporting and specialised plans have also been developed.  
These include: 
 
• Functional Area Supporting Plans 
o Agriculture and Animal Services 
o Engineering Services 
o Environmental Services (ENVIROPLAN) 
o Health Services (HEALTHPLAN) 
o Public Information Services 
o Transport Services 
o Welfare Services 
 
• Sub-Plans for Specific Hazards or Emergencies 
o Animal health Emergency 
o Aviation Emergency 
o Hazardous Materials Emergency (HAZMATPLAN) 
o Nepean-Hawkesbury Flood Emergency 
o Marine Oil Spill Plan 
o State Bush Fire Plan 
o Major Structure Collapse Plan 
 
• Management Arrangements for 
o Emergency Finance 
o Emergency Supply 
o Communication Services 
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Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs) 
Organisations are designated as combat agencies or functional areas.   
Combat agencies will respond to an incident and be involved at the Incident 
Site. 
 
Functional areas are support organisations and may not necessarily be 
involved with the site response directly. 
 
Combat Agencies 
The NSW SERM Act defines ‘emergency services organisations’ as being 
the: 
 
• Police Service 
• Fire Brigade 
• Rural Fire Service (the Bush Fire Brigade) 
• Ambulance Service 
• State Emergency Service (SES) 
• Volunteer Rescue Association (VRA) 
• Any other agency that controls an accredited rescue unit 
 
The combat agencies are mostly involved with Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response.   The combat agencies are those listed above. 
 
Combat agencies are allotted specific responsibilities. The table below shows 
the agency responsible for individual hazards. 
 
Hazard Agency Responsible 
Animal Health Emergencies NSW Agriculture 
Aviation Emergency  
 
Emergency Operations Controller at 
the relevant level.  
Fire 
• Within a Bush Fire District 
• Within a NSW Fire District 
 
NSW Rural Fire Service 
NSW Fire Brigades 
Flood State Emergency Service (SES) 
Hazardous Materials Emergency 
• Land Based 
• On Inland Waters 
• On State Waters 
 
NSW Fire Brigades 
NSW Fire Brigades 
Office of Marine Administration  
(through each Port Authority) 
Marine Oil Spill Office of Marine Administration  
(through each Port Authority) 
Storm - Tempest State Emergency Service 
 
Table 7.1 - Responsible Combat Agency for individual hazards(126)
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Combat Agency Roles and Responsibilities 
Police 
The duties and powers of the Police Service are contained in the NSW Police 
Service Act 1990.  In addition to crime detection and prevention, the Police 
have a duty to protect life and property.   The Police are also subject to the 
SERM Act.   The Police obligation is to protect persons from threats to injury 
or death, and to protect property from damage, regardless as to how the 
threat originates (34). 
 
The Police retain that responsibility, even if they are unable to carry out the 
protection themselves, and must find an organisation that can assist.    
 
The roles of the Police Service are included in the NSW State DISPLAN.   
Under the State DISPLAN the Police Service becomes the: 
 
• Designated combat agency for law enforcement 
• Designated combat agency for search and rescue 
• Control and coordination agency for the evacuation of victims in an 
area affected by an emergency. 
 
In addition to the above prime roles, The Police also have other 
responsibilities included in the NSW State DISPLAN which requires them to 
act as a support agency, as well as providing assistance, for other 
Organisations involved in a response.   The Police are also to ensure that the 
appropriate combat agencies, Functional Areas and  any other organisations 
are notified of the situation and to coordinate their response. 
 
In detail, under NSW State DISPLAN, the Police are responsible for: 
 
1. Maintaining law and order, protect life and property, and provide 
assistance and support to a combat agency, Functional Area, and 
other Organisations as required.  This may include;  
  
a. reconnaissance of the area affected by the emergency 
b. traffic control and crowd control 
c. access and egress route security and control 
d. identifying the dead and injured and notifying next of kin 
e. establishing temporary mortuaries 
f. maintaining the security of property 
g. statutory investigative requirements 
h. operation of a public enquiry centre capable of providing 
general information on incidents and emergencies to members 
of the public. 
 
2. Respond accredited rescue units to general and specialist rescue 
incidents, and control and coordinate rescue operations. 
 
3. As determined by the State Rescue Board, provide accredited rescue 
units. 
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4. Manage Disaster Victim Registration and a disaster victim enquiry 
system capable of: 
 
a. providing a Disaster Victim registration system for victims of 
emergencies 
b. managing a disaster victim enquiry centre capable o providing 
relatives and close friends with basic details on the location and 
safety of victims of emergencies occurring within New South 
Wales 
c. managing a similar disaster victim enquiry service when the 
National Registration and Inquiry Service (NRIS) is activated in 
relation to emergencies in other States or territories 
 
In NSW the words rescue units refer to accredited units of the Volunteer 
Rescue Association.  This organisation is dealt with separately. 
 
The Police also receive support from: 
 
• The State Coroner 
• NSW Institute of Forensic Medicine  
• Funeral Director’s Association of New South Wales 
 
The Australian Red Cross NSW assists the Victim Enquiry Centre,. 
 
When disaster victim identification is needed, then help is provided by: 
 
• NSW Institute of Forensic Medicine 
• New South Wales Department of Health. 
 
As has been mentioned in other sections, the senior member of the Police 
Service at any rescue scene coordinates and determines the priorities of the 
operation.    The site may be under the control of a specific agency such as 
the Fire Brigade in a fire or HAZMAT incident, or the SES in a storm 
recovery, for example.    
 
Police have the responsibility for the rescue of persons and domestic animals 
from all situations, however this usually excludes rescues from fire, flood, 
hazardous materials incidents, mines and surf-rescue. 
 
Fire Brigade 
The fire services include the NSW Fire Brigades and the NSW Rural Fire 
Service.   In addition to these services the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service and the State Forests of New South Wales may also be involved.    
Legislation includes the Fire Brigades Act 1989 and the Rural Fires Act 1997. 
 
Primarily the duty of the Fire Brigade is to prevent and extinguish fires, to 
protect and save life and to save protect and save property, in the case of 
fires. 
 
The Fire Brigade are also the combat agency for responding to incidents 
involving hazardous materials (HAZMAT). 
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The NSW State DISPLAN gives the following roles for the NSW Fire Brigade: 
 
1. …is the designated combat agency for taking all practicable 
measures for preventing and extinguishing fires and protecting and 
saving life and property in case of fire in any fire district. 
 
2. …is the designated combat agency for land based hazardous 
materials incidents and emergencies within New South Wales, 
specifically for taking all practicable measures: 
a. for protecting and saving life and property endangered by 
hazardous materials incidents 
b. confining or ending such and incident 
c. for rendering the site of such and incident safe 
 
In addition to the above, the Fire Brigade also has other roles and these are 
designated in the NSW State DISPLAN as; 
 
1. Provide fire control services by: 
a. dealing with outbreaks of fire and rescue of persons in fire 
endangered areas 
b. taking such measures as may be practicable to prevent the 
outbreak of fires 
c. on land, dealing with the escape of hazardous materials or a 
situation which involves the imminent danger of such and 
escape. 
 
2. As determined by the State Rescue Board, provide accredited rescue 
units. 
 
3. Assist in any other response or initial recovery operations for which 
the Fire Brigade’s training and equipment is suitable. 
 
Police have a duty to protect life and property regardless of the threat ,but the 
Fire Brigade acts only where the threat is from fire or hazardous substance. 
 
The Fire Brigade does have a popular conception as the agency to call to 
rescue the cat in the tree.  This comes from the last of the other roles (3), to 
assist where their ‘training or equipment is suitable’.   This can also include 
the provision of pumping equipment for flooded buildings or the provision of 
an emergency water supply or even the ladder to rescue the cat from the 
tree.    
 
In the cooperation concept of emergency management then the Fire Brigade 
may be requested to assist the SES in recovery from a storm. 
 
Rural Fire Service 
Primarily responsible under the NSW Rural Fires Act 1997, this service 
largely comprises volunteers.   The NSW State DISPLAN provides a single 
role: 
 
• …is the designated combat agency for fire incidents and emergencies. 
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NSW State DISPLAN allots two Other Roles: 
1. Provide fire control service by;  
a. dealing with outbreaks of bush fire and the rescue of persons in 
bush fire endangered area 
b. taking such measures as may be practical to prevent the 
outbreak of bush fires. 
2. Assist in any other response or recovery operations for which the 
Rural Fire Service’s training and equipment is suitable. 
 
The section involves five organisations, or classes of organisation, namely: 
• NSW Rural Fire Service 
• NSW Fire Brigades 
• National Parks and Wildlife Service 
• State Forests of New South Wales 
• Local Government Authorities. 
 
Ambulance Service 
Ambulance roles and responsibilities are included in the Ambulance Service 
Act 1990 and detailed in the State DISPLAN.   The role of the Ambulance 
Service differs in that it has no responsibility for the recovery or protection of 
property.    
 
The Service does have responsibility for the protection of persons from injury 
or death regardless of whether those persons are sick or injured.   This 
means then that they could be involved in evacuations of people from nursing 
homes and similar facilities in the event of an emergency.     
 
The Ambulance Service has its own detailed plan, the Major Incident 
Disaster Plan (AMPLAN). 
 
Because the ambulance crew is often the first organisation that attends an 
incident, the Ambulance Service personnel need also to be able to identify 
the need for other Emergency Organisations.  This is particularly so in the 
need to be able to identify HAZMAT or CBR incidents.   Detailed protocols 
are given to ambulance crews to cover such eventualities.   In the case of 
CBR the protocols emphasise the Safety Guidelines of Self – Scene – 
Survivors.   There is also an emphasis on decontamination. 
 
State DISPLAN lays down roles for the Ambulance Service, these being: 
1. Provide pre-hospital care and transport for the sick and injured. 
 
2. Provide and/or assume responsibility for transport of designated 
Health Service teams and their equipment to sites of incidents or 
emergencies, receiving hospitals or emergency medical facilities when 
so requested by the Health Services Functional Area Coordinator. 
 
3. Provide coordinated communications for all health systems involved in 
emergency responses. 
 
4. As determined by the State rescue Board, provide accredited rescue 
units. 
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In New South Wales there are three participating organisations associated 
with this function: 
 
• Air Ambulance Wing 
• Surf Life Saving Association Helicopter Rescue Services 
• CareFlight Limited 
 
In addition to the above, the Ambulance Service is supported by four other 
organisations: 
 
• New South Wales Department of Health 
• St John Ambulance Australia (NSW) 
• Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia 
• Red Cross VASC 
 
State Emergency Service (SES) 
Under the NSW State Emergency Service Act 1989, the SES is the combat 
agency that has the responsibility for dealing with floods and the control of 
damage from storms and tempest.    
 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines storm as being a disturbance of the normal 
condition of the atmosphere, manifesting itself by winds of unusual force or 
direction, often accompanied by rain, snow, hail, thunder and lightning, or 
flying sand or dust.   The same reference defines tempest as an extensive 
current of wind rushing with great velocity and violence, esp. one attended by 
rain, hail, or snow; a violent storm(50). 
 
Tempest includes cyclones, tornadoes, and severe hail storms.  Australia is 
prone to such events and such storms and tempests are quite common.  
There are even local names for them and they can be referred to as a 
‘howling terror’ or ‘kooinar’ (small tropical cyclone with an eye diameter of 
less than 20 kilometres) or a ‘willy-willy’ which is a small tornado.   
 
The Prepared Community recognises the likelihood of such events as floods 
and cyclones. Building codes and mitigation projects ensure that measures 
are in place.   Sudden, unexpected storms, particularly hail storms, can 
create considerable damage in a short space of time and are difficult to 
prepare for. 
 
The SES is, like the Rural Fire Service, an organisation comprising mainly 
volunteers.  Under NSW State DISPLAN the role of the SES is the 
designated combat agency for dealing with: 
 
1. … floods, and to coordinate the rescue, evacuation and welfare of 
affected communities. 
 
2. … damage control for storms and tempests, and to coordinate the 
evacuation and welfare of affected communities. 
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The SES has two Other Roles: 
 
1. As determined by the State Rescue Board, provide accredited rescue 
units. 
 
2. On request, assist Police, Fire Brigades, Rural Fire Service and 
Ambulance Service in dealing with incidents or emergencies. 
 
The NSW State DISPLAN requires that the SES be involved only with the 
rescue of people. Once extracted from danger, the responsibility for the 
rescued persons becomes that of the Welfare Services who must assume 
responsibility as soon as possible. 
 
As combat agency for storm and tempest response, the SES may find that 
the Event Site may cover a considerable area and that added assistance 
from  the fire services and VRA may be required.    When this is provided the 
SES remains the controlling agency.   
 
Rescue 
In New South Wales the principles and procedures for rescue are detailed in 
the State Rescue Policy, published in 1991 by the State Rescue and 
Emergency Services Board (SRSEB).   This document complements the 
provisions of the State Emergency and Emergency Rescue Management 
Act, 1989. 
 
The title Rescue can only be used by units accredited by the SRSEB.  Re-
accreditation is usually required annually.   Rescue units may be from the 
Police, Fire or Ambulance Services or the State Emergency Service (SES) or 
the Volunteer Rescue Association (VRA). 
 
Units are termed as primary  or  secondary: 
• Primary Rescue Units cover 365 days a year and their principal role 
is rescue 
• Secondary Rescue Units do not have rescue as their primary role. 
 
Units are trained to a standard set by the SRSEB who supply both the 
training policy and the training materials. 
 
In New South Wales the co-ordination of rescue is a Police Service 
responsibility.   Requests for rescue personnel are made to the Police Senior 
Operations Officer (SOO) who is located in the Communications Room at the  
Sydney Police Centre.   This officer, who holds the rank of Senior Sergeant, 
will nominate which agency (police, fire, ambulance, SES or VRA) will 
provide the rescue team for that incident.   In a major incident more than one 
agency may be called on to provide teams which can result in co-ordination 
problems.   All teams will be responsible to the Police Commander but will 
take orders regarding care of casualties from the Medical or Ambulance 
Commander. 
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The SOO is responsible to the Duty Operations Inspector (DOI) who is 
interested in all rescue operations that are ‘serious, unusual or newsworthy’ 
and who will be responsible for co-ordination in the event of a major incident. 
 
Volunteer Rescue Association (VRA) 
This organisation is not covered directly by specific legislation as are the 
other combat agencies.   SERM and the State Rescue Board lay down most 
of the requirements.   In New South Wales a rescue unit of any type must be 
accredited by the State Rescue Board before it can be involved in disaster or 
incident response. 
 
The  VRA comprises a number of participating and affiliated organisations 
covering a number of different fields.  In New South Wales these include: 
 
• Marine Search and Rescue 
o The Australian Volunteer Coast Guard 
o The Royal Volunteer Coastal Patrol 
o Port Macquarie Sea Rescue Group 
o Point Danger Air Sea rescue Organisation 
o Shoalhaven Marine Rescue Association 
o Tuross Sea Rescue Group  
o Tweed Coast Sea Rescue Squad 
o Woolgoolga Rescue Squad 
o In Shore 
• Camden Haven Sea Rescue Squad 
• Narooma Rescue Squad 
• Wooli Rescue Squad 
• Land Search and Rescue 
o The Federation of Bushwalking Clubs Search and Rescue 
Group 
o The Cave Rescue Squad 
• Snowfields 
o The Ski Patrol 
• Communications 
o The Wireless Institute Civil Emergency Network (WICEN) 
o The Citizen’s Radio Emergency Service Teams (CREST) 
• Air Search and Rescue 
o The Volunteer Air Patrol 
 
NSW State DISPLAN defines the role of the VRA as: 
 
• As determined by the State Rescue Board, provide accredited rescue 
units. 
 
The responsibilities are defined as: 
 
• During emergency operations, the Volunteer Rescue Association may 
be requested to perform rescue and other specialist tasks in support of 
a combat agency, Functional Area or other Organisation. 
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Figure 7.1 - St John Ambulance treatment area for a crowd event 
Functional Areas 
Functional areas may not be involved at the site itself but may provide 
support to the combat agencies or the victims.    
 
The Functional Areas can include several organisations that perform the 
same, or similar function. NSW State DISPLAN identifies the following 
functional areas: 
• Agriculture and Animal Services 
• Communication Services 
• Emergency Finance 
• Emergency Supply 
• Engineering Services 
• Environmental Services 
• Health Services 
• Public Information Services 
• Transport Services 
• Welfare Services 
 
Each of the above functional areas has an appointed Functional Area Co-
ordinator whose task it is to coordinate the support and resources required 
for the response and recovery operations.   The Functional Area Coordinator 
has the authority to commit the resources of the organisations represented.  
 
The New South Wales State Disaster Plan (NSW State DISPLAN) defines 
the roles and functions of each of the organisations. 
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Victorian Control Agencies 
Under the Victorian Displan there is a similar degree of responsibility to New 
South Wales for coordination with some changes in the control.   
 
The designated control agencies, equivalent to the New South Wales combat 
agencies, are shown below. 
 
Event Control Authority Coordinating 
Authority 
Assassination 
Hostage crisis 
Shooting 
Bomb threat 
Police Police 
Fire 
Explosion 
Fire services Police 
Transport accident Police Police 
Airport accident Police Police 
Marine accident Police Police 
Food and water poisoning DMS/Public Health Police 
Radioactivity DMS/Public Health Police 
Epidemic DMS/Public Health Police 
Flood 
Windstorm 
SES Police 
Food or water sabotage or 
extortion 
Police Police 
  
Table 7.2 – Victorian Displan Control Agency by Event (163)
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Rank Structures 
Most of the combat agencies are uniformed and wear a badge of rank.   
Rank insignia are standardised to some extent so that insignia are worn by 
officers of an organisation of similar or equivalent rank regardless of the title. 
 
By way of illustration, shown below in figure 7.2, are the rank insignia for the 
Ambulance and Police Services. 
 
AMBULANCE
POLICE
General 
Manager 
Operations
Ambulance 
Director  
(Rural) 
(Metropolitan)
Area Manager 
(Ops Centre) 
(Education)
Sector Manager
Clinical 
Education 
Manager
District 
Officer
Clinical 
Educator
Station 
Officer II
Technical    
Educator
Station 
Officer I
Commissioner Deputy 
Commissioner
Assistant 
Commissioner
Region 
Commander
Chief 
Superintendent
Superintendent
Local Area 
Commander
Chief 
Inspector
Inspector
Duty Officer
 
Figure 7.2 - Equivalent Rank Insignia and Titles – Ambulance and Police 
 
The recognition of ranks and the equivalent in other services has been a 
problem for a long time in the Defence Forces.  Insignia differ considerably. 
The titles do not reflect the levels where for example an Army Captain is 
three ranks below that of a Navy Captain.  The method used in joint 
exercises has been to use the Army rank with an (E) following it.  Thus a 
Navy Captain would be designated as COL(E).  Not surprisingly this is still 
confusing so a new system is in use which involves a Tri-Service Rank.  The 
Army equivalents are shown below. 
 
Army Rank Abbreviation Tri-Service Rank 
Second Lieutenant 2LT O-1  (pronounced ‘Oh-one) 
Lieutenant  LT O-2 
Captain  CAPT O-3 
Major MAJ O-4 
Lieutenant Colonel LTCOL O-5 
Colonel COL O-6 
Brigadier BRIG O-7 
Major General MAJGEN  
 
Table 7.3 - Tri-Service Rank Equivalents for the Army 
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Health Service Command and Control 
Command and control for the Health Services in New South Wales is 
detailed in two publications: 
 
• New South Wales State Disaster Plan – DISPLAN (1999) 
• New South Wales State Health Services Functional Area Supporting 
Plan (1999) – NSW HEALTHPLAN 
 
These plans are further detailed for local health services at Area Health 
Service and facility (hospital) levels. 
 
The Ambulance Service of New South Wales has  a separate plan, the 
Ambulance Service of NSW Major Incident/Disaster Plan – AMPLAN. 
 
DISPLAN provides that the Coordinator is the State Health Services 
Functional Area Coordinator (HSFAC).  In health this becomes the State 
Health Services Functional Area Coordinator (State HSFAC).  Similarly at 
Area Health Service level this becomes the Area HSFAC.  
 
The role of the State HSFAC is to control and mobilise all health responses 
to any emergencies when the plan is activated and includes: 
 
• the mobilisation of the resources to the site and the initiation of patient 
management; 
• the coordination of hospital and medical response to emergencies 
• providing mental health services to victims, workers and communities 
affected; 
• provision of public health services to prevent, prepare for, respond to 
and recovers from emergencies. 
 
The State legislation, the Health Administration Act, 1982, No. 135, defines 
health services as any medical, hospital, ambulance, paramedical, 
community health or environmental health service or any other service 
relating to the maintenance or improvement of the health, or restoration to 
health, of persons or the prevention of disease in or injury to persons.  Note 
that this is the only organisation in emergency response that does not include 
in its responsibilities the safeguarding of property, only people. 
 
NSW DISPLAN lists participating health organisations as: 
 
• New South Wales Health 
• Ambulance Service of New South Wales 
• Australian Red Cross Blood Service 
• Australian red Cross (NSW Division) 
• Department of Community Services 
• Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia (NSW Section) 
• St John Ambulance Australia (NSW Division) 
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In addition to the above, NSW DISPLAN  lists as supporting organisations: 
 
• Private Hospitals 
• Nursing Homes 
• Local Government Councils 
 
This text will not deal with the responses by mental health or public health in 
any detail since these do not generally become involved in the initial 
response to a major incident. 
Levels of Disaster Management 
Legislation provides that major incidents, disasters, etc. are a state or 
territory responsibility and so all such control is from that level down. 
 
Disaster management includes a number of key positions that interact with 
health either through coordination or cooperation.   This means that they can 
task, or be asked to supply resources for, health. 
 
Position Role 
State Emergency 
Operations 
Controller 
(SEOCON) 
Person appointed by the Governor, on the 
recommendation of the responsible minister, to control 
resources in an incident that affects more than one 
district.  Also responsible for the establishment and 
controlling of the State Emergency Operations Centre. 
 
District 
Emergency 
Operations 
Controller 
(DEOCON) 
Police District Commander, appointed by the Police 
Commissioner, as DEOCON to control the allocation of 
resources in response to an incident that extends over 
more that one Local Government Area.  Is also able to 
liaise to provide resources beyond those held locally.  
(See SEOCON and LEOCON) 
 
Local Emergency 
Operations 
Controller 
(LEOCON) 
A police officer, appointed by the Police Commissioner, 
who is responsible for the control of the allocation of 
resources within the local area. during an incident. 
(See also SEOCON and DEOCON) 
 
  
Table 7.4 – Key control positions that will interact with health. 
 
In addition to the positions in emergency management listed above in Table 
7.4, there are a number of key appointments within health.  These positions 
may be filled in response to an event or be a standing appointment.  For 
example the NSW HEALTHPLAN includes a number of key positions that 
cover both health and ambulance personnel that may be activated only for an 
event or be a position holder as part of normal duties. 
 
The main positions are shown below in Table 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
117
Position Role and Responsibility 
Ambulance 
Commander 
The ambulance commander at the disaster site, responsible for 
directing and coordinating the response at the site. 
Ambulance Controller The Ambulance State Superintendent (or nominee) who, from the 
Health Service’s Disaster Control centre, assumes control of all 
ambulance service responses whilst the Plan is activated. 
Area Health Services 
Functional Area 
Coordinator (Area 
HSFAC) 
The main point of contact between State and the Area Health 
Service.  Has the authority to commit all health resources within the 
Area.  This position may be responsible for the control and 
coordination of medical services or a separate Area Medical 
Controller may also be appointed. 
Area Medical Controller Controls and coordinates the Area’s medical services resources.   
May be combined with that of the Area HSFAC 
Chief Health Officer The most senior registered medical practioner within the NSW 
Department of Health.  Responsible directly to the Director-General 
of Health.  
Delegate A person nominated to act as the representative of an officially 
appointed office holder, having the same powers and authority to 
commit the resources of the official appointee. 
Health Services Liaison 
Officer (HSLO) 
Nominated by the State HSFAC, having a detailed knowledge of the 
health system and its resources.  Deployed to the State Emergency 
Operation Centre (SEOC), the HSLO represents the State HSFAC 
at the SEOC and coordinates requests and provides the 
communication link for health. 
Hospital Disaster 
Controller 
Appointed for each hospital, on a 24 hour basis, becomes the 
contact person between the hospital and the Area HSFAC.   
Assumes command and control of the hospital’s resources whilst 
the plan is activated for either an internal or external incident. 
Hospital Medical 
Commander 
May or may not be also the Hospital Disaster Controller.  
responsible for the hospital’s medical resources during the time the 
plan is activated. 
On-Site Nurse 
Commander 
Nominated by the State HSFAC, is responsible for the nursing 
management response at a major incident site.   A senior and 
experienced emergency nurse, will be sent to the site when a field 
hospital is to be established or multiple medical teams are required 
on-site. 
State Health Services 
Functional Area 
Coordinator (State 
HSFAC) 
A senior medical officer appointed by the Minister for Health, or 
delegate, who assumes responsibility for the control and 
coordination of the arrangements detailed in the NSW 
HEALTHPLAN. 
State Medical 
Commander 
(On-Site) 
Designated senior medical officer, appointed by the Sate HSFAC for 
the responsibility of the medical aspects and clinical management of 
casualties on-site.  Liaises with the Ambulance Commander and 
other emergency services commanders on-site and the State 
HSFAC. 
 
Table 7.5 – Key positions within the NSW health system 
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Site Control 
The detailed organisation of the physical site control is given in Chapter 8, 
Scene Command and Control.   This section deals with the personnel and 
appointments associated with command and control.  Most of this 
organisation is international in many respects and, whilst titles may change, 
the concept is very similar in many parts of the world. 
 
There are a number of key persons appointed and deployed to the site. The 
On-site positions are: 
• Ambulance Commander 
• Medical Commander 
• Nurse Commander 
• Disaster Medical Disaster Medical Response Team Leader 
• Disaster Medical Response Nursing Team Leader 
 
In addition to the above there may also be structures for Mental Health and 
Public Health.  Their roles and responsibilities are not dealt with in this text.  
Ambulance Commander 
The ambulance service is usually the first of the health services to arrive at 
the scene and other teams or position holders may not even attend. 
 
Initially the first ambulance officer to arrive on-site assumes the role of 
Ambulance Commander until relieved by an appointed, or more experienced, 
officer.  The Ambulance Commander should be an officer trained in disaster 
response.  On arrival at the site, the ambulance commander establishes: 
 
• Health Services Site Command Post 
• Triage area 
• Treatment area 
• Casualty loading and despatch area 
• Direction for any members from the volunteer organisations (St John 
Ambulance, Red Cross etc.) 
 
The ambulance service is responsible for all Health Services 
communications. 
 
is responsible for all site operations.  For Health Services personnel this 
includes work locations and safety. 
 
The Ambulance Commander is responsible for the directing of volunteers, 
however it is the Medical Commander who will supervise and direct their 
work when assigned to treatment areas. 
 
On-Site Medical Commander 
This person becomes the ‘Director of Medical Services’ for the site and 
manages the care of casualties where the numbers or conditions do not allow 
the area to be cleared rapidly.   This may involve the establishment and 
control of treatment areas.  
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As well as directing all clinical aspects of the situation, the Medical 
Commander is also responsible for the administration of the site in respect to 
team needs, including the arrangement of relief teams if needed. 
 
Triage Officer 
The Medical Commander appoints a Triage Officer.   This appointment is not 
made on a seniority basis but is selected on the grounds of clinical 
experience and capability.   This means that the Triage Officer may be a 
medical, nursing or ambulance officer. 
 
Nurse Commander 
A Nurse Commander is appointed if it is necessary to establish a field 
hospital.  This would occur where numbers and conditions are such that 
there will be an appreciable delay in clearing the site. 
 
The Nurse Commander becomes a site ‘Director of Nursing’ and becomes 
responsible for the supervision of patient management.    The Nurse 
Commander also becomes responsible for managing all nurses in the 
treatment area. 
 
Resource management is also the  responsibility of the Nurse Commander 
and this includes both personnel and material resources. 
 
Disaster Medical Response Teams 
These teams belong to, and are provided by, participating, designated 
hospitals.   It is not unusual for a Disaster Medical Response Team to be 
sent from an area that is not involved with the incident so as not to deplete 
staff from receiving hospitals. 
 
For NSW the HEALTHPLAN lays down the duties and responsibilities in 
detail. 
 
The selection and despatch of a team is the responsibility of the State 
HSFAC.  This is done through the Area HSFAC or Area Medical Controller.   
On arrival the Disaster Medical Response Team comes under the command 
of the On-site Medical Commander. 
 
A Disaster Medical Response Team commonly consists of two medical 
officers and four nurses. In military organisations this is often supplemented 
by an orderly who assists with communication and administrative needs. 
 
Disaster Medical Response Teams are deployed to the site of the incident 
taking with them the disaster packs (see Equipment, Chapter 9). 
 
Disaster Medical Response Team Leader 
The Team Leader of the Disaster Medical Response Team is appointed by 
the Area HSFAC or the Area Medical Controller and is a medical practioner 
usually selected from the fields of emergency medicine, anaesthetics or 
intensive care. 
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Nursing Team Leader 
One of the nurse members of the Disaster Medical Response Team will be 
appointed as the Nursing Team Leader.   This person is a registered nurse 
(RN) who is a clinical nurse specialist (CNS) in emergency nursing and who 
has been trained in disaster management.   This person is also appointed by 
the Area HSFAC or the Area Medical Controller. 
 
Control of Medical Helicopters and Other Vehicles 
NSW HEALTH PLAN designates the State HSFAC as the controller of 
ambulance vehicles, through the Ambulance Service of New South Wales, 
and all medical helicopters.   The State HSFAC becomes solely responsible 
for the tasking of medical helicopters. 
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Scene Command and Control 
The actual scene of an incident can vary enormously depending on the 
situation.  If it is a ‘natural disaster’, such as a bushfire or a flood, then this 
can affect  anything from a relatively small local area to thousands of 
hectares of forest in the case of fires, and thousands of square kilometres of 
land in the case of floods.   Where there is a road accident or a train involved 
then the location can be small but the results can be just as expensive in 
terms of lives and property. 
 
Because of the large variety of events that can impact on the population, key 
emergency service organisations are organised so as to be able to specialise 
in various types of incident.  Such organisations are referred to as combat 
agencies.  Ambulance, Fire and Police are such agencies. To assist them in 
the control of the situation, other organisations are involved, even though 
their prime responsibility may not be that of emergency management.  Such 
agencies are Health and Agriculture.  This was dealt with in more detail in 
Response Agencies, Chapter 7. 
 
As has been previously dealt with, since there is such a diversity of possible 
incidents, emergency management works to an all hazards approach.   This 
means that there needs to be a standardised organisational structure, or set 
of procedures, that allows rapid response without confusion. 
 
There are a number of terms in use to cover the situations internationally.   
Where possible there is a tendency to make processes and terminology the 
same so that when help is provided across state, or even international 
boundaries, then there is still an understanding of the process of command 
and control to be applied.  Terminology and abbreviations are detailed in 
Chapter 13, Terminology. 
The Site 
In Australia the term applied to the actual scene of the incident is the Site.   In 
the Major Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) process used 
in the UK, the scene is referred to as the Bronze Area(87). 
 
In Australia the scene of the incident is managed by forming a series of 
perimeters or boundaries.   This may be by natural means as in a river, 
embankment etc., or some other feature such as a road, or by tape or a 
vehicle across the entry route.   The plan below in Figure 8.1, shows an 
idealised site system. 
 
The Site is divided into two main zones, designated the: 
 
• Outer Perimeter 
• Inner Perimeter 
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The Outer Perimeter 
The Outer Perimeter must be established quickly to ensure rapid access and 
egress (a one way system is preferred but not always achievable) and to 
maintain a control on both the personnel and equipment entering and leaving 
the site.  The Outer Perimeter is controlled by the Police (34). 
 
H Car Park Rest Area
Media
Marshalling & 
Assembly Area
Command 
Posts
Triage
Treatment
Ambulance 
Loading
OUTER PERIMETER
Established quickly to 
maintain access/egress and 
to ensure restricted access
ACCESS ROUTE
Restricted Access
INNER PERIMETER
Established quickly
Restricted access
EVENT SITE
Combat Agencies only
Restricted access
SITE CONTROL
Overall control & coordination
Secure location 
EGRESS ROUTE
Ambulances - evacuees
Personnel - etc. Wind Direction
Considered in setting up Control Point
 
 
Figure 8.1 - Idealised site organisation and layout 
The Inner Perimeter 
An Inner Perimeter may also be established around the actual event and 
entry and egress to this is also controlled.   Entry is via Site Control where all 
control and coordination takes place.   This area must be secure to enable 
effective management. 
 
Site Control Point 
In most situations where a response is required by an emergency service 
organisation then the organisation having responsibility for that type of 
incident, for example the Fire Brigade in response to a fire or a HAZMAT 
incident, takes control of the Event Site and establishes a Site Control point 
at the entry to the Inner Perimeter. 
   
Command Posts 
Command posts for responding organisations are located within the Outer 
Perimeter.  This may simply consist of a vehicle with a communications link.  
All personnel must report to the Command Posts on arrival for briefing and 
the delegation of tasks.  Initially this will usually be the first police car, 
ambulance or fire appliance on the scene which then becomes the post and 
one of the officers becomes the commander until relieved by a person more 
senior. 
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Other Facilities 
Rest areas, vehicle parking and a helipad may also be included within the 
Outer Perimeter. 
 
Treatment Area 
If required this will be on the Site and positioned close to the Inner Perimeter.   
According to the AEM Glossary, this position is known by a number of names 
and may be called the Patient Treatment Post, the Casualty Treatment Post 
or the Casualty Clearing Area(34). 
 
The location is determined by the Site Controller in consultation with medical 
and ambulance commanders and is selected to meet the following criterion: 
 
• Safe 
• Close to the Egress Route 
• Vehicle access 
• Loading area for vehicles 
  
It is not necessary that parking for vehicles, other than those actually being 
loaded, be provided on the Site.   An ambulance holding point may be distant 
and vehicles called forward as required. 
Health, Scene Management Arrangements 
This will comprise a number areas or locations and key personnel.   Initially it 
is common for a single ambulance vehicle to be the first health personnel on 
site.  They are tasked with reporting the incident (ETHANE) and the 
establishing of a Forward Command Post.   From this the scene will develop 
as dictated by the event and the conditions prevailing at the time.  
 
Personnel may vary considerably in numbers and service depending upon 
the incident and the duration before all casualties are extracted and 
evacuated.    
 
As has been mentioned previously, this text deals only with the response and 
not the recovery phases on an incident. 
 
Forward Command Post  
The first ambulance to arrive becomes the Forward Command Post.   The 
driver remains with the vehicle. The lights are left on. This means that the 
driver can move the vehicle if necessary, is in radio contact with base and the 
lights indicate the point of control.   All other vehicles turn their lights off on 
arrival.  Internationally, for health, the vehicle should be marked by a flashing 
green light. 
 
Casualty Collecting Area 
This is in addition to the Treatment Area and is where casualties are taken 
when removed from danger.   Where there is no major hazard then triage 
may be performed at the Event Site.   Where there is danger however, they 
are removed from that location and are triaged in a place that is as near as 
possible to the Event Site but where it is safe for personnel and survivors. 
 
 
127
Patient Treatment Post 
This area is established as close to the Incident Site as is safely possible so 
that carrying the casualties is not too arduous.   It must be large enough to 
hold both the casualties and the support staff.   It needs to be protected from 
the elements where possible and be near to vehicle access. 
 
The treatment area is used for: 
 
• Secondary triage 
• Resuscitation 
• Initial treatment 
• Packaging for transport 
 
It may also be close to a body holding area for deceased victims.  
 
Ambulance Loading Point 
This is the area where the casualty is loaded for transport to a hospital.   At 
this place identity is checked and the destination recorded before loading. 
 
This site is chosen with the following in mind: 
 
• Located as close as possible to the exit of the Treatment Area 
• Large enough to accept more than one vehicle 
• Good access with ideally ‘one-way traffic’ 
• Safe from hazards and as clear as possible from other traffic. 
 
It must also be remembered that the types of vehicle used can vary 
considerably and this too must be considered in the establishment of the 
point. 
 
Ambulance Holding Point 
This is an area where ambulances are held before moving to the Loading 
Point. This location also has particular needs and the position selected must 
be: 
 
• Accessible 
• Large enough to hold all the responding vehicles 
• In good communication with the Loading Point. 
• As close as possible to the site but where it will not cause traffic 
congestion 
 
The Holding Point may also be used as a preparation area for the vehicles 
and a rest area for crews.    
 
Because of the above requirements, the Holding Point may be located some 
distance from the scene.  Since communication is one of the essentials, 
vehicles can be called forward with a lead time if there is any significant 
travel time between the two locations.   Physically the Holding Point will need 
to be larger than the Loading Point and this also will influence the location of 
the site.  
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Disaster Field Hospital 
The NSW Functional Area Supporting Plan 2001 and NSW STATE DISPLAN 
allow for the establishment of a Disaster Field Hospital when the situation 
requires it.  This is a facility established at the site when it is not practical to 
transport all the casualties quickly from the location of the incident to a 
general hospital(3).    
 
A Disaster Field Hospital may be required because of the overwhelming 
numbers of casualties or because of the inability of the transport available to 
cope due to too few vehicles, or the conditions of the roads, or weather.  
 
Such a facility will be set up to provide triage, resuscitation and initial 
treatment of casualties prior to evacuation.   In many cases the treatment 
provided could remove the need to evacuate to a hospital in cases of minor 
trauma or illnesses.   The facility would also support rescue workers needs 
for minor, first aid type treatment.  
Health Personnel 
As the scene develops, the ambulance service (40) may appoint: 
 
• Transport Officer – Usually one of the first officers on site. 
• Casualty Officer – An early arrival tasked with estimating casualty 
numbers, liaises with the other emergency services to determine 
hazards and safety procedures, identifies additional equipment that will 
be required as well as commencing primary triage and treatment.   
• Triage Officer – Taken by the most medically skilled officer, will triage 
and tag at the incident site. 
• Ambulance Commander – Takes command of ambulance resources at 
the scene.  Where there is no medical controller, then also performs 
that role. 
• Liaison Officer – Appointed by the Commander, liaises with the other 
agencies present. 
• Loading Officer – Supervises loading of casualties and checks 
destination and identity. 
 
Disaster Medical Response Teams need not be sent to all incidents.  Where 
they are, then the following will usually be appointed: 
 
• Medical Commander – Medical officer who controls the medical 
management aspects and commands all medical teams at the site 
• Deputy Medical Commander – Assists the Medical Commander and 
may act as a medical liaison officer 
• Medical Team Leader – Medical officer in charge of the Disaster 
Medical Response Team despatched from a hospital 
• Triage Officer – Carries out triage, usually at the secondary triage 
treatment area. 
• Nurse Commander – Appointed where a large treatment facility is 
established and will be in place for a significant time.   Responsible for 
the nursing aspects of the response.  
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Special Incidents 
In the case of special incidents, that is those involving chemical, biological or 
radiological (CBR) hazards, the layout of the scene in respect to the Event 
Site and the Inner Perimeter may change.   A layout showing the relative 
sections is shown below in figure 8.2. 
 
The Site is now further divided into three zones: 
• Hot Zone – The contaminated area and Incident Site. 
 
• Warm Zone – This area includes the Decontamination Area, HAZMAT 
Control, an Emergency Safe Haven and a Police Evidence Collection 
Point. 
 
• Cold Zone – Services and arrangements as in the standard Outer 
Perimeter. 
 
Whilst wind direction was a factor in the positioning for the standard system, 
in HAZMAT incidents it is also necessary to consider slope and drainage so 
as to contain hazardous materials. 
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Responders
DECONTAMINATION
 
 
Figure 8.2 -  Idealised Layout – HAZMAT Incident 
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Hot Zone 
This is the Event Site.  Entrance to this area will be strictly limited to trained 
personnel who are wearing appropriate protective equipment.   Numbers of 
responders and equipment entering this location will be kept to a minimum. 
 
In establishing boundaries, containment issues such as drainage, ground 
slope and wind direction, will be important. 
 
Warm Zone 
The HAZMAT Control Point will be situated inside, and at the entrance to, 
this zone.  This is equivalent to the Site Control in the standard site but is an 
additional area in the Special Incident. 
 
The Warm Zone also includes an Emergency Safe Haven where staff can 
retreat to if the conditions worsen.   The Police and forensic evidence 
collection point is included in the Warm Zone since all evidence must be 
either decontaminated or packaged before it can leave the site. 
 
All personnel and equipment leaving the Hot Zone must be decontaminated 
and then proceed to a holding area before leaving the site or returning to the 
Hot Zone.   The holding area will also function as a rest area.  Because the 
work is often arduous and uncomfortable in the special protection suits, staff 
will be relieved and rested at frequent intervals.  
 
In most situations, triage is not performed until survivors are decontaminated. 
 
Cold Zone 
This is similar to the area within the Outer Perimeter and will contain 
treatment facilities, ambulance loading points and despatch areas.   
 
Triage is carried out at the junction of the Cold Zone and the 
Decontamination Point.   Some basic ‘ABC’ procedures may be performed 
before decontamination but, because working in the protective suits is difficult 
and requires special training, this will be minimal 
 
In Special Situations, uninjured survivors, once decontaminated, will still pass 
through the treatment areas and will be observed where appropriate since 
some symptoms may not become evident for several hours following 
exposure. 
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Aircraft Incidents 
Aircraft accidents involve other agencies depending on whether the incident 
involves civil or military aircraft. 
 
In the event of civil aircraft accidents the controlling body is the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) which is a branch of the Australian 
Department of Transport and Regional Services.  The ATSB was formed in 
1999 with the reorganisation of the then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation 
(BASI)(14). 
 
The Australian Defence Force is responsible for dealing with military aircraft 
incidents(152). 
 
These types of incident have some differences in handling at the site. 
 
Civil Aircraft Incidents 
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) uses a protocol originally 
developed by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) and issued to all 
Police and Emergency Services (26). 
 
ATSB are not concerned with incidents involving military aircraft unless civil 
aircraft were also involved.   Otherwise when any incident where an aircraft is 
damaged in the air or on the ground, or where anyone is injured as the result 
of aircraft operations, occurs then ATSB must be notified. 
 
The ATSB categorises incidents as shown below.  Generally only categories 
1, 2 and 3 are investigated on-site. 
 
Category Description of incident 
1 
Occurrences involving High Capacity Air Transport operations 
where the facts indicate a significant threat to the safety of the 
travelling public or are the subject of widespread public interest. 
2 
Those involving other than High capacity Air Transport operations 
where the facts indicate significant threat to the safety of the 
travelling public or are the subject of widespread public interest. 
3 
Those where the facts indicate actual or potential serious safety 
deficiencies or there is significant concern for public safety.  The 
category is used when there is a need for an in-depth  
investigation to determine the facts. 
4 
Occurrences where the facts do not indicate a serious safety 
deficiency but investigations are required to substantiate the 
initial reported facts.  The circumstances are sufficiently complex 
to require detailed information from the pilot, operator, and/or 
other involved parties.  This category may also include a 
selection of occurrences identified as involving characteristics, 
which from trend or safety analysis, require investigation. 
5 Primarily of statistical interest and are not generally investigated. 
  
Table 8.1  ATSB Investigation Categories (14)
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When an aircraft crashes, the ATSB require some specific information.  In 
particular the following data, where known, should be reported (26): 
 
a. Aircraft type and registration letters (in Australia this is VH 
followed by an additional three letters). 
b. Name of owner or operator. 
c. Names of pilot and any other persons on board. 
d. Date and time of the crash. 
e. Aircraft’s last departure point and its destination. 
f. Location of the crash, including directions as to how to reach 
the scene. 
g. Nature of any injuries suffered by persons. 
h. Nature of the crash. 
i. Extent of damage to the aircraft. 
j. Action taken to prevent disturbance of the wreckage pending 
arrival of the investigating officer. 
k. Name and telephone number of the originator of the advice. 
 
The wreckage should be preserved as much as possible, excepting for 
anything done for the removal of  survivors or where the wreckage may catch 
fire, sink into water or creates a danger to other transport or the public.   
Preservation of the wreckage also includes any marks on the ground from 
impact or flying debris.  Of prime concern will be the recovery of the flight 
recorder (the black box). 
 
Modern aircraft also present additional hazards from their construction.  In 
particular it is essential that precautions be taken since hazardous materials 
can be present such as: 
 
• Airborne synthetic products similar in nature to asbestos fibres. 
• Toxic chemicals that can be inhaled or absorbed through the skin. 
• Engine fuel. 
• Explosive devices such as oxygen cylinders, high pressure tyres and 
hydraulic accumulators. 
• Pathogenic products. 
 
In Australia, the states and territories have agreed that all victims will be 
subjected to a post-mortem examination to both identify the victim and to 
examine the nature of the injuries.   Such examinations should be performed 
by an experienced pathologist. 
 
Military Aircraft Incidents 
For Australia, the Occupational Health and Safety Directorate of the Office of 
the Surgeon General, Australian Defence Force (OSGADF), has issued 
safety guidelines for emergency services personnel respond to accidents 
involving military aircraft (151).    
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The advice included in the guidelines is aimed at: 
 
• minimisation of injury and loss of life; 
• reduction of property loss from damage or fire; and 
• prevention of loss of clues to the cause of the accident. 
 
The guidelines offer an immediate action checklist: 
 
1. Extract and gather survivors. 
2. Render first aid. 
3. Extinguish open fires. 
4. Notify nearest Police Station. 
5. Notify nearest Military Air Base. 
6. Guard the wreckage. 
 
The reporting procedure is very similar to that required by the civil authorities 
with the addition of the location of where rescue and emergency vehicles will 
be met to be guided to the site. 
 
On arrival military personnel will take over as site controllers. 
 
The guidelines also emphasise the dangers outlined in the civil situation and 
add that there should be no smoking and no eating in the vicinity. 
 
Because of the nature of military aircraft, other dangers, in addition to those 
found in civil aircraft, may be present.  These will include: 
 
• Ejection seats. 
• Explosive ordinance. 
• Hazardous cargo. 
 
Wing mounted tanks or  armament pods offer special danger and should 
never be disturbed.   Similarly care must be taken when any such objects are 
found that have been thrown clear from the aircraft. 
 
In the military situation it is possible that responders will find that there is no 
one there.  This may be because they ejected from the aircraft, were thrown 
clear or could have survived and gone in search of assistance.  
 
Where a crew member is still in the seat, then extreme care must be taken 
not to operate the ejection seat.  The operating handle safety pin should be  
inserted before attempting to move the crew member.  The operating handle 
is painted yellow and black.   The member will probably also be wearing a 
harness as well as oxygen and radio connections. 
 
Military aircraft will be marked with information to assist rescuers.    Break-in 
points are marked with yellow arrows, bordered with black and containing the 
word RESCUE a s shown in figure 8.3. 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESCUE 
 
Figure 8.3 - Rescue point indicator. 
 
Normal hatch openings will also be marked with the words ‘NORMAL HATCH 
OPEN – PUSH & TURN’.  An arrow indicates the direction to turn the handle. 
 
Cut-out panels will be indicated for use if the doors are blocked or won’t 
operate.  These will be indicated by the words ‘EMERGENCY RESCUE – 
CUT HERE’ surrounded by a yellow box. 
 
Additional markings and signs will indicate where there is danger.  This will 
be in a red coloured triangle bearing the word ‘DANGER’ and the nature of 
the danger. 
 
The location of such items as asbestos gloves axes, fire extinguishers and 
first aid kits will also be indicated. 
 
Composite Fibres 
With military aircraft in particular and civil aircraft to a lesser extent, there is 
the problem associated with the construction of the aircraft in the inclusion of 
additional materials. 
 
The Aviation Rescue Fire Fighting Service Australia, points out that 
composite fibres are produced when two or more unlike materials are 
combined in such a way that the materials will still retain their own unique 
properties.  This allows the construction of very strong, light and complex 
components. In the case of military aircraft this may also make them less 
visible to radar(1).  
 
Examples of such materials include: 
 
• Fibreglass 
• Graphite 
• Carbon Fibre. 
 
Military aircraft may be constructed with levels of carbon fibre up to 90 per 
cent, as for example in the stealth aircraft, whilst in civil aircraft currently this 
can reach 20 per cent, as in the case of the A380. 
 
On burning, the fibres can release toxic gasses.  This means that when there 
is a crash site, with or without fire, the presence of fibres can not be 
excluded.   This means that entry to the site may need to be controlled.   
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Equipment 
Equipment can be divided into two categories: 
 
• Personal (protective and comfort) 
• Medical (that used to extricate, treat and package survivors) 
 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) must meet certain requirements to be 
of any value.  Principally, these requirements fall into three categories which 
are: 
 
• Protective  
• Durable and Comfortable 
• Visible and Recognisable 
 
In the hospital setting doctors in white coats and nurses in uniform are both 
recognisable and comforting to patients and visitors, whilst in the field, at a 
major incident, they are inappropriate and dangerous.   Respondents to the 
situation, dressed like this, should be denied access to the scene (87). 
 
Protective 
This means that the equipment must protect the body of the wearer. In 
particular, the equipment must provide protection to: 
 
• Head 
• Eyes and face 
• Hearing 
• Body 
• Hands 
• Feet 
 
Protection to the head may be a helmet (hard-hat) but if the team member is 
working in a casualty clearing station then this may not be required.  If the 
location is in the sun then protection could be a shade-hat and in the rain a 
waterproof hat but in the cold then beanie would be appropriate.  Note that 
the base-ball cap is may not be considered to be able to provide adequate 
protection from the sun.  Where disaster response work requires the head to 
be lowered, to look at the casualties condition for example, this also means 
that the back of the neck is not protected. 
 
Eyes and face follow similar requirements.   A mask to keep out dust and a 
pair of goggles may be all that is required.   
 
Hearing protection is best provided by ear-plugs that do not cut all noise out 
but reduce to it a safe level so that conversation can still take place. 
 
Body protection is probably universal now in that full body overalls (or its two 
piece equivalent) are now provided to hospitals with response teams.   
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Hands need protection from a variety of hazards and accordingly leather 
gloves, surgical gloves or chemical resistant gloves will be required to suit 
the situation. 
 
Feet will generally be protected by boots or sturdy shoes.  These need to be 
able to resist falling objects, be fully closed and waterproof to splashes or 
damp conditions.  Safety boots and shoes are preferred since these meet the 
above requirements and in addition will be acid and oil resistant. 
 
The equipment must also be protective against the hazards present.  The all-
hazards approach will mean that a variety of equipment must be readily 
available to the responder. 
 
The hazards will include such things as: 
 
• Weather 
• Sharp materials such as metal and glass 
• Blood and body fluids (BBF) 
• Fire 
• Chemicals, Biological or Radioactive substances (CBR) 
 
It must be remembered that Australia is a land of considerable contrasts so 
far as weather is concerned.  High temperatures, that is above 40°C in the 
summer months to below freezing point in the winter.   Similarly weather 
conditions can vary from drought, with accompanying dust, to high humidity 
and rain which can be anything between drizzle to torrential.   Clothing must 
be available to meet any of these conditions. 
 
Most of the sharp objects, as in debris, are catered for by the use of overalls, 
boots and leather gloves. 
 
Blood and body fluid exposure may require, in addition to protection for the 
eyes and hands, some form of waterproof apron. 
 
Protection against fire is allowed for in that the overalls are fire retardant.   
Helmets and boots will also offer protection.   Jumpers, where worn, should 
be wool or wool and cotton mix. 
 
Chemical, Biological or Radiological (CBR) incidents are a special category 
and will be directed by the appropriate combat agency.   The agency 
responsible will lay down the type of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
that will be required.   This may be a full suit and gas mask or just a cape 
depending on the degree of risk.   It must be remembered that working in 
PPE requires experience and members of teams that may respond to such 
incidents must be trained and practice wearing the equipment regularly. 
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Figure 9.1  Full protection suits (PPE) for CBR incidents 
 
 
Durable and Comfortable 
The durability of equipment is important.   Working under adverse conditions 
for long stretches will mean that the equipment must be able to take the 
strain of the conditions over the duration of the recovery time. Plastic rain-
wear, whilst adequate for casual trips into the rain, may not be able withstand 
the heavy stress of a major incident.   
 
Individual comfort is important.   Equipment must fit properly and be neither 
too loose nor too tight.   In hot and humid conditions, air flow is important.  
 
Boots are of particular importance.   It is essential that they fit well and that 
appropriate socks are worn.   The footwear should be worn previously to 
ensure that it is comfortable over an extended period. 
 
The choice of underwear is similarly important.   It too must be comfortable 
and a spare set should be available. 
 
Visible and Recognisable 
There are two requirements here.   Visible means that the person should 
standout from the scene.  This usually means a bright colour, generally with 
reflective material, that will make the person clearly visible at a distance.  
This is often achieved by use of a tabard over the outer clothing.  
Recognisable means that the person should be identifiable as to the 
organisation from which they come as well as their position if appropriate.  
There are Australian standards that specify the requirements. 
 
Internationally, certain colours are allotted to combat and support agencies.  
These are shown below in Table 9.1. 
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Service Identifying Colour  
Fire Brigade/Rural Fire Service Red 
Police Blue 
Ambulance/Health Green 
State Emergency Service (SES) Orange 
 
Table 9.1 – Response agency identifying colours 
 
Protective overalls are in these base colours.  
 
The illustration below shows members of the SES in their regulation 
protective overalls.   The person on the left of the picture is wearing the older 
style overall without reflective tape.   The person in the centre is wearing a 
two-piece set, this has reflective tape on the sleeves and legs of the pants.   
The person on the right is wearing a one piece ‘boiler suit’ overall with 
reflective tape around the middle. All three have the words ‘State Emergency 
Service’ across the back and all are manufactured in the standard orange 
colour that designates that organisation.  In the field, the soft caps would be 
replaced by hard hats. 
 
 
Figure 9.2 - SES members wearing Protective Overalls and Boots 
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Tabards 
Tabards are often worn over clothing in order to identify specific position  
holders or branches.   In NSW Health they have the designation Doctor, 
Nurse, and Mental Health etc.  In addition the position of Commander will 
also be displayed. Other states simply use the designation, ‘Health’.  
Queensland uses the one title, ‘Medical’.  The tabards are also fitted with 
reflective tapes for visibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 - Medical Team from Western Sydney Area Health Service ready to deploy (49)
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Field Medical Equipment 
Until recently most of the medical equipment used for major incident 
response, whilst following a basic pattern, tended to be adapted suit the 
preferences of individuals.  This meant that there was little consistency and 
team members who moved from one establishment to another had to learn a 
whole new system.  
 
The Olympic Games of the year 2000, conducted in Sydney, New South 
Wales, provided the opportunity for the NSW Counter Disaster Unit of the 
NSW Department of Health to review and then to standardise the equipment 
held at hospitals and centres for response to incidents involving pre-hospital 
care.   These sets were assembled and field tested during the Olympic 
Games period and, following review by the NSW Health Services Functional 
Area Coordinators, introduced across the state (82). 
 
Disaster planning ensures that identified facilities are able to field response 
teams to any major incident.  Teams consist of two medical officers and four 
nursing officers and equipment packs are designed to meet their needs in the 
field. 
 
The kits were designed so as to allow each team to be able to treat: 
 
• 4 critically injured patients (e.g. patients who have been intubated); 
• 4 severely injured patients (e.g. those needing IV therapy or drugs); 
• 10 walking wounded. 
 
A complete set of equipment for each team consists of a series of packs 
made up as: 
 
• 2 critical care packs; 
• 2 resupply bags (one red and one blue); 
• 2 basic-support dressing packs; 
• 6 comfort packs (one per team member) 
 
The equipment is assembled identically, both in container and contents, for 
all teams across the state for the main packs.   
 
A A
B
B
C
D D
 
 
Figure 9.4 - Complete set of equipment for one team (two medical and four nursing officers) 
A –  Critical Care Packs (2) 
 
B –  Basic Support and 
Dressing packs (2) 
 
C -  Comfort Packs  
 (1 per team member) 
 
D - Resupply Packs 
 (2 – Red x 1 Blue x 1) 
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Personal comfort packs have a basic content but can be personalised to 
meet individual needs. 
 
Each of the packs is arranged so that contents are easily accessible.  
Individual units are easily identifiable and contain sub-packs where 
necessary to make accessibility quick. The sub-packs can be removed from 
the pack as a complete working set. 
 
The kits are monitored and evaluated after each use to ensure that 
modifications and adjustments to the contents can made as indicated. 
 
All the packs were designed with occupational health and safety in mind and 
are assembled to ensure that weight is not excessive and that each team can 
carry all its equipment without undue strain. 
 
Detailed contents of the bags, as at the 1st of May 2001, are included in the 
appendix.  Basically however, the kits are assembled as follows. 
 
Critical Care Packs 
There are two of these to each team.   The pack itself, obtained from 
CareFlight, is a Thomas Pack, red in colour and standard in design.  When 
packed the critical care pack weighs approximately 15 kg. 
 
These packs contain most of the equipment required for respiratory, 
circulation and pneumothorax treatment.    They also contain the drug packs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.5 - Critical Care (Thomas) Pack 
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The pack contains a number of sub-packs: 
 
• Drug Box (coloured yellow) and divided into a number of 
compartments. 
 
• The Respiratory Pack is contained in the white intubation roll, with a 
hand-operated sucker, stored in the large front pocket of the pack.   
Spare disposables for the sucker are stored in the red resupply bag.   
 
Also in the pack are two Laerdal bags, oxygen masks and nebulising 
equipment. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.6 -  Internal layout – Critical Care Pack 
 
• The circulation pack is packed into three orange coloured bundles 
each of which provides all the equipment required to cannulate and 
to commence an intravenous (IV) fluid.   Additional fluids are held in 
the resupply bags.  The kit includes an 8.5 French rapid infusion 
device and a pressure bag. 
 
 
146 
 
• The pneumothorax equipment is divided between the two side 
pouches and the inner pocket. 
 
As well as the main packs detailed above, the kit also includes a 
stethoscope, an aneroid sphygmomanometer, a torch, thermal blanket, 
trauma shears, syringes and needles of a variety of sizes and gauges. 
 
Basic Support and Dressing Pack 
The pack contains dressings, swabs and multi-trauma dressings in the large 
zippered compartment.  The see-through pocket holds gloves, and a set of 
three, adult oropharyngeal (Guedel) airways and the pocket in the main 
section holds a variety of shell dressings and bandages. 
 
The side pockets hold such items as trauma shears, safety pins, pens, 
marker pens, torches and ‘glow sticks’ and digital thermometers. 
 
The main section holds a sphygmomanometer and alcohol wipes whilst 
triage tags and soap will be found in the centre. 
 
Figure 9.7 - Basic Support and Dressing Pack 
 
The bag is carried as a ‘bum-bag’ and can be worked from whilst still being 
carried or it can be placed on the ground and opened out.   The weight of the 
unit is in the order of 5 kg. 
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Resupply Packs 
There are two resupply packs to each team set.  One is colour coded red and 
the other blue. These can be carried either slung over the shoulder or as a 
backpack. 
 
The red bag holds, in addition to the half of the resupplies, the amputation 
pack.  
 
The blue bag has the remainder of the resupplies, the paediatric extras pack 
and the cut-down pack. 
 
Blue Pack Red Pack 
Figure 9.8 - The Resupply Bags 
 
The red bag holds cleaning solutions, water, and wipes.  There is also a 
plastic box with a nail scrubbing brush, waterproof paper, a clipboard with a 
pen, ‘visi-shields’ and eye-streams. 
 
The red bag also holds the amputation set. 
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The blue bag contains a surgical cut-down pack and hard collars.  The 
paediatric extras include a Laerdal bag, face masks, airways and oxygen 
tubing and the circulation set includes cannulae, intraosseous needles, a 
giving set and an elbow splint. 
 
Both bags also contain intravenous fluids and additional personal items for 
the team’s use. 
 
Comfort Bag 
The last item in the set is a comfort pack. This contains items for the personal 
needs of the team member where they may be deployed for some time in 
addition to items for immediate use. 
 
In the case of the comfort bag, this bag itself is not a standard item and any 
suitable basic pack will do.  
Individualism allows easy 
recognition by the owner. 
 
The contents of the bag include 
such items as a toothbrush and 
toothpaste, soap, shaving gear, 
insect repellent, tissues, water and 
spare socks. 
 
For immediate use the kit contains 
a whistle, torch and torch batteries, 
a beanie, goggles, rain protection, 
dust masks, leather gloves, and 
kneepads. The helmet can also be 
carried in the pack when not in use. 
 
In addition, wallets, money, mobile 
phone, sanitary items, medications, 
sun cream and the like can be 
added by the team member. 
 
Figure 9.9 - The Comfort Pack. 
 
Kit Maintenance 
Facilities who have such kits must make certain that they are inspected at 
regular intervals to ensure that contents are in good condition.   It is essential 
that where drugs are involved then these must be checked or rotated to 
ensure that they do not go out of date. 
 
It is important to make sure that the standard contents and system of packing 
are maintained.   Any personalisation by way of preferred drugs or equipment 
should be avoided in order that any trained team member can go to any pack 
confident in knowing what should be there and where, within the pack, it will 
be.   It is only in the comfort packs that any personalisation can be allowed. 
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Triage 
Meaning 
The word triage is a French word meaning sifting and comes from the word 
‘trier’ to sort.  It was originally a process applied to coffee(68).    
 
Triage is now usually considered to be a military medicine term meaning to 
sort the sick and wounded on the basis of urgency (132).    The Australian 
Emergency Management Glossary defines triage as ‘the process by which 
casualties are sorted, prioritised and distributed according to their need for 
first aid, resuscitation, emergency transport and definitive care(62). 
 
There is in addition, a process referred to as negative or reverse triage.   St 
John Ambulance Australia defines this as when ‘in a disaster situation, the 
least seriously injured are evacuated before the most seriously injured’(62). 
History of Triage 
Historically the introduction of a system of triage is attributed to Surgeon 
Marshall Dominique Jean Larrey, the chief medical officer under Napoleon.    
Larrey utilised a system for the sorting of casualties that presented to field 
dressing stations with the highest priority being given to the minor wounded 
(reverse triage) who could be returned quickly to the line with a minimum of 
treatment (87).   
 
The British Army also introduced a system of triage during the Napoleonic 
Wars and Garet Rodgers, in her book Brother Surgeons (136) about the British 
surgeons John and William Hunter, recounts John Hunter’s description of the 
Battle of Belle Isle.  The triage used an expectant category, that is it was 
anticipated that the casualty would not survive, and in this event the survivor, 
conscious or not, was simply thrown over the side of the ship. 
 
During World War 1 the United States Army used the word triage to describe 
the area in which the sorting was carried out rather than the process itself.    
In the New Zealand  Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), 
triage is defined as ‘an area and a process where patients are taken to for 
treatment in a priority order’.   
 
Whilst the practice of triage is now established as an essential part of the 
management system, it usually means the process of assigning a treatment 
priority rather than a location. 
 
In military campaigns the situation can change rapidly and a treatment facility 
may suddenly find itself overwhelmed by casualties. Under these 
circumstances the top priority will usually be given to those who can best be 
helped with the minimum amount of resources and time.   This situation 
Collins (41) likens to the principle of ‘the survival of the fittest.’ 
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Objective of Triage 
According to Hodgetts, the objective of the triage process is to achieve the 
greatest good for the greatest number of  casualties(87).   Outcomes are not 
only to deliver the patient to the right place as quickly as practical, in order to 
provide optimum treatment, but also to do the ‘most for the most’.   
Casualties who are unlikely to recover may not be given a high priority that 
will use scarce resources or time.These casualties are designated expectant. 
 
Triage was first used by the military as a process of sorting casualties into a 
priority order for evacuation and treatment, with the objective of the most 
good for the most casualties.   It should be noted that this differs from the 
usual medical practice of providing the most good for all casualties (41). 
 
In practice triage should be used when the number of casualties is more than 
the skilled assistance available.   Thus in a motor vehicle accident there may 
be four or five casualties but only two ambulance officers or, in the event of a 
major incident, even though there is a major facility available,  the number of 
casualties is so large that some decisions on priority must be made. 
 
In order to give some guidance and consistency a number of systems have 
been devised to assist in the process. 
Hospital Triage 
Patients on arrival at a hospital, by own means or by ambulance, are 
examined and allotted a priority.   In the hospital setting this is referred to as 
triage.  There is some confusion in that the term can be applied to the 
location at which the assessment is performed and a patient will be asked to 
‘wait at triage’ where the ‘triage area’ is what is meant. 
 
In hospital emergency departments the philosophy is to treat life threatening 
cases first with minor or non-urgent cases often waiting a considerable time 
to be attended to.   In America this process can also involve the turning away 
of those who are not considered to be urgent. This process is known as 
‘gatekeeping’(106). 
 
At most hospitals the triage is performed by a nurse.  Each patient is 
assessed on arrival and is allotted a category which is based on the 
Australasian College for Emergency Medicine’s National Triage Scale (10). 
 
There are five categories in the scale: 
• Category 1 - Should be seen by a doctor immediately 
• Category 2 – Should be seen by a doctor within 10 minutes 
• Category 3 – Should be seen by a doctor within 30 minutes 
• Category 4 – Should be seen by a doctor within 1 hour  
• Category 5 – Should be seen by a doctor within 2 hours 
 
This means that a higher category patient will be seen before a lower 
category regardless of how long the lower category has been waiting.   It is a 
dynamic process and patients who deteriorate will have their category altered 
accordingly. 
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Timing 
Triage is a dynamic process.   It may even begin with the casualties 
themselves deciding whether or not skilled assistance is required.   The 
condition of the casualty can also change and this change can be for the 
better or the worse depending upon the injuries or treatment received.   
Similarly each move will require a reassessment.  The initial triage may be at 
the scene, then at the Treatment Area and on arrival at a hospital.   If the 
casualty’s condition changes at the same location then again reassessment 
is necessary. 
 
The evacuation process is tightly bound to the triage priorities.   Movement 
from the site is associated with a process of casualty regulation. Note the 
regulation process does not send casualties back in large numbers but in 
relatively small packets so as to avoid overloading the receiving hospital.   
Even the choice of receiving hospital may be governed by waiting time for 
surgery rather than the number of empty beds. 
Pre-Hospital Triage 
The Ambulance Service of New South Wales has a number of protocols for 
its teams to guide them in dealing with casualties in the field.   Protocols 4 
and 5 deal with triage (5). 
 
Protocol 5 is designed for any ambulance crews attending ‘multiple victim 
situations’.  The Protocol explains that this is whenever the number of victims 
exceeds the available resources. 
 
In such a situation there are three steps in the procedure: 
 
1. Raise Alarm (ETHANE, see Communications), Reconnoitre, Report 
and Take Command. 
2. Move victims from danger and give basic field treatment 
3. Move victims through triage point and label 
 
The triage system used is that of the Triage Sieve detailed below. 
 
Where the situation is within the resources available then triage is still carried 
out under the Pre-hospital Triage of Trauma guidelines. The objective of this 
process is to ensure that the patient reaches an appropriate treatment facility 
in sufficient time. 
 
Protocol 4 looks at vital signs, serious injury and high risk situations to decide 
whether the patient should be taken to the nearest hospital or to a Major 
Trauma Service (Metropolitan) or the rural equivalent, a Designated Protocol 
4 Hospital. 
 
The indicators for vital signs are given as: 
1. Respiratory distress – rate <10 or >30 
2. Systolic blood pressure <90 or no palpable radial pulse in a child 
3. L.O.C. is V, P, or U. 
4. Serious trauma to any body region 
5. Burns, partial or full >20% in adults or >10% in children. 
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Serious injury is defined as: 
1. Penetrating injury of: 
a. head 
b. neck 
c. chest 
d. abdomen 
e. perineum 
f. back 
2. Head; 
a. 1 or 2 dilated pupils 
b. open head injury 
c. severe facial injury 
3. Chest; 
a. subcutaneous emphysema 
b. major flail segment 
4. Abdomen; 
a. distension 
b. rigidity 
5. Spinal; 
a. weakness 
b. sensory loss 
6. Major limb; 
a. vascular injury with ischaemia of limb 
b. amputation 
c. crush injury of limb or trunk 
d. bilateral femur fractures 
 
The Protocol also takes time into consideration.  Where any of the above are 
present then, if the time to extract as well as the time to transport would 
exceed 30 minutes, the nearest hospital is used or paramedic or medical 
assistance is requested to be sent to the scene.   
Who Performs Triage 
In the mass casualty, major incident situation, the triage officer should be 
clearly identified. 
 
Basically the triage officer should be the most experienced person on the 
site.  Ideally this will be a medical officer with surgical training.   Where a 
medical officer is not available then this role can be carried out by the most 
experienced ambulance or nursing officer present. In most situations 
ambulance officers will be the first health personnel to arrive and the task of 
triaging will fall to them.  Again it is the most experienced officer who should 
perform that role. 
 
There may be more than one triage officer at a site if casualties are scattered 
and in this case the senior triage officer, that is the most experienced, should 
be at the Treatment Area. 
 
According to Collins (41) the triage officer should have both hands tied behind 
the back and their hearing aid turned off.   The triage officer has to avoid 
getting involved with treatment and not to delay definitive treatment or to be 
 
 
156 
an obstruction to the casualty flow.   It is essential that the triage officer 
assess casualties using the minimum time and equipment.    
 
The triage officer may change as more experienced personnel arrive on the 
scene.   Initially the triage officer may be an ambulance officer and be 
replaced by an ambulance paramedic or a nurse and then by a medical 
officer as the situation evolves.  Regardless of who performs the role, the 
principles remain the same. 
Site of Triage 
In a restricted impact disaster, such as the crash site of a vehicle or an 
aircraft, casualty evacuation to a staging area by first responders may occur 
without triage (63).    In many circumstances, such as fires and cyclones, it 
has been found that many casualties will make their own way to hospital 
using non-ambulance transport. 
 
For the more localised incident, the first triage decision is ideally taken at the 
location where the casualty is found.  After this subsequent triage should 
occur at the Treatment Area. 
 
A typical triage evacuation map is shown below. 
 
Note that ambulatory casualties with minor or no injuries (Priority 3) may be 
directed to a separate holding area and moved by non-ambulance transport. 
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Figure 10.1 - Triage and evacuation diagram(87)
 
 
157
Triage Priorities 
The desired outcome of any triage system is to deliver the casualty to the 
right place at the right time.  As a first step casualties are assigned to 
different casualty, or priority, groups. In Australia the system varies from 
State to State and varies from two to five levels and even more depending on 
local plans (63).    
 
The table below shows the triage priorities.   There are two systems widely in 
use; the ‘P’ classification for field priority and the ‘T’ system for treatment 
priority. 
 
‘P’ Priority ‘T’ Treatment Description Colour Identifier 
1 1 Immediate Red 
2 2 Urgent Yellow/Orange 
3 3 Delayed Green 
 4 Expectant Blue 
Dead Dead Dead 
Unsalvageable 
White/Black 
 
Table 10.1 - Triage Priorities 
 
The major difference between the two systems is the inclusion of  the 
expectant category. Using the ‘T’ system, categories are defined as: 
 
Priority Intervention 
• Priority 1 
(Immediate) 
Immediate life saving procedures required 
 
• Priority 2 
(Urgent) 
Intervention required within 4 - 6 hours 
 
• Priority 3 
(Delayed) 
Less serious cases where treatment is not essential within 
the times given above 
 
• Priority 4 
(Expectant) 
Casualties whose injuries are so severe that they are 
either unlikely to survive in the circumstances or would 
require so much input from the limited resources available 
that their treatment would seriously compromise the 
treatment of large numbers of other less serious 
casualties. 
 
Table 10.2 – Priority and intervention required. 
 
In New South Wales the urgent category is colour coded orange. The New 
South Wales system does not utilise the blue expectant label as is used in 
South Australia and the Northern Territory and a green label endorsed 
‘EXPECTANT’ can be used instead.  In Victoria the orange label is used for 
the expectant category as well as for urgent.   The orange label is identified 
by a black stripe added by the triage officer.  The logic is that expectant 
casualties would be red priority if there were enough resources and so 
should receive treatment as soon as all red priority casualties have been 
treated(163). 
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In Victoria, the triage system also looks at mental health and has five 
categories which are shown in the table below. 
 
Label Priority Description 
Green with black 
writing. 
Walking 
Wounded 
Walking wounded, psychologically wounded.  Minor injuries but 
capable of walking. 
Hospital admission unlikely. 
OR 
Uninjured but psychologically damaged. 
Urgent counselling required. 
 
Black with white 
writing. 
Dead Medical officer must certify death on card. 
Body the responsibility of the Police/Coroner’s Office. 
 
Red with white 
writing. 
Top Priority Severely injured, in need of urgent medical care.   Urgent, quick, 
simple, minimal treatment. 
Stabilise prior to transportation. 
 
Orange with red 
writing. 
2nd Priority Significant injuries – condition can wait. 
 
Orange with red 
writing. 
Black stripe added 
by Triage Officer 
2nd Priority Extensive medical care will jeopardise survival of other 
casualties. 
 
Table 10.3 – Victorian Triage Categories(163). 
Triage Systems 
There are a number of systems in use or advocated.  The most frequently 
used system is probably the Sieve /Sort protocol and which is internationally 
the most widely used.    Sieve/Sort is the military standard for NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation), and is used in the United Kingdom.  In 
Australia the system usually utilised is Sieve/Sort (61). 
 
Another system widely advocated is the START/SAVE protocol developed by 
Benson et al (22).   START (Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment) is similar to 
Sieve except that neurological signs are taken instead of circulation to 
determine priority.   This system is also adapted for paediatric cases with the 
STARTPLUS system being used for children less than nine years of age.   
START and STARTPLUS systems are used by the St John Ambulance (143). 
 
CareFlight/NSW Medical Retrieval Service, Sydney, Australia has a variation 
that uses the neurological condition (obeys commands) as an indicator rather 
than breathing rate and a palpable radial pulse. This results in a very quick 
and simple process which has the advantage of not requiring adaptation 
when cold weather, or other factors, make capillary refill a difficult process. 
The system uses the absence of breathing as ‘unsalvagable’.  The CareFlight 
system is probably the quickest of the methods used(72). 
 
The other major system advocated is the SAVE (Secondary Assessment of 
Victim Endpoint) and this looks at the degree and location of injury, pre-
existing conditions, Glasgow Coma Score, burns and other non-traumatic 
emergencies.   The authors in advocating START/SAVE point out that this is 
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ideal for long term situations and was advocated for earthquake situations 
where the site could not be cleared for a considerable time(22).   Sieve/Sort 
assumes that there will be a rapid clearance of the incident site. 
 
None of the systems are perfect.  During overwhelming conditions they all 
offer some method of trying for the ideal of the greatest good for the greatest 
number. The system that gives everything for everyone is not yet with us. 
Triage Sieve and Sort 
As has been noted above, triage is a dynamic process and a casualty may 
be reassessed many times depending upon locations and circumstances. For 
the first person on the scene the situation may present many problems. 
There may be a large number of casualties and this then may result in a 
considerable number of critical decisions that need to be made very quickly.   
The system used must be quick, simple, safe and reproducible. 
 
The ‘first look’ process is usually by necessity a ‘quick look’.  Later when the 
casualty reaches the Treatment Area then more time will be available for a 
more detailed assessment.   These two stages of the triage process are 
referred to as the triage sieve and the triage sort respectively. 
 
Triage Sieve 
The principal objective of the triage sieve is to quickly separate the casualties 
into a priority order.   While it is quick, it is not perfect although care must be 
taken to err on the safe side.   Any mistakes at this stage can be corrected 
later at the triage sort stage.   The process used is outlined in figure 10.2. 
 
Mobility is the first stage of the sieve.  Any walking casualties, regardless of 
injury type, are categorised as Priority 3 (Delayed) and are moved from the 
site.  This is often referred to as the mobility sieve. 
 
It can be argued that it is possible to walk with a knife sticking out of your 
back or with fifty percent burns to your body.  This is so but you won’t walk 
far.   When collapse occurs, since triage is a dynamic process, then the 
priority will change.   It is important to remember that the triage sieve is an 
assessment of the casualty’s condition as it is at the time and not a predictor 
of what will later occur. 
 
Those casualties who are not walking will initially be classified as Priority 1 
(Immediate) or Priority 2 (Urgent).  The distinction is made according to the 
airway, breathing and circulatory (ABC) parameters described below. 
 
Airway patency can be checked by the simple chin lift - jaw thrust manoeuvre 
and observing whether or not breathing occurs.    Those casualties who do 
not breathe in spite of this manoeuvre are dead or unsalvageable.  Those 
who do resume breathing are designated Priority 1. 
 
Where breathing is occurring then the second assessment, that of respiratory 
rate, is made.  If the respiratory rate is less than ten per minute or is greater 
than twenty nine per minute then the casualty is classified as Priority 1 
 
 
160 
(Immediate).    If the rate is normal, that is between ten and twenty nine 
breaths per minute, then an assessment of circulation is performed. 
 
The circulatory assessment is not easy under ideal circumstances and can 
be very difficult in the pre-hospital situation.  A quick method is to use the 
capillary refill time (CRT) which is assessed in the nail bed. Where CRT is 
greater than two seconds then the casualty is classified as Priority 1 
(Immediate) . The preferred alternative is to use pulse rate with 120 as the 
cut off point.  
   
TRIAGE SIEVE
SURVIVOR
Injured SURVIVORRECEPTION
NO
Walking
YES
PRIORITY 3
(Green – Delayed)
YES
Open
Airway
Breathing?
NO
DEAD
(White / Black)Breathing
NO NO
YES
YES
PRIORITY 1
(Red - Immediate)
Respiratory 
Rate
<10
>29
10 - 29
PRIORITY 2
(Orange - Urgent)
Circulation
Pulse 120 or less
(CRT <2 sec)
Pulse >120 
(CRT 2 sec or more)
 
 
Figure 10.2 - The Sieve Protocol(87)
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Obviously exsanguinating haemorrhage should be stopped at this stage.   
Where capillary refill time is two seconds or less or the pulse rate is 120 or 
less, then the casualty is classified as Priority 2 (Urgent). 
 
To perform the capillary refill check the victim’s hand is held above the body 
and the nail pressed for five seconds before being released.  The time taken 
for the colour to return to normal is the capillary refill time (CRT). 
 
Capillary refill time is utilised for circulatory assessment because it is quick to 
perform and reflects capillary tissue perfusion. CRT is difficult to perform in 
poor lighting.  It is affected by ambient temperature and will be significantly 
reduced in cold conditions.   In cold conditions the rescuer’s own capillary 
time should be used as an indicator and the triage adjusted.  In very cold 
conditions the capillary refill method may become unusable and in such 
situations the assessment should be performed using a heart rate with a 
count of 120 beats per minute as the sieve point.   Again the system is not 
perfect in that a heart rate of greater than 120 beats per minute in a child can 
be quite normal.  Where there is trauma to the limbs, it is dark, or even the 
presence of nail varnish, then the heart rate is used. 
 
Once the triage sieve has been completed then each casualty will have been 
assessed and allotted a priority.  This allows other rescuers to go to the 
Priority 1 (Immediate) casualties and to treat and transport them first. 
 
Triage Sort 
On arrival at the Treatment Area casualties are re-triaged using a more 
detailed approach.   This process is called the triage sort.    
 
Whilst the sieve process is rapidly, accurately and reproducibly performed by 
any trained personnel, the sort process should be performed by a senior 
person.  The process is standardised and divides casualties into categories 
quickly and reproducibly, however the anatomical subdivisions require skill. 
 
If a casualty is not walking, then under the sieve system, they will not be less 
than Priority 2. This means that a casualty with two sprained ankles will be 
Priority 2.   This is because the aim is to clear the site as quickly as possible 
and a person unable to walk will be removed for safety reasons rather than 
as a treatment priority.  On arrival at the second stage, that is the sort 
process, then this person will be downgraded to Priority 3 since treatment 
urgency is not high. 
 
There are two basic methods of sorting the casualties.   The first is 
anatomical in which all the injuries of the casualty are identified so as to 
provide an overall picture of the urgency of the casualty’s condition.   The 
casualty is then placed in the triage category as assessed.  This may be 
regarded as the ‘gold standard’ against which all triage methods can be 
measured.    In the pre-hospital situation with many casualties this is 
impractical.  This requires the casualty to be fully undressed and requires a 
broad medical knowledge so that each individual injury can be assigned an 
individual importance and before the overall urgency can be assessed.   This 
process is time consuming. 
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The Ambulance system mentioned above also has problems if applied to the 
larger picture and can lead to over triage if used at a treatment area following 
a major incident.   For example in the case of a rail accident all casualties 
would be coded as Priority 1 (Immediate) if the following points from the 
history parameters were taken into account:: 
 
• Vehicular crash > 60 kph 
• Major deformation of the vehicle 
• Fatal injury in same vehicle 
 
An alternative method utilises the physiological approach in which, not the 
injury, but their physiological outcome is considered.   There are many such 
systems in use, often adapted to meet specific situations, but probably the 
best known of these is the Trauma Score. 
 
In the pre-hospital setting the Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS)  has 
been advocated as the best of the systems currently available.   The TRTS is 
based on three parameters as shown in the table below.  This allots a value 
to each of the parameters with a possible score of 12 for little or no injury and 
a level of zero for dead. 
 
Parameter Coded Value 
Respiratory Rate 0 – 4  
Systolic Blood Pressure 0 – 4  
Glasgow Coma Scale 0 – 4  
 
Table 10.4 - Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS)  parameters 
 
Each of the three sections is scored using a number of parameters.The 
variables are shown in the table below. 
 
Physiological Variable Measured Value Score 
10 – 29 4 
> 29 3 
6 – 9 2 
1 – 5 1 
Respiratory Rate 
0 0 
≥ 90 4 
76 – 89 3 
50 – 75 2 
1 – 49 1 
Systolic Blood Pressure 
0 0 
13 –15 4 
9 – 12 3 
6 – 8 2 
4 – 5 1 
Glasgow Coma Scale 
3 0 
 
Table 10.5 - Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS) System 
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The third level, is a commonly used function, that of the Glasgow Coma 
Scale. This scale, which looks at neurological responses, is coded to give a 
score.   The system is shown below. 
 
GLASGOW COMA SCORE 
EYE OPENING Coded Value 
Spontaneous 4 
To voice 3 
To pain 2 
None 1 
VERBAL RESPONSE 
Oriented 5 
Confused 4 
Inappropriate words 3 
Incomprehensible 2 
None 1 
MOTOR RESPONSE 
Obeys commands 6 
Localises to pain 5 
Withdraws to pain 4 
Flexes to pain 3 
Extends to pain 2 
None 1 
 
Table 10.6 - Glasgow Coma Scale(87)
 
The Glasgow Coma Score will result in a value between 3 and 15. 
 
The Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS) is calculated from the parameters 
shown in the table below to give a score between 0 and 12.    
 
The Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS) score can then be used to assign 
triage priorities as shown in the Table below. 
 
Priority TRTS 
T1 1 – 10 
T2 11 
T3 12 
Dead 0 
 
Table 10.7 - Triage Revised Trauma Score (TRTS) and Priority 
 
If Priority 4 (Expectant) is in use then a TRTS of 1 – 3  should be used. 
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One of the simpler ways of calculating the priority is by subtraction rather 
than calculating the final score.  For example: 
 
• No points are lost then the priority is    T3 
• One point lost then the priority is    T2 
• More than one point lost then the priority becomes  T1 
• A score of zero is      DEAD 
 
Work carried out for the US Navy has shown that non-expert staff can 
provide reliable trauma scoring for casualties after a very short period of 
training indicating that the use of such a system is feasible and practical.   
Many modern casualty labels incorporate trauma scoring as part of the 
patient report. 
 
The advantages of the physiological methods are that they are quick and 
reproducible and are essentially an extension of the triage sieve.   The 
disadvantage is that they do not take into account the nature of the injury and 
therefore cannot be used to decide whether the casualty should be 
transported to a specialist or a general facility. 
 
An ideal is probably a mixture of both anatomical and physiological methods.  
The rapidity and simplicity of the TRTS is used to define the initial priority and 
this is supplemented by as much relevant anatomical information as can be 
obtained in the time available and under the conditions prevailing.   This 
means that casualties with head injuries can be selected for facilities with 
neurological capabilities and burns be sent to centres with that capability.    
Triage Labelling 
It is essential that once assessed other rescuers are aware of the priority 
given to an individual casualty.   To ensure this some form of labelling is 
necessary.   To be effective such labels should be highly visible, use 
standard categories and be  easily and firmly secured to the casualty.   
Provision must also be made to alter the priority as the casualty’s condition 
changes.   There is no standard for tag design but all tags should indicate 
clearly the casualty’s priority for treatment and transport as well as providing 
space for the recording of vital signs and details of treatment provided. 
 
Primary colours are preferred because these can usually be distinguished 
even under poor ambient lighting.   The colours are often fluorescent which 
also aids in visibility. The standard colours are: 
 
Priority Colour 
Priority 1 (Immediate) Red 
Priority 2 (Urgent) Yellow or Orange 
Priority 3 (Delayed) Green 
Dead White (black letters) Black (white letters) 
 
Table 10.8 – Triage label colours 
 
The labelling of the dead is important and this may either be a special card or 
be incorporated into the standard triage label.    This is discussed later. 
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Basically two types of label exist and these are either a single label or a 
cruci-form/ foldable type. 
 
The single style consists of a label marked with the appropriate priority which 
is attached to the casualty.   These labels usually consist of a coloured card 
with printed headings and space for casualty information. The style is shown 
below. 
 
Since a single coloured card is attached to the casualty, changing categories 
is relatively difficult because if the first card is removed before the new card is 
attached it would mean that any notes made on the first card must be 
transferred to the new card. Alternatively the old card  is left in place beneath 
the new.  With the need to check times, the latter situation can lead to 
confusion concerning the current status of the casualty. 
 
(red) 
 
Priority 1 
(Immediate) 
 
 (yellow or orange) 
 
Priority 2 
(Urgent) 
   
(green) 
 
Priority 3 
(Delayed) 
 
 (white or black)  
 
DEAD 
 
Figure 10.3 - Single Triage Label System 
 
A variation to the single label is the Mettag label shown below in Figure 10.4.   
 
The Metag label consists of a single label which has a number of colour-
coded perforated strips on the bottom edge, with each strip corresponding to 
a different triage category.  The strips are removed until the lowest remaining 
corresponds to the casualty’s priority.  There are two disadvantages to this 
label.   
 
1. The system assumes that the casualty’s condition will only get worse.  
If the condition of the casualty improves then either the removed strips 
must be stuck back on or the whole card is replaced.  
    
2. Because the strip designating the priority is not large, it is difficult to 
see at a distance or in poor lighting conditions. 
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Figure 10.4  METAG Triage Label 
 
The second type of card used is the cruciform type.   As the name suggests, 
these cards are shaped like a cross and when all the portions are folded into 
the middle they result in a rectangle with the current priority only showing.   
The layout is shown in below. 
 
The main advantage is that when it is necessary to change the priority it is a 
simple matter to refold the card to show the new priority on the outside.   This 
means that the same card can be used no matter how many times the priority 
changes.   Whilst this card overcomes the problems associated with dynamic 
triage, one disadvantage is that casualties can themselves refold the card to 
give themselves a higher priority. 
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PRIORITY 3 
(DELAYED) 
 
    
 
PRIORITY 1 
(IMMEDIATE) 
 
   
 
DEAD 
    
   
PRIORITY 2 
(URGENT) 
 
 
  
Figure 10.5 - Cruciform Style Triage Label 
 
As another option for use at the site, coloured pegs corresponding to the 
triage category can be used for ‘first look’ triage (triage sieve) and are easily 
carried on the belt of the rescuer’s clothing.   This system is particularly 
useful where rapid evacuation from the site is necessary with the peg being 
taken with the casualty on the litter and replaced by a tag at a secondary 
triage.  The disadvantage is the absence of notes and the need for everyone 
to understand the system. 
Triage of Smoke Inhalation Victims 
START/SAVE and STARTPLUS were mentioned above under Triage 
Systems.  Those systems discussed are designed for the field.  Other 
systems have been introduced to cover special circumstances, for example 
to triage those effected by smoke inhalation.  
 
Fire is often associated with disaster situations including those associated 
with natural causes as in earthquakes, bush or forest fires and volcanic 
events.  Fire is also associated with terrorist attacks, industrial and transport 
accidents and crowd related incidents.   The problem considered here is not 
that of burns but smoke inhalation.   Research has shown that there are 
many toxic substances released by fire and the amount of exposure will be 
reflected in the casualty’s condition.  Inhalation of carbon monoxide (CO) or 
hydrocyanic acid (HCN) cause serious complications.   It is also quite 
common in the case of fires for smoke inhalation to be the only factor and for 
there to be no other trauma.  To aid in triage in these situations, Kirchner et 
al (102) advocate a special triage system.   
 
 
168 
The authors point out that smoke on clothing or the face is not significant and 
complaints of irritation to the eyes, throat or bronchi indicate exposure but are 
not necessarily clinically significant.   
 
Initially Kirchner et al suggest that there are five examination points: 
History 
• inhalation in a closed area   (high dosage) 
• prisoner of the smoke/fire   (longer exposure) 
• troubles of consciousness in the smoke (possible fainting) 
 
Clinical Examination 
• face burn 
• vibrissae in the nostrils burn 
• soot on the tongue and pharynx 
• change of voice 
• foetor of smoke 
 
If possible carboxyhaemoglobin (HbCO) should be measured and if the 
HbCO level is >5% (>10% if smoker) then breath CO should be measured 
although this may not always be possible at the site. 
 
The system advocated then uses the standard categories of Black (dead or 
hopeless), Red (require immediate resuscitation), Yellow (urgent hospital 
treatment) and Green (those who can wait).   This is summarised in the table 
below. 
 
Category Clinical Situation Treatment 
BLACK/ 
WHITE 
• Cardiac arrest • In routine situations resuscitate as any 
other cardiac arrest and use 
hydroxocobalamin. 
• In major incident/disaster consider 
immediately as dead. 
RED • Unconscious 
• Respiratory failure 
• Haemodynamic failure 
• Oxygenate at high doses. 
• iv line and volume infusion. 
• consider intubation under general 
anaesthesia. 
• consider bronchodilator. 
• Consider hydroxocobalamin and 
hyperbaric oxygenotherapy 
YELLOW Smoke inhalation with: 
• voice changes, stridor 
• cardiac arrhythmias 
• coronary thoracic pain 
• bronchospasm 
CO intoxication with: 
• breath CO>20%HbCO 
• initial unconsciousness 
• neurological troubles 
• High dose oxygenotherapy. 
• iv line. 
• Vital sign monitoring. 
• Early transfer to hospital 
• Consider nitroglycerine and morphine. for 
coronary pain. 
• Consider bronchodilator 
GREEN Inhalation syndrome: 
• History 
• Examination 
• Breath CO>5-10% 
• Consider delayed transfer to hospital or 
other care structure 
• Pulmonary auscultation every 6 to 24 
hours for two days. 
 
Table 10.9 - Triage of Smoke Inhalation Victims (102). 
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Summary  
Triage is the first step in the hierarchy of medical support at a major incident. 
 
Triage is a dynamic process beginning with the a first look classification at 
the site where the casualties are found and continuing with consideration of 
the physiological and anatomical situation to give a priority category in the 
treatment area and continuing to the point of definitive care. 
 
A form of labelling is an essential part of the process with cruciform triage 
labels providing the best system in dynamic triage. 
 
Health personnel must always remember that for the survivor who is not a 
casualty then health has no responsibility and their care becomes a police 
matter.    The axiom for health workers with regard to these survivors must 
be: 
 
 
‘Not injured – Not interested!’ 
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Treatment and Transport 
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Treatment 
Introduction 
Up to 80 per cent of those injured in most major incidents require only routine 
treatment for superficial injuries such as bruising and abrasions.  Up to 20 
per cent may suffer from a single major injury such as a fracture.   Generally 
less than 10 per cent will be severely injured and will require immediate 
attention (55). 
 
A great many people are likely to be involved in giving treatment to the 
injured following a major incident. These will range from the concerned 
bystander to those trained in the provision of advanced life support. First 
treatment immediately following the incident is often given by other survivors, 
who themselves may be injured, or from bystanders, or those who arrive on 
the scene shortly after the incident.   Some of these may be trained in basic 
first aid and can provide life saving initial care. 
Organised Support 
With the arrival of emergency services larger numbers of personnel trained in 
first aid may become available.   In particular, aside from the health service 
personnel, first aid assistance may be available from the following groups: 
 
• Police Service 
• Fire Service 
• State Emergency Service 
• Volunteer Rescue Association 
• St. John Ambulance Australia 
• Australian Red Cross 
• Members of the Australian Defence Forces 
• Passing qualified staff 
 
Unless a medical team is present, the Ambulance Service has the overall 
responsibility for the treatment of casualties at all incidents outside a hospital.    
 
If at a major incident response teams of medical officers and nurses from 
health service facilities supplement the services available then the Medical 
Commander becomes the responsible person for treatment decisions. 
 
It is important to remember the hierarchy of medical support: 
 
• Triage 
• Treatment 
• Transport 
 
To achieve the best overall outcome for casualties, triage precedes treatment 
and transport.   Once triage has been carried out then the limited advanced 
care can be allotted to those with the greatest need and rescuers with lower 
skill levels can be assigned to casualties with less demanding problems. 
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Where is Treatment Performed? 
Many first aid measures are performed by bystanders or other survivors and 
will occur at the incident site.   These procedures, which do not usually 
involve airway and breathing manoeuvres, will be carried out immediately 
after the occurrence of the incident.   Once emergency services arrive on the 
scene, and a command and control structure is in place, then the focus of 
activity is likely to move to the Treatment Area.    
 
Some casualties, including those still trapped, may require advanced life 
support procedures and these will have to be delivered in situ.  Any 
casualties who arrive at the Treatment Area who require only minor first aid 
will not be returned to the site but will be treated there.   Packaging for 
transport is usually carried out at the Treatment Area in the Casualty Loading 
and Dispatch Area or the Ambulance Loading Area. 
How Much Treatment? 
The objective of treatment at the scene is not to return the casualties to 
health but to ensure that they are stable enough to endure the journey to a 
facility where they can be fully assessed and treated.   In Australia, where 
long distances and poor conditions of travel are involved, this may include 
staging procedures for rest and reassessment before the definitive care 
facility is reached.    
 
Triage and treatment are closely related with the priority given to the casualty 
reflecting the amount of treatment received at the scene.   A casualty who is 
walking and assessed as Priority 3 (Delayed) may be moved directly to a 
hospital without any prior treatment at all.  A casualty who has a 
compromised airway and assessed as Priority 1 (Immediate) may have 
considerable treatment at the scene to prepare for transportation. 
What Treatment? 
As can be shown from modern military medical systems, virtually any 
treatment can be carried out in the pre-hospital setting.   This however does 
not mean that all treatments should be provided at the scene of a major 
incident.   At the major incident the objective of treatment remains the safe 
transportation of the casualty to hospital and the amount of treatment carried 
out should be limited to that required to ensure that this is possible. 
 
Medical management is required to ensure that casualties do not die on the 
way to hospital because too little was done but also that not too much is done 
so that time that could be spent on other casualties is wasted. 
 
This all means that treatment at the scene will be probably confined to those 
concerned with the airway, breathing and circulation (ABC).   Other advanced 
life support measures to prevent exacerbation of spinal injuries will form an 
integral part of packaging for transfer.   Other treatments, including such 
procedures as amputation for extrication, may rarely be required. 
 
The range of clinical skills that may be needed at the major incident scene 
are shown in Table 11.1 
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ABC Basic Advanced 
 
Airway 
 
Airway opening 
• Chin lift (Note: avoid if there is 
potential for cervical spinal 
injury) 
• Modified Jaw thrust 
 
Oropharyngeal airway 
Nasopharyngeal airway 
Oral tracheal intubation 
Surgical airway 
• Needle cricothyroidotomy 
• Surgical cricothyroidotomy 
Breathing Mouth to mouth ventilation 
Mouth to nose ventilation 
(Note: where ever possible utilise 
a barrier device) 
Mouth to mask ventilation 
Bag – valve – mask ventilation
Needle thoracocentesis 
Chest drain placement 
Circulation Control of external 
haemorrhage 
Infusion set up 
Peripheral venous access 
• Extremity veins 
• Venous cut down 
    Central venous access 
• Femoral vein 
• External jugular vein 
Intraosseous access 
Defibrillation 
Spinal 
control 
Manual cervical stabilisation Log rolling 
Cervical collar application 
Spinal board application 
Rapid extrication 
 
Table 11.1 - Basic and Advanced Treatments 
 
 
Occasionally it may be appropriate for minor injured casualties to be treated 
at the scene, thus avoiding unnecessary overloading of the hospital system 
and it would be sensible to use local general practitioners for this purpose.   It 
should be noted however that those immediate care medical officers with 
advanced skills should not be used for performing minor treatment on site. 
 
Medical staff at the scene should have current certification in advanced life 
support training and ideally have special competence in pre-hospital care.   In 
Australia there is no modular course that trains medical and nursing officers 
to a specified standard of pre-hospital care as for example the U.K. Pre-
Hospital Emergency Care Certificate Course. 
 
The U.S. Basic Trauma Life Support Courses (BTLS) and the Advanced 
Trauma Life Support Courses (ATLS) are run in Australia as the Emergency 
Management and Severe Trauma (EMST) Courses.  For New South 
Wales,Table 11.2 shows the recommended minimum standards for medical 
officers and nurses attending a major incident(123). 
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Position Minimum Training Standard 
Medical Commander (MC) EMST1,  
EMA2 (5 – day course),  
MIMMS3
Medical Officers    
(excluding the MC) 
EMST,  
MIMMS 
Nurses TNC4,  
MIMMS 
1 Emergency Management and Severe Trauma 
2 Emergency Management Australia 
3 Major Incident Medical Management and Support Advanced Course 
4 Trauma Nursing Core Course 
  
Table 11.2. - Recommended minimum standards of training for disaster teams(123). 
 
In the absence of modular training courses in pre-hospital care and cardiac 
or paediatric emergencies, it would be appropriate that the Medical 
Commander, and possibly the Medical Team Leader, have a recognised 
emergency medicine qualification such as the Fellowship of the Australasian 
College for Emergency Medicine. 
Who Treats? 
The problem with the provision of adequate treatment at a major incident is 
usually not one of lack of staff but rather of lack of direction.   Everybody from 
ambulance officer to senior consultant feels the need to treat casualties 
rather than to triage or administrate and yet all three aspects are vital.   As 
has been emphasised in this text, triage is essential and should be performed 
by the most experienced person available.   Treatment is the second step in 
the hierarchy of medical support and it is triage that is used to direct 
treatment. 
Summary 
• The first treatment is likely to be performed by unskilled people and will 
be limited to basic first aid. 
• All emergency services are trained in first aid. 
• The Police Service has overall control of allotting rescue teams. 
• The Ambulance Service has the responsibility for treatment at the 
scene. 
• Treatment is the second step in the hierarchy of medical support. 
• Attention to airway, breathing and circulation (ABC) is all that is usually 
required at the scene of the incident. 
• All health service staff at the scene of the incident should have current 
certification at the appropriate level of skill. 
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Transportation 
Transportation is the third step in the hierarchy of medical support to a major 
incident.  Both the preceding steps, triage and treatment, will have an 
influence on transportation.   The order of evacuation, the destination and the 
means of transport will often be dictated by these earlier decisions.  As the 
EMA Manual, Disaster Medicine (1999) points out, further limitations will 
include the location, the type of incident and the available transport (56). 
 
Casualties require transportation to remove them from danger, environmental 
exposure and to allow definitive diagnosis and treatment. 
 
The outcome should always be to deliver the right casualties to the right 
place, at the right time, by the right means. 
  
One of the prime tasks of the health services command and control structure 
is to ensure that the movement of casualties is as smooth and efficient as 
possible.   An essential part of this is the organisation of transport both at the 
scene and beyond.   The layout and positioning of treatment and loading 
areas are very important for smooth operation.   Similarly the choice, where 
one exists, of the type of transport used, the destination and the order of 
evacuation must be controlled by an officer able to adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
 
In Australia many of the transport decisions will be dependent on the location 
and type of incident.   As well as this the prevailing weather conditions may 
also make transport difficult.   The situation may be complicated by 
landslides, bush fires, cyclones or earthquakes as has been shown in the 
recent past in Australian situations.  The distance from the site to a major 
population centre can also be a decisive factor on the means of transport 
used. 
Organisation 
There principally are two aspects to the organisation of transport that need to 
be considered: 
 
1. Movement of casualties at the scene 
2. The chain of transportation for evacuation 
 
Movement at the Scene 
This will vary according to the scene, however the basics are: 
 
• Priority 3 casualties (walking) will make their own way to the treatment 
or holding area unassisted. 
 
• If vehicle access is limited, or not possible, then Priority 1 and 2 
casualties may need to be moved by a manual handling means, that is 
by litter, manual carry or by makeshift conveyance such as a door or 
other rigid framework.   This will depend upon the situation, the type of 
injury and the availability of equipment and personnel.   
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• Movement involving manual handling is exhausting over long distances 
and requires considerable personnel to perform.   Typically to move 
one casualty may require six people.   Consequently, such carrying 
should be over the shortest distance possible to a place where they 
can be loaded to a mechanical conveyance or vehicle. 
 
Chain of Transportation 
Ambulances and other rescue vehicles could respond to the scene from a 
variety of sources or locations.   To ensure control, at the outer cordon 
ambulances and casualty carrying vehicles will enter the site under police 
control at the Incident Control Point and will be directed to the Ambulance 
Parking Point where they will come under the control of the Ambulance 
Marshalling Officer.   The Ambulance Marshalling Officer will hold the 
vehicles at the Parking Point until they are required by the Ambulance 
Loading Officer.  This is covered in Chapter 8, Scene Command and Control. 
 
When called forward the ambulances go to the Casualty Loading and 
Dispatch Area, which will be close to the Treatment Area, and there load their 
assigned casualties.   The Ambulance Loading Officer will inform the 
ambulance crew of the casualty’s condition, treatment requirements en-route 
and the destination. 
 
Once loaded the ambulance then continues along the circuit to the release 
point at the outer cordon.  They will then proceed to the allotted destination. 
 
This system allows control over both the number and types of vehicles at the 
Loading Point.   It also allows rest and recuperation for crews at the 
Ambulance Parking Point without interfering with the evacuation process. 
Casualty Flow 
In many situations the movement of casualties from the site of the incident to 
the treatment area will be manually, by rescue personnel using stretchers or 
litters.  Priority 3 (Delayed) casualties can be directed to walk to the 
treatment area.   In the disaster situation many casualties could present 
directly to the hospital having either made their own way there or been taken 
by non-ambulance transport outside the system.   On a number of occasions 
this inundation has overwhelmed hospitals and hindered their ability to deal 
with serious cases (9). 
 
To optimise the movement of casualties from the site to receiving hospitals, 
casualties who are stable may bypass the Treatment Area.   Others may be 
held there to ensure that the casualty flow allows those with the best chance 
of survival to reach hospital first. 
 
It may be possible to discharge those casualties with minor injuries directly 
from the site.   This is not recommended however since caution is needed in 
ensuring that injuries are not missed in often inadequate facilities and tight 
time frames. Unless the casualty actually refuses transport to a hospital, then 
all should be taken for further examination and observation.   
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Where special incidents are involved, that is those involving hazardous or 
biological or radiation (CBR) situations, it should be remembered that 
symptoms may not become evident for several hours after exposure. 
Because of this it is essential, where direct discharge is utilised, that records 
are kept to ensure follow-up of those seen but not transported to a receiving 
hospital or other facility. 
 
In the preferred organisation the Treatment Area becomes the evacuation 
route for all casualties leaving the site. Triage sorting occurs in this area and 
casualties are evacuated with the most serious going first. 
 
The second system varies in that casualties identified as Priority 3 (Delayed) 
during the triage sieve are moved to a holding area close to the Ambulance 
Loading Area.  Priority 1 (Immediate) and Priority 2 (Urgent) casualties are 
moved to the Treatment Area and from there to the Casualty Loading and 
Dispatch/Ambulance Loading Area (loading area). 
 
The choice of system will affect the transport chain because the number of 
casualties, and their priorities, arriving at the loading area will differ 
depending on the scheme used.   The second arrangement, where Priority 3 
casualties are not held in the Treatment Area, is recommended because it 
optimises casualty flow for transportation.   In this scheme the first casualties 
available for transport will be the walking Priority 3 (Delayed) casualties and 
non-ambulance transport can be used to convey these to hospital and quickly 
clear them from the site.   This can occur whilst the Priority 1 (Immediate) 
and Priority 2 (Urgent) casualties are being moved to the Treatment Area for 
stabilisation and whilst ambulances are being mobilised to the scene.   By the 
time ambulances arrive on the scene then the first of the Priority 1 
(Immediate) casualties are likely to be ready for transportation. 
Evacuation Decisions 
There are three key decisions to be made concerning each casualty before 
they are moved to hospital.   These involve: 
 
1. Triage priority,  
2. Pre-transport treatment and stabilisation (packaging) and  
3. Destination. 
 
Triage priority 
The priority for evacuation will usually reflect the triage priority.  The 
Secondary Triage Officer and the Ambulance Loading Officer may have to 
use additional criteria to decide the order of evacuation.   The availability of 
suitable transport and the capacity of vehicles are factors that may have to 
be taken into account. 
 
As already mentioned, Priority 3 (Delayed) casualties may be transported in 
non-ambulance vehicles.  Some Priority 2 (Urgent) casualties may be able to 
be transported in a seated position whilst some Priority 1 (Immediate) 
casualties may require to be transported alone in intensive care ambulances.   
Casualties with lower priorities may be transported with Priority 1 (Immediate) 
casualties if they are bound for the same destination. 
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Treatment and Packaging 
The correct amount of treatment is that which will ensure safe transportation 
of the casualty or, if stabilisation is not possible, then that which will give the 
casualty the highest chances of surviving to reach hospital. 
 
The amount of packaging is similarly limited to that required for safe 
transport.  Where receiving hospitals are at maximum capacity then it may 
even be better for Priority 2 (Urgent) casualties to be held where they can be 
observed and fully stabilised before transfer.   The Medical Commander 
should be in contact with the various receiving hospitals and should be able 
to advise the Treatment Area staff if delays are to occur. 
 
Destination 
It is the responsibility of the Ambulance Commander to decide which 
hospitals are to be used as receiving hospitals.   Outside the metropolitan 
areas of Australia there may be little choice.   The Medical Commander, in 
communication with the receiving hospitals, will be able to suggest how many 
casualties of each priority can be sent to each facility(5). 
 
In metropolitan areas, where there may be some choice of destination, then 
casualties may be better dispatched to specialist facilities depending on the 
nature of their injury.    
 
Priority Destination 
RED – Priority 1 (Immediate)    Major trauma system hospital 
ORANGE/YELLOW – Priority 2 
(Urgent)  
Major trauma system hospital 
GREEN – Priority 3 (Delayed) Minor hospitals 
Head Injury (isolated) Neurosurgical unit 
Burns (isolated) Burns unit 
Spinal injury (isolated) Spinal unit 
 
Table 11.3 - Ambulance destinations by priority or nature of injury(5)
Methods of Transportation 
In the major incident situation the choice of vehicle will depend upon 
availability as well as distance and terrain.   In the Australian situation off-
road capability can also be a factor.   This may mean that several vehicles 
may be required with the casualty transferred to the optimum vehicle as the 
situation allows. 
 
The range of transport may include any of the following: 
• Emergency ambulances 
• Other emergency vehicles 
• Private road vehicles 
• Flood rescue boats 
• Small and larger vessels 
• Rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters) 
• Fixed-wing aircraft 
• Other vehicles of opportunity (busses, trucks, etc.) 
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Another form of transport that should be considered where available is that of 
railway trains.   These are often available and offer considerable advantages 
for long distance transport for large numbers when road conditions may not 
be ideal as in flood situations, rough roads and the like. 
 
Emergency Ambulances 
The most commonly used vehicle for casualty transport is the emergency 
ambulance.   Such vehicles are specially designed and crewed to enable 
rapid transport of the serious ill and injured and have the ability to provide 
advanced life support en route. 
 
In the event of a major incident there may not be enough of these vehicles 
readily available and it should also be remembered that these vehicles do not 
have off-road capability should this be required.   Under these circumstances 
other methods of transportation may be considered. 
 
 
Figure 11.1 - Emergency Ambulance. 
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Other land vehicles 
There are three key elements that have to be considered when transportation 
needs and possibilities are being assessed: 
 
• Capacity – what is needed and what is available? 
• Availability – what vehicles are available now or in the near future? 
• Suitability – what speed, equipment, safety and reliability does each 
have? 
• The ambulance service may have available buses.  These are ideal for 
the movement of Priority 3 casualties and can often be used for Priority 
2 casualties where there injuries permit. 
 
 
Figure 11.2   Ambulance Service Bus 
 
Whilst the transport of Priority 3 (Delayed) casualties may not present a large 
problem, the moving of stretcher cases can result in considerable difficulty 
and their movement will probably need to be by specialist vehicle.   Non-
ambulance vehicles can be co-opted where their construction allows and light 
vans and busses may be ideal for moving Priority 3 (Delayed) casualties. 
 
Air Transport 
Air space around a major incident is controlled by the Civil Aviation Authority 
at the request of the Police Commander.   Basically there are two types of 
aircraft in use for moving casualties and these are either fixed or rotary 
winged.   In Australia there is a wide spread organisation of air ambulances 
and rescue helicopters in existence as well as, in the more remote areas,  the 
aircraft of the Royal Flying Doctor Service. In addition, where so authorised, 
military aircraft may be available. 
 
Each type of aircraft has a number of  advantages and disadvantages. 
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Rotary winged aircraft (helicopters) 
Helicopters may be used for: 
• Transport of essential medical personnel and equipment to the scene. 
• Scene reconnaissance by the medical commander. 
• Transport of casualties. 
 
The Ambulance Commander is responsible for deciding the most appropriate 
form of patient transport and, after consultation with the Medical Commander, 
may decide to use helicopters for primary casualty transport.   However it is 
usually the Medical Commander who will request the helicopters through the 
Medical Controller. 
 
The location of the helicopter landing site will be determined by the Police 
Commander in consultation with the Medical and Ambulance Commanders.    
 
The main advantages of the helicopter as a means of casualty transport are: 
 
• Used where road transport is disrupted. 
• Able to take out casualties where terrain does not allow the use of 
wheeled vehicles. 
• Rapid transport when airborne. 
 
Many Australian hospitals have helicopter landing zones as part of their 
grounds or a nearby suitable place, such as a park or open area. 
 
The following disadvantages must be considered before helicopters are used 
for casualty transport: 
 
• Limited capacity. 
• May cause dust and debris to be thrown out by the rotor downdraft.  
• Limited availability. 
• Cost. 
 
There may also be adverse factors for casualty such as; 
 
• Effects of altitude in un-pressurised aircraft. 
• Vibration (producing pain in fractures and additional damage in soft 
tissue and organ injuries). 
• Cold. 
• Noise (causing disorientation). 
• Restricted flying conditions (helicopter pilots rely on direct vision). 
• Difficulty with casualty interventions during flight. 
 
In addition to the above, except in direct extraction manoeuvres,  
ambulances may be required to get the casualty to the landing site.   
Additionally, downdraft  caused by the helicopters rotor can make working 
conditions at the scene difficult or even hazardous.   Some helicopters may 
interfere with radio communications at the scene. Where distances are short, 
the transfer times may outweigh any advantages gained by a short flying 
time. 
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Figure 11.3 - Typical rotary wing aircraft fitted for rescue work 
 
Fixed wing aircraft 
The use of fixed wing aircraft for primary transport at a major incident is not 
usual and may be requested through the Medical Controller.   The casualty 
will require ambulance transport to a suitable landing strip and transport from 
the destination strip to the receiving hospital.   Fixed wing casualty transport 
is more commonly used to move the victim from a rural receiving hospital to a 
major hospital. 
 
In remote areas however the initial response may be by fixed wing aircraft 
where that response is by a team from the Royal Flying Doctor Service.  In 
these situations the Australian open nature of the landscape will often allow a 
fixed wing aircraft to land close to the scene. 
 
Summary 
Transportation, after triage and treatment, is the third part of the hierarchy of 
medical support at major incidents.  To be effective: 
 
• Establishment and organisation of the ambulance circuit and the 
patient flow is essential if evacuation is to proceed smoothly. 
• The order of casualty evacuation depends primarily on the triage 
category of the casualty but may be influenced by other factors such as 
transport availability and destinations. 
• Emergency ambulances will usually provide most of the transportation. 
• Other vehicles may be used where terrain does not allow ambulance 
access or casualty conditions allow the use of non-ambulance 
vehicles. 
• Aircraft may be used where circumstances and availability allow. 
• Rail transport may be utilised where available. 
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Chapter 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dealing with the Dead 
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Death At The Scene 
Pronouncing Death 
At the scene of a major incident a casualty is presumed to be dead if at the 
time of the initial triage they do not breathe when the airway is opened.   In 
New South Wales an ambulance officer is authorised to pronounce death.   
 
At the site of a major incident, death must be confirmed by a medical officer 
before the body is moved unless there is a danger of the body being 
destroyed by fire, corrosive chemical or some other hazard. 
  
A body may also be moved in order to get access to the living. 
 
The same rules apply to body parts as to the complete body, that is they 
must be left in place until forensic data is collected. 
Certifying Death 
The medical officer in certifying death will usually perform a more 
conventional examination to include the presence of apnoea, asystole (no 
palpable pulse) and fixed and dilated pupils.  Where there is mutilation of the 
body or other major trauma then the usual examination may be omitted. 
 
The medical officer should certify death in the presence of a police officer. 
 
Final certification of death, that is the issuing of a death certificate, will not 
occur until the body has been formally identified and the cause of death is 
known.   This will not occur at the scene of a major incident. 
Moving the Dead 
As stated above, a body must be left in situ unless there is a danger that the 
body will be destroyed in some way as for example in the case of rising tidal 
or flood water or fire.    
 
It may also be necessary to move a body in order to gain access to the living. 
If a body has to be moved then its position should be clearly marked and if 
possible photographed by the Police or Coroner’s Officer before it is moved. 
 
In some situations it may be necessary to dismember the body to remove it in  
the circumstances outlined above.   Where this occurs it should be by a 
process of joint disarticulation and amputation.   Again photographs before 
removal and a full description of the injuries to the body before it is 
dismembered will be important. 
 
Rescuers should also be aware of the psychological effects of having the 
dead in clear view of the survivors.   Whilst bodies can not be moved they 
should be covered to reduce the impact on others until they can be taken to a 
holding area.   
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Labelling the Dead 
It is of great importance that those pronounced dead are clearly labelled.   
This covered under Triage.   The triage card is coloured white in some states, 
or territories and black in others, and should be completed by the medical 
officer pronouncing death.   The Medical Commander may appoint a specific 
medical officer to the role of Mortuary Officer and this officer’s duties will 
include: 
 
• Certifying death 
• Labelling bodies at the scene 
• Establishment of a body holding area in conjunction with the Police 
Identifying the Dead 
In New South Wales the task of identifying the dead at a major incident is 
undertaken by the Police Disaster Victim Identification Unit under the 
supervision of the Police Commander(34). 
The Coronial Service 
The Coronial Service (and through the Coroner’s representative at the scene, 
the Police) has absolute control over the bodies of deceased persons 
following any major incident or disaster.  The roles of the Coronial Service 
are to: 
 
• Establish the identity of deceased persons 
• Establish the circumstances surrounding death 
• Establish the medical cause of death 
• Identify any person who contributed to the death. 
 
The State Coroner’s Office will have the following resources at its disposal: 
 
• The Police Service 
• Pathologists 
• Mortuary technicians 
• Histologists 
• Toxicologists 
• Forensic scientists 
• Social workers 
Temporary Mortuary 
When a body is moved from the place where the fatality occurred, it will 
usually be taken to a temporary mortuary or body holding area where it can 
be held for preliminary forensic examination and identification. 
 
The position of a temporary mortuary should be considered early in the site 
organisation.   If the temporary mortuary is some distance from the incident 
site then a body holding area may be established.   This may be in proximity 
to the Treatment Area.   Both temporary mortuaries and body holding areas 
should be out of sight of the media and the public and offer some protection 
for the bodies. 
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Temporary mortuaries and body holding areas may be established in 
available buildings, in tents or even, during hot weather, refrigerated motor 
vehicles or containers. 
 
All live casualties should be evacuated before transport is utilised for 
movement of the deceased persons. 
 
Summary 
Full responsibility for the dead, including identification and removal, is that of 
the Coroner assisted by the Police Service.  For medical staff the following 
criteria should be applied: 
 
• All bodies must be clearly labelled. 
• Whilst death may be presumed during triage, a medical officer in 
the presence of a police office must confirm and certify death. 
• Dead bodies, or parts of bodies, should not be moved unless they 
are in danger of destruction or prevent access to the living. 
• Bodies will be held in a temporary mortuary or a body holding area. 
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Terminology and Abbreviations 
Disaster management comes with its own terminology.   Many of the terms 
used in incident management are derived from legislation and consequently 
they have specific meanings. Acronyms, acrostics and mnemonics are also 
frequently used in disaster management.   The following are in common use 
across Australia. 
Definitions 
Term Meaning 
Aerodrome/Airport A defined area of land or water (including any buildings, 
installations or equipment), intended to be used either 
wholly or in part for all arrival, departure and surface 
movement of aircraft(17)
Airside The movement area of an aerodrome, adjacent terrain 
and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is 
controlled(17)
Alert Under Victorian Displan, the period when an 
emergency has or may occur and requires increased 
preparedness (163) 
 
Bird Strike A collision between a bird, or a number of birds, and an 
aircraft.  (A bird strike is classified as an incident under 
the Air navigation Act 1920)(17) 
 
Casual Volunteer 
(Volunteer 
Emergency 
Worker) 
Any person who: 
 
a. assists an accredited rescue unit in carrying out 
a rescue operation with the consent of the 
person in charge of the rescue operation; 
b. assists, on their own initiative, in a rescue 
operation in response to an emergency in 
circumstances in which the assistance was 
reasonably given (3) (4) 
 
Casualty A person killed or injured as the result of an incident or 
emergency. (4)
 
(see also patient and victim) 
 
Civil Defence The performance of some or all of the 15 humanitarian 
tasks intended to protect the civilian population from the 
immediate effects of hostilities and also to provide the 
necessary conditions for survival (2)
 
Combat Agency 
(Combating 
Agency) 
(Combat Authority) 
In New South Wales an organisation that has specific 
responsibility for responding to, and controlling, a 
particular type of emergency. (4)(5)   
 
(see also Control Agency) 
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Term Meaning 
Control The overall direction of the activities, agencies or 
individuals concerned(17)  
Control Agency In Victoria, an organisation that has specific 
responsibility for responding to, and controlling, a 
particular type of emergency(163). 
 
(see also Combat Agency) 
Coordination The bringing together of agencies, organisations and 
individual to ensure effective emergency or rescue 
management(17)
Critical Incident Any situation faced by emergency workers that causes 
them to experience unusually strong emotional 
reactions which have the potential to interfere with their 
ability to function either at the scene or later(3).  
 
Dangerous Goods Substances which are specifically listed in the 
Australian Dangerous Goods Code or meet the 
classification criteria of that Code(144).  
(see also hazardous material) 
Disaster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• an occurrence, whether or not due to natural 
causes, that causes loss of life, injury or distress 
or danger to persons, or loss of, or damage to, 
property(6).  
 
• A serious disruption to community life which 
threatens or causes death or injury in that 
community and/or damage to property which is 
beyond the day-to-day capacity of the prescribed 
statutory authorities and which requires special 
resources other than those normally available to 
those authorities(7).  
Disaster Medicine The application of various health disciplines to the 
prevention of, preparedness for, response to and 
recovery from the health problems arising from major 
emergencies or disaster(163). 
DISPLAN Short title for state emergency response plans(3)(126)(163). 
 
Emergency • An event, actual or imminent, which endangers or 
threatens to endanger life, property or the 
environment and which requires a significant and 
coordinated response(9).  
• An unplanned situation arising, through accident 
or error, in which people and/or property are 
exposed to potential danger from the hazards of 
dangerous goods.   Such emergencies will 
normally arise from vehicle accident, spillage or 
leakage of material or from a fire(10) 
• An emergency due to the actual or imminent 
occurrence (such as fire, flood, storm, 
earthquake,  explosion, accident, epidemic or 
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Term Meaning 
warlike action) which: 
a. endangers, or threatens to endanger, the 
safety or health of persons in the State; or 
b. destroys or damages, or threatens to destroy 
or damage, any property in the State 
 
• Being an emergency which requires a significant  
and coordinated response(3).   
 
An actual or imminent event which in any way 
endangers or threatens to endanger the health and 
safety of persons in Victoria or which destroys, severely 
damages or threatens damage to property or the 
environment in Victoria(163). 
 
Emergency – State 
Of 
In New South Wales, a state of emergency declared by 
the Premier under Section 33(1) of the State 
Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989(3).  
Emergency 
Operations Centre 
A centre established at State, District or Local level as a 
centre of communication during an emergency(3).  
Emergency 
Service 
An agency recognisable for the protection and 
preservation of life and property from harm resulting 
from incidents and emergencies(4).   
Essential Services A service consisting of any of the following: 
 
a. production, supply and distribution of any form of 
energy, power or fuel resources; 
b. public transportation of persons or freight; 
c. fire fighting services; 
d. public health services (including hospital or 
medical services; 
e. ambulance services; 
f. production, supply or distribution of 
pharmaceutical products; 
g. provision of garbage, sanitary cleaning or 
sewerage services; 
h. supply or distribution of water; 
i. conduct of a welfare institution; 
j. conduct of a prison; 
k. a service declared to be essential under the Act; 
l. the supply of services and goods necessary for 
providing any service referred to in a-k 
above(119).   
 
Full Emergency The condition declared when an aircraft approaching 
the aerodrome is, or is suspected to be, in such trouble 
that there is a danger of an accident and emergency 
services will be required to attend.  There are three 
levels of full emergency related to the size of the 
aircraft: 
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Term Meaning 
Full Emergency 
(Continued) 
level 1 – up to 18 seats  (light aircraft) 
level 2 – up to 150 seats  (medium aircraft) 
level 3 – more than 150 seats (heavy aircraft) 
 
Functional Area A category of services involved in the preparation for an 
emergency, including: 
 
a. agriculture and animal services; 
b. emergency finance; 
c. emergency supply; 
d. engineering services; 
e. environmental services; 
f. health services; 
g. public information services; 
h. welfare services; 
i. Australian Defence Force (4) 
  
Functional Area 
Coordinator 
The nominated coordinator of a functional area, tasked 
to coordinate the provision of functional area support 
and resources for emergency response and initial 
recovery operations, who, by agreement of participating 
and support organisations within the functional area, 
has the authority to commit the resources of those 
organisations. (126)
(see also Medical Coordinator) 
 
Hazard A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential 
to cause loss.   
 
 
Hazardous 
Material/Substance 
A substance which: 
 
a. is listed on the National Occupational Health and 
Safety Commission List of Designated 
Hazardous Substances; 
b. has been classified by the manufacturer or 
importer in accordance with the National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
Approved Criteria for Classifying Hazardous 
Substances. (147) (169)  
 
(see also dangerous goods)  
 
Health Services Any medical, hospital, ambulance, paramedical, 
community health or environmental health service or 
any other service relating to the maintenance or 
improvement of the health, restoration of health, of 
persons or the prevention of disease in or injury to 
persons(118).  
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Term Meaning 
Incident A localised event, either accidental or deliberate, which 
may result in death or injury, or damage to property, 
which requires a normal response from an agency, or 
agencies. (5)
 
Incident Controller Under the Victorian Emergency Management Act, an 
officer appointed by the control agency responsible for 
response to an emergency(163). 
 
Major Incident • An incident involving, or having the potential to 
involve, a large number of casualties, which can 
be adequately managed by available resources, 
but requiring a significant and coordinated 
response(126).  
 
• An event which requires response by police, 
emergency services and the community which 
may affect a wider area over a longer period of 
time but is not declared a disaster(3).  
 
Mass Casualty 
Incident 
An incident where initially the casualties are more than 
the trained responders can manages and where the 
local health infrastructure is unable to cope(41).   
 
 
Medical 
Emergency 
Any event in which trained personnel are required to 
respond effectively to a medical crisis beyond the 
accepted routine of a health care facility(126).   
 
Medical 
Coordinator 
Under the Victorian Displan, the designated medical 
officer coordinating health and medical response(163). 
 
Mobilisation 
Stages 
Four levels of disaster state: 
a. ALERT – disaster situation possible                     
(an increased level of preparedness); 
b. STAND BY – disaster situation probable    
(available for immediate deployment); 
c. CALL OUT – disaster situation exists               
(there is deployment); 
d. STAND DOWN – disaster situation contained(62). 
 
Negative Triage In a disaster situation, the least injured are evacuated 
before the most seriously injured(4).  
 
(see also reverse triage and triage) 
 
Patient A casualty in receipt of medical care(4)  
 
(see also casualty and victim) 
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Term Meaning 
Rescue The safe removal of persons or domestic animas from 
actual or threatened danger of physical harm(3).  
 
(see also search and rescue) 
 
Reverse Triage see Negative Triage 
 
Search And 
Rescue 
The process of locating and recovering disaster victims 
and the application of first aid and basic medical 
assistance as may be required(27).   
 
Situation Report A brief report published and updated periodically during 
an emergency.  It outlines the details of the emergency, 
needs and responses as known at the time(4).   
 
State Of 
Emergency 
see Emergency – State of 
 
Triage The process by which casualties are sorted, prioritised 
and distributed according to their need for first aid, 
resuscitation, emergency transportation and definitive 
care(32). 
   
(see also negative triage) 
 
VicPol Victoria Police, responsible in that State for overall 
coordination within the Displan (163). 
Victim A person directly affected by a disaster or a person who 
is killed(4).  
 
(see also casualty and patient) 
 
 
It is important to understand the usage of the words defined above.      There 
is also the problem that most people will define the words or phrases in their 
own way.  In Australian colloquial English for example a disaster area is 
defined by The Dinkum Dictionary – A ripper guide to Aussie English(99) as: 
 
1. any untidy, messy place, room, living quarters etc., 
2. a person who is always experiencing trouble, difficulty or misfortune. 
 
The misuse of a term could result in an inappropriate response. 
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Abbreviations, Mnemonics and Acronyms 
Generally, abbreviations and acronyms should be avoided unless the context 
is such that there is no room for confusion.   
 
A sentence such as ‘I will leave about three o’clock and it will take about two 
hours so I should be there at approximately five.’ can be simply and 
unambiguously recorded as ‘ETD 1500 Hours – ETA 1700 hours’.  
 
Questions such as ‘Have you seen the MCV?’ will mean different things to 
different professions.  To a communications officer it would be the mobile 
communications vehicle whilst to a haematologist it would probably be 
interpreted as the mean cell volume. 
 
The most commonly used are: 
 
Abbreviation/Mnemonic/ 
Acronym 
Meaning 
AA Airservices Australia 
ADF Australian Defence Force 
AEC Aerodrome Emergency Committee 
AEM Australian Emergency Management 
AEMI Australian Emergency Management Institute 
AHS Area Health Service 
AIS Abbreviated Injury Scale 
AMC Area medical Coordinator 
AME Aero Medical Evacuation 
AMPLAN Ambulance Service of NSW Major Incident/Disaster 
Plan 
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation 
ARC Australian Red Cross 
ASV Ambulance Service Victoria 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATS Air Traffic Services (AA Air Traffic Controllers) 
ATLS Advanced trauma life support 
ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
BASI Bureau of Air Safety Investigation 
BBF Blood and body fluids 
BOM Bureau of Meteorology 
CAP Message requirements: 
• Concise 
• Appropriate 
• Precise 
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CBR Chemical, Biological and Radiological 
CCU Coronary Care Unit 
ChMC Chief medical Coordinator 
CHO Chief Health Officer 
CISD Critical incident stress debriefing 
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Abbreviation/Mnemonic/ 
Acronym 
Meaning 
COSOPs Critical Operations Standard Operating Procedures 
CP Command Post 
CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation  
CREST Citizens Radio Emergency Service Teams 
CRT Capillary refill time 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation 
DACC Defence Assistance to the Civil Community 
DCC Disaster Control Centre 
DCS Department of Community Services 
DEMC District Emergency Management Committee 
DEMO District Emergency Management Officer 
DEOC District Emergency Operations Centre 
DEOCON District Emergency Operations Controller 
DGEMA Director General, Emergency Management Australia 
DHS Department of Human Services (Victorian health 
department) 
DISPLAN Disaster Plan 
DOH Department of Health 
DRABC St John Ambulance action plan for first aid 
management: 
• Danger 
• Response 
• Airway 
• Breathing 
• Circulation 
DVI Disaster Victim Identification 
DVR Disaster Victim Registration 
ED Emergency Department 
EMA Emergency Management Australia 
EOC Emergency Operations Centre 
EPA Environment Protection Authority 
ER Coordinator Emergency Response Coordinator 
ERCC Emergency Response Control Centre 
ESLO Emergency Services Liaison Officer 
ESO Emergency Services Organisation 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETD Estimated Time of Departure 
ETHANE 
(See also 
METHANE) 
Reporting format: 
• Exact location 
• Type of incident 
• Hazards present 
• Access 
• Number of casualties 
• Emergency services required/present 
EMST Early Management to Severe Trauma 
FAST Fly-away surgical teams 
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Abbreviation/Mnemonic/ Meaning 
Acronym 
FCP Forward Command Post 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GR Grid Reference 
GRN Government Radio Net 
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials  
HDU High Dependency Unit 
HF High Frequency 
HSDCC Health Services Disaster Control Centre  
HSFAC Health Services Functional Area Coordinator 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICC Incident Control Centre 
ICC Information Coordination Centre (Victoria DHS) 
ICU Intensive Care Unit 
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
LEMC Local Emergency Management Committee 
LEMO Local Emergency Management Officer 
LEOC Local Emergency Operations Centre 
LEOCON Local Emergency Operations Controller 
LO Liaison Officer  
MAS Metropolitan Ambulance Service (Victoria). 
MCI Mass Casualty Incident 
MERO Municipal Emergency Resources Officer 
METHANE 
(See also ETHANE) 
Reporting format: 
 
• Major Incident declared 
• Exact location 
• Type of incident 
• Hazards present 
• Access 
• Number of casualties 
• Emergency services required/present 
MIMMS Major Incident Medical Management and Support 
course 
MVA Motor Vehicle Accident 
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
(See also CBR) 
NDRA National Disaster Relief Arrangements 
NEMC National Emergency Management Committee 
NEMCC National Emergency Management Coordination 
Centre (EMA) 
NH&MRC National Health and Medical Research Council 
NSW New South Wales 
NSW DISPLAN NSW State Disaster Plan 
NSW HEALTHPLAN New South Wales Health Service Functional Area 
Supporting Plan 
OMDC Office of the Medical Displan Coordinator, Victoria 
OSGADF Office of the Surgeon General of the Australian 
Defence Force 
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Abbreviation/Mnemonic/ Meaning 
Acronym 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
PPRR The Comprehensive Approach: 
• Prevention 
• Preparedness 
• Response 
• Recovery 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RFDS Royal Flying Doctor Service of Australia 
RFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (AA or ADF) 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 
SEMC State Emergency Management Committee 
SEOC State Emergency Operations Centre 
SEOCON State Emergency Operations Controller 
SERC State Emergency Response Coordination Centre 
SERM NSW State Emergency Rescue Management Act   
SES State Emergency Service 
SEWS Standard Emergency Warning Signal 
SITREP Situation Report 
SJAA St John Ambulance Australia 
SMC Site Medical Coordinator 
SMEAC (T) Format for writing orders: 
• (Topography) 
• Situation 
• Mission 
• Execution 
• Administration and logistics 
• Command and signals 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UN United Nations 
USAR Urban Search And Rescue 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VRA Volunteer Rescue Association 
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Disaster Kits 
The following is a typical disaster kit arrangement.  The equipment here is 
that used in New South Wales and was developed and tested during the 
2000 Sydney Olympic Games. 
 
The kits are designed to be used in an all hazards approach and are also put 
together so as to be readily carried by the team.   The object is to provide a 
kit that is versatile and standardised throughout the system. 
Victorian Supplementary Kits 
Other States have disaster kits that vary from the above.  Victoria uses a 
system comprising: 
 
• One box. 
• Two rucksacks  
• A Laerdal suction unit 
 
The Victorian system also uses a standardised layout for the equipment.  
One difference between the Victorian and New South Wales kits in the 
second ruck-sack of the Victorian kit.   This pack contains equipment 
required for specific disasters.  The Displan gives as examples(163): 
 
Burns Equipment: 
 
Roehampton (brenniston) burns dressings: 
• large        4 
• medium       4 
• small        4 
 
Bushfire Eye Equipment: 
 
• Amethocaine eye drops (minims)    10 
• cotton buds     100 
• needles 21 g         6 
• fluorescent strips      10 
• eye pads       10 
 
Radiation  
 
• thick gloves         6 
• blue incontinence sheets     20 
• plastic aprons       10 
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NSW Disaster Response Packs 
Critical Care Pack 
Contents List, Front Pockets 
 
Location Item Qty 
Front Pocket, Large   
 Tape, Roll (Elastoplast, brown or Transpore on linen tie) 1 
 Sharps container, small 1 
 V-Vac or Res-Q-Vac suction device 1 
 Pressure bag 1 
   
Syringe, 20 ml 2 1 xYellow Pouch and 1 x Orange 
Pouch each containing Syringe, 10 ml 4 
 Syringe, 5 ml 4 
 Syringe, 2 ml 4 
 Needle, 23 gauge 4 
 Needle, 19 gauge 4 
 Needle, blunt, 19 gauge 1 
Front Pocket, Small   
 Stethoscope 1 
 Aneroid sphygmomanometer with cuff 1 
 Pocket torch, disposable 1 
 Thermal blanket 1 
 Trauma shears 1 
Side Pocket, Left   
 Chest drain kit 1 
 Trocar Thoracic Catheter, 32 Fr 2 
 Trocar Thoracic Catheter, 28 Fr 1 
 Portex emergency chest drain disposable kit 2 
 Cutiplast dressing 6 
Side Pocket, Right   
Dressing pack 1 2 x chest drain disposables kits, 
each containing Sterile gloves, size 6 ½  1 
 Sterile gloves, size 7 1 
 Sterile gloves, size 8 1 
   
1 x Lunch bag containing Scalpel, disposable 1 
 Chlorhexidine, 25ml 1 
 Betadine, 30ml 1 
 Sutures, Mersilene 1 
 Syringe, 10 ml 1 
 Needle, 18 gauge, blunt 1 
 Needle, 23 gauge, sharp 1 
 Lignocaine 1%, 5 ml 2 
Top Pocket   
1 x Oxygen Kit containing Oxygen mask, adult with reservoir 1 
 Y Suction catheter, 10 Fr 2 
 Y Suction catheter, 14 Fr 2 
 Yankauer sucker 2 
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Critical Care Pack 
Contents List, Main Pack 
 
Location Item Qty
Orange (Circulation) Section 
3 x infusion bundles each 
containing
Cannula, 16 gauge*  1
 Cannula, 18 gauge* 1
 Cannula, 20 gauge* 1
 *above items packed in lunch bag  
 Needle-free valve 3
 Alcowipes 20
 Band-aids, packet 1
 Opsite dressings, pack 1
 Pump, giving set 1
 Shaver, disposable 1
 Tourniquet, with handle 1
Hartmann’s fluid,  1000 ml* 1* 2 x bundles contain Hartmann’s 
* 1 x bundle contains Gelofusine 
* 1 x Gelofusine spare Gelofusine, 500 ml* 2
Blue and Green Airway Pocket 
 Oxygen tubing 1
 Nasopharyngeal airway, 6.5 mm 1
 Nasopharyngeal airway, 7  mm 1
 Oropharyngeal (Guedel) airway, size 3 1
 Oropharyngeal (Guedel) airway, size 4 1
 Oropharyngeal (Guedel) airway, size 5 1
 Mask, face, small adult 2
 Mask, face, large adult 2
 HME / filters 4
Blue and Yellow Airway Pocket 
 Laerdal bag, adult, with reservoir bag 1
Intubation Roll 
 White tape, pre-cut 3
 Lube sachet 1
 Forceps, mosquito 1
 Forceps, Magill 1
 Cuff syringe, 10 ml 1
 Scalpel, disposable, with blade cover 1
 Laryngoscope handle 1
* 1 x blade with spare bulb Laryngoscope blade, Macintosh size 3* 2
 Laryngoscope blade, Macintosh size 4* 2
 Bougie, adult 1
 Tube, ET, cuffed, 6 mm 1
 Tube, ET, cuffed, 7 mm 1
 Tube, ET, cuffed, 8 mm 1
 Tube, ET, cuffed, 9 mm 1
Main Pack 
Unpacked, flattened and placed 
along sides 
Mouldable splints 2
 Rigid elbow-splint 1
 Cervical collar, adult, adjustable 2
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Critical Care Pack 
Contents List, Main Pack 
 
Location/Notes Item Qty 
Clear Fronted Pocket, Top  
Naso-gastric (NG) tube, 14 gauge 2 
Naso-gastric (NG) drainage bag 2 
 
Lube sachet 2 
Clear Fronted Pocket, Lower  
Mask, nebulising 1 
Tubing, oxygen 1 
Salbutamol, nebules, 5 mg/2. ml 5 
Salbutamol, puffer 1 
Atrovent, nebules, 500 mcg 1 
Nebulising equipment 
beclomethasone puffer, 250 mcg/dose 1 
Hidden Pocket  (Behind clear fronted pockets)  
 Catheter sets, rapid infusion exchange, 8.5 Fr 1 
Chest drain insertion extras Disposable drape, sterile, set of two 2 
   
Needle holder 1 
Scissors, suture 1 
Forceps, toothed 1 
Sterile instruments 
Forceps, artery (Harrison-Cripps) 2 
Yellow Drug Box 
 (Box has two sides, one of which is sealable) 
 
Location Item Qty 
Sealable Side  
 Sodium bicarbonate, 8.4%, 50 ml 1 
 Calcium chloride, 1 g/10 ml 2 
 Adrenaline, 1:1000, 1 ml ampule 5 
 Glyceryl trinitrate tab (Arginine) 100 x 600 mcg bottle 1 
 Atropine sulphate, 1200 mcg/ml 3 
 Lignocaine, 100 mg/5 ml 2 
 Dextrose, 50 ml 1 
Sealed Pouch  
 Ketamine, 100 mg/ml in 2 ml 3 
 Midazolam, 5 mg/ml 5 
Non-Sealable Side  
 Frusemide, 20 mg/2 ml 3 
 Cogentin, 2 mg/ml 1 
 Phenytoin, sodium, 250 mg/5 ml 5 
 Hydrocortisone, 100 mg/2 ml 2 
 Promethazine, 50 mg vial 4 
 Suxamethonium, 50 mg/ml in 2 ml 4 
 Pancuronium, 4 mg/ml 4 
 Vecuronium, 4 mg vial 5 
 Naloxone, 0.4 mg/1 ml 2 
 Metaclopromide, 10 mg/2 ml 3 
Dividing panel (Sealable Side)  
 Asprin, chewable, 300 mg 12 
 Paracetamol, tab, 500 mg 12 
 Water for injection, 10 ml 10 
 Sodium chloride, 0.9%/10 ml 10 
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Resupply Pack - Red 
Contents List, Red Resupply Bag 
 
Location Item Qty
Front Pocket (Against Main Pack) 
 Sharps container, medium 1
 Toilet paper, roll 1
Front Pocket (In Open Pouch) 
 Sanitary pads, packets 2
 Tampons, small packet 2
 Underpants, female, size 10-12 1
 Underpants, female, size 12-14 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Big Pouch) 
 Roll-On deodorant, (unscented) 1
 Sunscreen, roll-on 1
 Sorbolene cream 1
 Emery boards, small packet 1
 Hair clips, small packet 1
 Hair bands, small packet 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Small Pouch) 
 Jelly beans, small packet 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Zippered Compartment) 
 Aprons, disposable 6
Domestos, 500 ml 1
Water, 500ml 1
Instrument cleaning kit  
‘ChuQty’ wipes, packet 1
Side Pouches, left 
 Plastic box, with lid 1
 Nail scrubbing brush 1
Outer Lid Pocket 
 Spare sucker disposables for V-Vac apparatus 
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Contents List 
Red Resupply Bag 
 
Location Item Qty 
Main Pack (Inside Lid Pocket)  
 Eye Stream 4 
Main Pack (Main Section)  
 Normal Saline, 1 litre 2 
 Hartmann’s, 1 litre 1 
 Mannitol, 20%, 500 ml 2 
 Visishields 3 
 Paper, waterproof, pad 1 
 Clipboard with pen 1 
Amputation Pack (Bag A) Contained in Main Section  
Dressing set, basic 1 
Combine, 20 cm 2 
Bandage, 7.5 2 
Gloves, surgical, size 6½  2 
Gloves, surgical, size 7  2 
Gloves, surgical, size 8  2 
Sponge, surgical, sterile 5 
Plastic bag marked  
Amputation Pack A, containing 
Bandage, Esmarch 1 
  
Povidine-iodine, 30 ml 3 
Chlorhexidine, 25 ml 3 
Mannitol, 20%, 500 ml 2 
Lunch bag containing antiseptic 
solutions 
Visishields 3 
  
Marcaine, 0.5%, 20 ml 2 
Syringe, 20 ml 2 
Needle, 18 gauge, blunt 2 
Lunch bag containing local 
anaesthetic solutions 
Needle, 23 gauge 2 
Amputation Pack (Bag B) Contained in Main Section  
 Drapes, set of two sterile, disposable 3 
Scalpel, disposable, size 10 2 Lunch bag containing  
Scalpel, disposable, size 15 2 
  
Ties, Vicryl, size 0 2 
Ties, Vicryl, size 2/0 1 
Sutures, Vicryl, 3/0 taper needle 2 
Sutures, Vicryl, 0 taper needle 2 
Sutures, nylon, 3/0, cutting needle 1 
Sutures, nylon, 2/0,  big cutting needle 2 
Lunch bag containing  
Sutures, Mersilene 1, on cutting needle 1 
  
Forceps, dissecting, toothed 1 
Forceps, dissecting, plain 1 
Scissors, suture 1 
Needle holder 1 
Forceps, artery, Harrison Cripps 4 
Forceps, artery, Spencer Wells 5 
Scissors, strong curves, dissecting 1 
Gigli saw handle, set of 2 1 
Gigli saw blade 2 
Sterile instruments 
Retractor, Langenbeck, medium 2 
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Resupply Pack - Blue 
Contents List, Blue Resupply Bag 
 
Location Item Qty
Front Pocket (Against Main Pack) 
 Sharps container, medium 1
 Toilet paper, roll 1
 Sanitary pads, packets 2
 Tampons, small packet 1
 Underpants, female, size 10-12 1
 Underpants, female, size 12-14 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Big Pouch) 
 Roll-On deodorant, (unscented) 1
 Sunscreen, roll-on 1
 Sorbolene cream 1
 Emery boards, small packet 1
 Hair clips, small packet 1
 Hair bands, small packet 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Small Pouch) 
 Jelly beans, small packet 1
Front Pocket, Free Wall of Pocket (In Zippered Compartment) 
 Aprons, disposable 6
Side Pocket, Right 
 Bags, clear plastic 6
 Bags, contaminated waste 3
Side Pocket, Left 
Paediatric breathing equipment Paediatric Laerdal bag 1
 Face mask, small 1
 Face mask, medium 1
 Face mask, large 1
 Airway, Guedels, size 0 1
 Airway, Guedels, size 1 1
 Airway, Guedels, size 2 1
 Oxygen tubing 1
Outer Lid Pocket 
Cannula, 22 gauge 5
Cannula, 24 gauge 5
Tap, three way 2
Needle,  intraosseous 2
Giving set, with burette 1
Lunch bag containing 
Paediatric circulation equipment 
 
Splint, elbow 1
Clear Outer Pocket 
 Pouches for DD’s for nurses 4
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Contents List 
Blue Resupply Bag 
 
Location Item Qty 
Main Pack (Inside Lid Pocket)  
Paediatric airway equipment Laryngoscope blade, Miller 1 1 
 Paediatric White Bougie 1 
 Catheters, suction, Y, size 6 2 
 Catheters, suction, Y, size 8 2 
 Ryles tube, size 8 1 
 Nebuliser mask, paediatric 1 
 Face mask, paediatric 1 
 Forceps, Magills, paediatric 1 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 3.0 1 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 3.5 2 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 4.0 2 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 4.5 1 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 5.0 1 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 5.5 1 
 ETT, uncuffed, size 6.0 1 
Main Pack (Main Section)  
 Normal Saline, 1 litre 2 
 Hartmann’s, 1 litre 3 
 N/4 + 3.75% dextrose, 500ml 2 
 Cervical collar, size 1 1 
 Cervical collar, size 2 1 
Main Pack (Main Section), Cut-Down Pack  
Plastic resealable bag containing Dressing set, basic 1 
 Dressing, Cutiplast 2 
 Gloves, surgical, size 6½  1 
 Gloves, surgical, size 7  1 
 Gloves, surgical, size 8  1 
 Drapes, sterile, disposable, packets of 2 2 
 Forceps, artery, mosquito, curved 1 
 Forceps, artery, mosquito, straight 1 
 Forceps, artery, Spencer Wells, curved 1 
 Forceps, dissecting, toothed 1 
 Forceps, dissecting, plain 1 
 Scissors, suture 1 
 Needle holder 1 
   
Lunch bag containing Povidine-iodine, 30 ml 2 
 Chlorhexidine, 25 ml 2 
   
Lunch bag containing Lignocaine, 1%, 5 ml 4 
 Syringe, 10 ml 2 
 Needle, 18 gauge, blunt 2 
 Needle, 23 gauge 2 
   
Lunch bag containing Scalpel, disposable, size 10 1 
 Scalpel, disposable, size 15 1 
 Syringe, 10 ml 2 
 Cannula, intravenous (IV), size 16 2 
 Needle, cannula cap 2 
 Sutures, Vicryl, 3/0, taper needle 2 
 Sutures, Vicryl, 2/0, ties 1 
 Sutures, Nylon 3/0, cutting needle 1 
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Basic Support And Dressing Pack 
Contents List, Basic Support And Dressing Pack 
 
Location Item Qty
Large Zipper Compartment 
 Dressings, 20 cm x 20 cm 4
 Dressings, multi-trauma, 75 cm x 25 cm 1
 Swabs, gauze, 7.5 cm x 7.5 cm 20
 Vas Gauze, 10 cm x 10 cm 10
Formed Pockets to Side of Large Zipper Compartment 
 Triage tags, set of 4 5
 Siloam (illumination) sticks 3
 Pens 3
 Torch, pocket, disposable 2
 Thermometer, digital, with disposable covers 1
Main Compartment 
 Sphygmomanometer 1
 Alcohol wipes, packet 1
 Trauma Shears 1
 Stethoscope 1
Main Compartment, Pouches, Clear Fronted 
One packet per section Gloves, disposable, small, packet 1
 Gloves, disposable, medium, packet 1
 Gloves, disposable, large, packet 1
Small Zipper Pocket 
 Dressing, shell, No.15 2
 Dressing, shell, No.13 2
 Bandage, 15 cm 2
 Bandage, 10 cm 2
 Bandage, 7.5 cm 2
 Bandage, 5 cm 2
Clear Front Pouches (near small zipper pocket) 
 Soap, cake in glove 1
 Safety pins, packet 1
 Marker, thick, permanent  1
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Personal Equipment Pack 
Contents List, Personal (Comfort) Pack 
 
This bag is to carry all the needs for a single team member.  There is no 
standard pack but the piece of equipment chosen should have sealable 
compartments, be large enough to hold the equipment listed below and to 
have sufficient additional space to hold the safety helmet (hard hat).   Team 
members should be encouraged to have prepared a bag containing spare 
underwear, personal medications and any other personal necessities that 
can be placed in the pack as needed.   Bags should be varied to allow quick 
identification.  
 
Location Item Qty 
Outside Pocket  
 Toiletries,  (incl toothbrush, toothpaste, shaving 
equipment, soap, comb) 
 
 Face washer, disposable 1 
 Towel 1 
 Lip cream 1 
 Insect repellent, sachet pack 1 
 Pen 1 
 Whistle, with lanyard 1 
 Earplugs, disposable, packet of 10 1 
 Tissues, packet of 30 1 
Main Section  
 Water, 600 ml 1 
 Socks 1 
 Dust mask 2 
 Gloves, leather, gardening, pair 1 
 Beanie 1 
 Helmet, safety (hard-hat) 1 
Note 1 Rain gear, set 1 
Note 2 Torch 1 
Note 2 Batteries for torch, set 2 
 Kneepads, set 1 
 
 
Note 1 Rain equipment for forward-capable members meets Australian 
standards in respect to reflective taping and is fully waterproof. 
 
Other team members require shower-proof equipment only. 
 
Note 2 There are four types of torch, provided depending on roll: 
 
• Forward-capable team members are provided with Petzel 
headlights for fitting to safety helmet. 
• Other medical officers have lamps that can be fitted to 
their safety helmet. 
• Commanders are provided with torches with 2 x D cell 
batteries. 
• All other team members are provided with small pocket-
torches with 2 x AA batteries.  
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Dangerous Drugs 
In accordance with State HEALTHPLAN, some dangerous drugs (Schedule 
8) are carried by a nursing officer on their person.  All such S8 drugs must be 
accounted for. 
 
Included are: 
 
• Pethidine   100mg/2ml  5 
• Morphine sulphate 10mg/ml 1ml  5  
 
These items are carried on the nurse’s person.  These are best packed in a 
small draw-string bag or similar container to ensure their protection and 
separation. 
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